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The purpose  of  this study  is   to examine  all available public 
and private   correspondence of Jan Christian Smuts  in order  to assess 
his   impact upon international affairs.    This  examination shows  that 
Smuts wielded  great   influence over men and  events  in Great  Britain 
and   in  the Commonwealth and maintained  this position throughout his 
long career   in public affairs. 
Smuts   seemed   to  fit naturally into the British  context,   and was 
increasingly given positions of  trust  and  authority.     He also achieved 
a personal harmony,   apart   from political views  and policies,   that  pene- 
trated  to  the  great   leaders of the world,  as well as  to humbler  friends. 
Smuts   saw safety for South Africa in  the wholeness of the  British 
Empire and realized   that South Africa retained   these privileges because 
the  Empire remained an elastic and  expanding institution,   offering 
advantages   In proportion as  cooperation and understanding prevailed. 
He viewed   the  British   Empire,   the League of Nations,  and  later  the 
United Nations   as vehicles  through which  international  cooperation 
could  be realized.     It was,   as Smuts  saw it,  a hope  for  the  future. 
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CHAPTER   I 
THE  EMERGENCE OF   SMUTS   INTO   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
When Jan Christian Smuts was born on May 24,   1870,   on a farm one 
hundred miles from Cape Town,   the  Cape of Good Hope and  Natal were 
British  colonies  and  the Orange Free State and  the Transvaal were Dutch 
republics.     During  the nineteenth  century  in  the Eastern Province of 
the Cape,  Dutch and British settlers were  still periodically  engaged   in 
frontier wars against   the Bantu tribes whose penetration  into South 
Africa   from the north  coincided with the development  of the white settle- 
ments  in the extreme  south. 
In  1836 the Great Migration began,   mainly of dissatisfied Dutch 
farmers,   or Boers,   from the Eastern Province who subsequently,   in  the 
middle of the  century,   founded  the Transvaal and the Free  State Republics. 
The relationships between the   two republics developed a strange pattern 
of   friendships and  antagonisms.     In  1806  the British had annexed the 
Cape Province area and   in 1820 British  settlers  arrived.     Opposition  to 
British rule  subsequently  led many of  the Boers   to migrate  north.    They 
reached Natal   in 1837,   and after defeating the Zulus   founded   the Republic 
of Natal  In 1838.     In  1843  the  British annexed Natal, which became a 
crown colony in 1856.     The Orange Free State which the Boers  settled 
between 1835 and 1848 became a republic  in  1854.    Meanwhile,   the Boers 
settled the Transvaal   in   1837.     The same year Andreus W. Pretorius 
formed it   into a strong state.     The new state was  recognized  by the 
British  in  1852 and was named   the South African Republic and Paul Kruger 
emerged as  the state's chief   leader.     Great  Britain annexed   the Trans- 
vaal   in  1877 but   restored   its   independence  in  1881.     Jan Smuts was  ten 
years old when the   first Anglo-Boer war broke out,   and  the defeat of 
the British  in the   Battle of Majuba on February 27,   1881  restored 
republican  independence to  the Transvaal  Boers.     Paul Kruger,  whom 
Smuts was   to serve   later as  State Attorney,   served as President of  the 
Republic   from May  9,   1883 until April   30,   1888. 
According to   two of Smuts's biographers,  Rene Kraus and F.   S. 
Crafford,   Smuts  seems  to have been a shy and   introspective  student 
with no great desire   for athletics and  not as useful on the  farm as 
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practical  South African farmers   expect   their  sons  to be.       His  parents, 
descendants  of original Dutch  settlers   of the  Cape,   hoped  he would 
enter  the  Dutch Reformed ministry; his  own  inclination proved   to be 
towards   law and philosophy,  and   later politics.     From Victoria 
College at  Stellenbosch, Cape Province he won an  Ebdin Scholarship 
for overseas  study which took him to Cambridge,   England. 
In  September,   1891 he departed  for  England  to read   law at 
Christ's College,  Cambridge where  he remained until  the  summer  of 
1894.     The best guide   to the growth of Smuts's  mind   in his   Cambridge 
years   is  a collection  of essays which he wrote during his  long vacations. 
The germ of his philosophical  thought appears   in an  essay entitled On 
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ESS Applicat ion  of  Some  Physical   Concepts   to   Biological  Phenomena. 
His awakened  political   consciousness led him to consider  the bearing 
of language  on the problems of his   country   in The Conditions  of Future 
South African Literature which he wrote in July     1892.     In  this essay 
he maintains   that unity   of the  European peoples   in Southern Africa must 
come before  South Africa can attain  greatness. 
What  has been  the real condition of  the greatness of  England,   the 
condition which has rendered her world empire and her world-com- 
merce possible?   .   .   .    That   indispensable  condition  is  the  complete 
equilibrium which has existed for  centuries between the various 
strata of English  society.   .   .   .    With  this national  equilibrium 
the other  essential   factor  of self-government   through all   the  stages 
of  the  social  order   co-operated   to educate Englishmen  to that great 
ruling capacity which  they   have always   subsequently displayed. 
...     It  is   clear   that  if   the past  history of South Africa has 
effected  this  amalgamation  of the  fundamental  factors  of its white 
population and   thus   laid   the basis  for all  enduring work on the 
part  of coming generations,   it need not be  looked upon as barren 
and   inglorious.■* 
He  returned   to South Africa in September     1896 and  to  the  Cape 
a month  later.     On January 20,   1897 he  left   to start his  law practice 
in Johannesburg where he remained  from January  1897 until June  1898. 
Little has  been recorded   about   this phase  of his  life.    He did,  how- 
ever,  do   some  teaching  in  law and wrote a pamphlet   called The British 
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Position   in  South Africa.       No  evidence of   its publication has  been 
found.     It   is   significant   that   in this pamphlet Smuts  argues   for  an 
independent,   unified  South Africa that would  remain aligned with Great 
Britain  in matters  of  trade  and   foreign policy.     This   concept remained 
with him throughout his   life.     In The British Position  in South Africa 
Smuts states: 
The Transvaal  thus having the   key  to the political and  commercial 
situation,   a liberal  internal   and external South African policy 
on its  part will  react profoundly on  colonial South Africa and 
have a disastrous   effect on the chances  of a rampant  imperialism. 
The Dutch  and even the  English   in the Colonies will   come  to look 
more  and  more  to  the Transvaal   for material help and  support. 
The Union Jack--which has been   in South Africa,   not  as a  symbol 
of peace and  goodwill,   but of blood,   force and  aggression—will 
be more  and more relegated to   that  limbo  of innocuous   fads   in 
which   'imperial   federation'  and  similar  entities  and nonentities 
flourish.^ 
Smuts made his   first  appearance on a political platform at  a 
meeting of  the  De Beers Consolidated Political  and Debating Association 
in Kimberly.     A verbatim report  of his  speech  appeared  in  the Diamond 
Fields Advertiser on October  30,   1895.     It was   a reply to a paper 
written by Oliver Schreiner  and read  at Kimbcrley by S. C.   Cronwright- 
Screiner on August  20,   1895,   in which  Rhodes's   Native  policy was 
attacked and he was accused   of using the Afrikander  Bond  in   the capi- 
talist   interest   and deceiving  it.    On October   29,  1895  Smuts   publicly 
defended  Rhodes.     In  this public defense of Cecil Rhodes Smuts relates 
that  the great  overriding concern  for South Africa  is   to consolidate 
the white race  and build  an  ordered  civilization based   on European 
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models as a bastion against   the black race. 
It   seems   to me  that   in the politics   of our   country,   and   indeed  of 
South Africa,   there are   two problems vitally affecting our present, 
and  our  future, which dominate and  dwarf  into comparative   insignif- 
icance every  other political problem and   issue.     These two problems 
are   the consolidation of   the white race,  and   the relation  of the 
white  to the   coloured   community   in South Africa .   .   . 
The question   thus   is raised:    How are we  to  be consolidated and 
fused   into a  great homogeneous white   race?   .   .   . We want   sentiment. 
We want   those   invisible  links of union which are harder than stone 
and  tougher  than the  toughest metal.     In one word we want  a great 
South African  nationality,   and  pervading national sentiment. 
Meanwhile,   in the Transvaal Republic events were  beginning to 
develop   for the  second Anglo-Boer War.     Johannesburg,   site of  the 
world's  greatest  goldfield,   attracted outsiders   from all  parts  of the 
world  and   their presence  created vexing problems   for President  Paul 
Kruger's  government.    The Boers   called these  foreigners   "Uitlanders" 
and   looked with disfavor on  their mode of   life and   their   insistence on 
franchise  and other rights.     The republic was not  ready to assimilate 
them and   the Boers   had no desire   to share   their political power with 
others.     On the British side, both Sir Alfred Milner,  the  High Commis- 
sioner   for   South  Africa,   and  Joseph  Chamberlain,   the  Colonial  Secretary 
in London,   saw eye  to eye with Cecil Rhodes;  and these men,  by foster- 
ing and airing the  "grievances" of  the British Uitlanders   in the Trans- 
vaal—chiefly workers  in the gold mines—and demanding their  enfranchise- 
ment by the Boer  government,   aroused popular  sympathy in  Britain,   as 
well as  in Cape  Colony,   for a militantly aggressive policy toward  the 
Boer republic.     On  the Boer side,   the abortive Jameson raid on December 
29,   1895 and  the  leniency which  the British  courts had   shown  created a 
bitterness and an   intransigeance which found expression  in  the re-election 
in   1898 of  the anti-Uitlander Paul Kruger to  the presidency of the 
Transvaal   for another  term of  five years,  and   in the military alliance 
which he concluded with the Orange Free State.    While British-Boer nego- 
tiations dragged  on about  enfranchising the Ui tlanders,   both  sides pre- 
pared  for war.     The  British   thought  they could quickly overpower the 
Boers. 
For Smuts   the Jameson Raid was  a blow to his  ideal  of British 
and   Boer cooperation   in building a greater South Africa.     He became 
angry and disillusioned with  Rhodes and his  sympathies  swung over  to 
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the   two Dutch republics.    Ons Land,  an  influential newspaper,  was  the 
mouthpiece of the Afrikander Bond  and was established   in Cape Town  in 
1892.     The editor was  Smutts's   friend,   Francois  S. Malan.     The paper 
was   combined with Het  Zuid-Afrikaan which was  established   in  1830 and 
published until April   1932. 
Referring to the Jameson raid Smuts stated   in the  leading article 
in Ons  Land 
Our history began once more  to be written in blood.     The monster of 
jingoism again  showed  its repulsive  face in the  land.     The affairs 
of  South Africa were again regulated  from Downing Street.     Deeply 
humiliated,  Afrikanderdom sat   indeed   in dust and ashes.y 
In a leading article   in the South African Telegraph on July  18, 
Smuts expressed in strong language his disillusionment with all  that 
Rhodes had done  in South Africa. 
He  (Rhodes)   alone,   of all  the remarkable men of his  generation, 
could have  put  the  capestone  to the rounded arch of South African 
unity.   ...  He wanted   indeed  a United   South Africa--but  one which 
would be  the work of Cecil Rhodes;   and which would be the pedestal 
for  his  colossal personality.     And he  spurned  the ethical   code of 
humanity.     He spurned  the long laborious  road,   and  took that moral 
short-cut which  led   the   greatest genius   of the modern world to St. 
Helena at   the prime of his  life.1" 
On June  8,   1898 Smuts was  appointed  State Attorney.    The interest- 
ing circumstances around his  appointment are  revealed  in  several con- 
fidential   telegrams   that are published   in Selections  from the Smuts 
Papers. The  events that   led  to the appointment by President  Kruger 
of Smuts  as Transvaal State Attorney began  in  January 1897.     On Jan- 
uary 31,   1897 a  constitutional struggle arose  over Sir J.   G.   Kotze's 
decision   in the   case of Brown vs. Leyds.    The plaintiff,   Brown,   claimed 
large mining rights against   the Government  of  the South African Republic. 
The case  turned on the question of whether a resolution  (besluit)   of 
12 the Volksraad       could alter existing  law.     Chief Justice Kotze ruled 
that  it   could not,   since  such action was  contrary to the provisions of 
the Constitution   (Grondwet).     This  challenge   to the  supremacy of  the 
Volksraad was met   by the  adoption,  by besluit,   of Law No.   I  of  1897 which 
denied   the  right  of  the   court   to   interpret  the   Constitution,  and autho- 
rized  the President   to dismiss   judges who claimed  it.     Kotze persisted 
in his  opinion and was dismissed by Kruger.     Smuts upheld Kruger   in a 
legal brief  the  sum of which  showed  that  the president was  not  necessarily 
wrong.     The document met with hostility from the   legal profession  in 
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South Africa;   but   it   impressed   the  president. 
Smuts was a close  spectator  of the unfolding events which reached 
their climax   in the  outbreak of the second Anglo-Boer War on October 11, 
1898.    He accompanied  Kruger   to the abortive conference with  the British 
High Commissioner, Lord Alfred Milner,   at  Bloemfontein,   the   capital of 
14 
the Orange Free State. The  Bloemfontein Conference, held   from May 31 
until June  5,   1899 was  almost  entirely an encounter between Kruger and 
Milner.     Smuts was present but   took no part   in the discussions.     As 
legal adviser   to President Kruger he probably drew up the memorandum 
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submitted  by  Kruger. 
In a  telegram composed  by Smuts  on October  5,   1899,   just   six 
days prior   to   the outbreak of war,   Smuts'  bitterness  appears   to have 
reached  its  peak.    This  reply  to his  former Middle Temple  tutor,   John 
H.   Roskill,  t.-ho had pleaded   that  he   (Smuts)   attempt   to get  Kruger to 
continue negotiations with   the  British,   leaves  the  impression  that 
Smuts prepared  himself   for a  total break  from Great  Britain.     Smuts's 
cable states: 
.   .   . All  previous proposals have been formally withdrawn and no 
longer open  for acceptance.    What more solemn guarantee  indepen- 
dence  than London Convention and every other have been  torn  up. 
Lost all   faith in British statesmanship which is  bent on either 
losing South Africa or making it white man's grave." 
That   sixteen years later  Smuts was  appointed Lieutenant-General   in the 
British army attests to  the  great  respect   that  he earned both as   an 
able   soldier and   as a statesman. 
By the  end  of the   first week in October   1899,   negotiations  be- 
tween Boers and  British reached an impasse.     Kruger had  offered,   with 
some   restrictions,  to enfranchise Uitlanders after five years of resi- 
dence   in the Transvaal.     Joseph  Chamberlain had demanded   the  five-year 
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franchise without restrictions.     The  only way out was war,  and  on Octo- 
ber  11   it was precipitated  by a Transvaal ultimatum which barely headed 
off a similar ultimatum from Britain.     The Orange Free  State immediately 
joined   the Transvaal. 
The Selections   from the Smuts Papers   contains a remarkable  memo- 
randum by Smuts on military and diplomatic strategy in   the war he 
already believed to be  imminent. This memorandum written on September 
4,   1899   for  the Executive Council  of  the South African Republic offers 
suggestions   for prosecution of war against Great  Britain.     His memoran- 
dum lists  two  essential   conditions which must  occur before  the Boer 
Republics  can   secure  victory over Great Britain.     These  are: 
1. The   Republics must  get   the better  of the English  troops 
from the  start ;  and 
2. The   Republics  must,   as   far  as  possible,   take   the  necessary 
steps   in advance to maintain  themselves during a  long and exhausting 
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struggle. 
This memorandum is perhaps   the most revealing gauge of Smuts's attitude 
toward Great Britain  at  the   time of the Boer War.     Smuts   lists the 
following proposals,   all  backed up with detailed  recommendations,   for 
achieving victory over Great Britain. 
The  great question  then   is:     in what way we  shall be  able to get 
the upper hand from the  start.    My humble answer is:     by taking 
the offensive, and doing it before  the British   force now in South 
Africa  is markedly strengthened. 
.   .   .   All possible  efforts must  be made  to  continue agriculture as 
in peace time.   .   .   .  The Treasury must  not be allowed   to become 
empty.   .   .   .   Steps   should be  taken  to manufacture  fire-arms and 
ammunition   in this   country.   .   .   .   Some military experts of high 
rank  should   be summoned   from Germany.   ...   An  attempt   should  be 
made   to start a rising  in India on a  large  scale with Russian 
help.19 
Smuts  sums  up  in the final paragraph his designs  for the  future of 
South Africa. 
.   .   .   in my opinion  Soutli Africa  stands on  the  eve of a  fright- 
ful blood-bath out of which our  people will  come,  either as an 
exhausted  remnant,  hewers of wood and drawers  of water  for  a 
hated race, or as victors,   founders  of a United  South Africa, 
of one of  the  great  empires of  the world.     I may be wrong,   but 
I   seriously think that,   if the programme sketch-above  is   carried 
out, we  should, within a few years  perhaps within one year,   found 
an Afrikaner republic   in South Africa stretching  from Table  Bay 
to  the Zambesi.^0 
Smuts  held  no military command   from the beginning of  the war 
until   the  fall of Pretoria on June 5,   1900.    It has  not been possible 
to find documents  to show what  part  he played  in the war organization 
of the  South African Republic while   its   forces were   invading Natal and 
attacking Kimberley, Mafeking and the   key points  of  the railways   to 
the Cape ports,   though it   is   clear  that  he paid visits   to the Natal 
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front.       Also,   there  is  little recorded  of his activities during the 
early months  of 1900 when the British   forces drove  out   the  Boers   from 
Cape Colony and moved   into   the Dutch republics.    From May 29, when his 
Government   left Pretoria for Machadodorp,   until June 4, when he   joined 
them,   Smuts was   left   in charge of the  threatened  capital.     There  are 
no documents  in  the Smuts Papers on this week, but after the Boer war 
Smuts wrote an unpublished  account of   it   in his Memoirs  of the  Boer 
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War. 
President Paul  Kruger   and the members  of the Government had 
left Pretoria on May  29,  1900 and established themselves at Machado- 
dorp on   the railway line  to Lourenco Marques   in Mozambique.    After   the 
fall of Pretoria and  the  last   defensive  battle at Diamond Hill   in   the 
Magaliesberg on June  10,   1900,   the guerrilla phase of  the war began. 
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It was decided,   as part of  these operations,   to attempt   to regain a 
footing   in the Western Transvaal which had been virtually abandoned 
to  the  British,  partly because  its   commandos had been withdrawn for 
concentration elsewhere,  partly because of widespread desertion among 
23 
the  Boers. General J.  H.   de  la Rey now assumed military control of 
the western districts.     Expecting trouble from recalcitrant  Boers,  he 
asked   for  Smuts,  who still  held  the office of State Prosecuting 
Attorney,   as his  assistant.     An Executive Council resolution  constitut- 
ing a separate government  for the Western Transvaal was passed,   at 
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Smuts's request,   on July 17,   1900. 
In reports  to Louis  Botha,   F.  W.   Rcitz,   C.  R.   de Wet,   and 
Jacobus de  la Rey Smuts described encounters with British  forces  and 
the successful  reestablishment  of Boer authority in  the Western dis- 
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tricts.       De  la Rey delegated   the reorganization of the Potchefstroom, 
Wolmaransstad  and  Bloemhof  commandos  to Smuts.     He  thoroughly and 
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effectively carried out  this  assignment. 
In January 1901 a plan to  invade  the Cape Colony,   first made 
in October   1900 at   the Cyferfontein meeting of Botha,   Smuts,   Steyn 
and  the members of  the Orange  Free State Government, was revived.     Smuts 
was   enthusiastic   about  it and  clearly made up his mind not  only to  join 
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such an expedition but,   if possible,   to  lead   it. But   this project, 
as well  as  his work in the Western Transvaal,  was  interrupted on May 10 
by a summons   from his Government  to join  them near Ermelo in the Eastern 
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Transvaal   for discussions about   the  future of the war. 
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Meanwhile,   on March 7,   1901 Lord Kitchener      had  offered Botha 
generous   terms  for peace at   their meeting at Middelburg,   including 
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eventual self-government  and a virtual amnesty  for  the Boers.       The 
Middelburg discussions   came to nothing because   the British Government 
would not approve of these terms. 
On May  10,   1901   the Transvaal   leaders,   including Smuts,  met at 
Iniuigratie near Ermelo and decided,  because of theit   deteriorating 
situation,   to make  contact with and  seek consultation  from Kruger  and 
members  of the Boer deputation abroad   through an envoy.     Should 
Kitchener refuse permission to send an envoy,   an armistice would   be 
sought   to enable  the   two Governments  to discuss   their   future course of 
action.     A letter signed  by F. W.   Reitz,   State  Secretary,   was sent   to 
Orange Free State President Steyn  informing him of this  decision.     His 
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reply was a strong objection to  the whole proposed  course   of action. 
In spite of this rebuttal   it was decided  to communicate with the   leaders 
abroad by telegram.     Smuts was charged with  this   task and went  to 
Standerton,  then held by  British  forces  under General  Clements,   to 
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carry  it out. 
On receiving a reply  from President Kruger  to continue the 
struggle,   the  leaders  of both Republics met at Waterval  to   consider   it 
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and  then  issued  a public report drafted  by Smuts. This report read 
in part: 
.   .   .   considering further the  incalculable personal  and  material 
sacrifices  already made   for our  cause, which would all  be rendered 
worthless and vain by a Peace  in which the  independence  of the 
Republics were given  up;   considering   further  the certainty that 
the loss of our  independence,   after  the destruction already 
accomplished and the   losses already suffered,  would bring  in its 
train the national and material  downfall of  our whole People; 
.   .   .   resolves:     that no Peace will be made and  no Peace   conditions 
accepted whereby our  independent  and  separate national  existence 
or the  interests of our  Colonial brothers will  be surrendered.34 
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On August   1,   1901 Smuts, at  the head of a  commando of two hun- 
dred  fifty Boers,   started on a trek through the Orange Free State. 
He   led his   troops over the Orange River   into British  territory in  the 
north-eastern Cape raiding and  foraging and harassing the British  lines. 
These  events are described  in detail   in his unpublished Memoirs  of the 
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Boer War.       He wrote a number of other  reports on  the  course of the 
war,  not  only to keep   the Boer  leaders   in  touch with one another,   but 
36 
also to be published   abroad  as propaganda. 
On February 8,   1902 General  de Wet  appointed  Smuts  to the  command 
of all  the Orange Free  State   forces   in  the  Cape Colony  in succession 
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to Commandant Kritzinger who had been reported  captured. 
In a  letter  to William T.  Stead  on January 4,   1902,   only  four 
months before the  end  of the war,  Smuts  again reveals  his   contempt   for 
Great  Britain.    W.  T.   Stead,   a British  journalist, was one of  the most 
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influential publicists   of his   time.       At   first a supporter of Cecil 
Rhodes  and   imperialism,   he later changed  his attitude  and  opposed   the 
policy that   led  to  the Anglo-Boer War.     In  discussing  British military 
policy Smuts  stated: 
Are such  ruin and  sorrow and suffering part  of  that  great mission 
of  Empire which  the   English people believe to be   theirs?     Does  the 
present   state of South Africa not  rather show that  Imperialism,   as 
here applied,   is not  a mission but a madness?    Every rule of  inter- 
national   law,   every principle of humanity,  every precept of religion, 
has  been wantonly and systematically violated  for  the  greater glory 
of  the Empire and  the good  of South Africa.*'' 
Smuts's   invasion  of the  Cape was  still actively  in  progress when 
the  summons   came  from Lord Kitchener,   Commander-in-Chief of British forces 
in southern Africa,   for Smuts  to attend  the peace negotiations at  Vereenig- 
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ing. On May 4,   1902 when Smuts was  on his way to the Transvaal  by 
13 
train to join his  colleagues  before  the Conference at Vereeniging,   he 
met Lord Kitchener  at Kroonstad  Station where   they discussed   terms  of 
41 
surrender. 
In notes   taken by Smuts during  the period of peace negotiations 
Kitchener's proposals are  listed.     They include  surrender with honor, 
no chance of   immediate self-government,  and  amnesty for rebels  and   tem- 
porary loss of enfranchisement.    Also,  Smuts writes  that "Kitchener 
strongly disapproves unconditional  surrender  as   this will   indicate 
that Boers wish   to rise again and   then prisoners will not  return with- 
out delay.     English Government prefers unconditional  surrender  but 
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Kitchener as  friend  of the  Boers  strongly against   it." 
The few documents   listed  in   the Select ions   from the Smuts Papers 
show that  Smuts was   late  in getting to the peace negotiations   in May 
43 
1902  and had  no part   in  the preliminary negotiations. His  earlier 
discussions with Lord Kitchener  formed   the basis   for  the   final draft 
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of  the peace treaty.       Documents  175 and 176 are  resolutions drafted 
by Smuts  and Hertzog at   the request   of the delegates at Vereeniging on 
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May   16,   1902. 
The Peace Treaty of Vereeniging ending the South African War 
was   signed  on May 31,   1902,   and the  two Boer Republics   lost  their  in- 
dependence.     Smuts,  strongly  influenced by Lord  Kitchener's  opinion 
that  a Liberal Government would  shortly come  into power  in Great 
Britain and  that   generous  treatment   could be expected   for  the  two ex- 
Republics,   threw his  influence,   as did General Louis Botha,  on the 
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side  of making peace.       This   helps  to explain Smuts's  acceptance and 
welcome  into the  British War  Cabinet   fifteen years   later.     Having, 
14 
however,  been   called direct   from his   commando headquarters   in   the Cape, 
and   not being officially designated by  the Transvaal, he was  not  a 
signatory to  the  treaty. 
On December  14,   1902  news  that  Joseph Chamberlain,   Secretary 
of State  for the  Colonies, was  to make a South African tour and visit 
the  Transvaal prompted Smuts  and Louis Botha to begin  laying the  founda- 
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tion   for an opposition political party. The Boer  opposition  to Sir 
Alfred Milner,   then Governor  of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, 
was  based on his  assault  on   the  Dutch   language   in his   education policy 
and  his expressed   intention   to  import  Chinese laborers  for  the  gold 
mines.     Evading Milner's  attempt   to  include them in  the nominated 
Legislative Council,   they decided   to  create an organized opposition. 
Along with Smuts,  Louis Botha  called  a meeting of Boer delegates  at 
Pretoria on May  25,   1904 which marked   the beginning of political  organi- 
zation among the Transvaal Afrikaners.     A  committee was appointed   to 
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create  a permanent  party. 
In January  1905 Botha as  Chairman,   S. W.   Burger,  de la Rey, 
and Smuts  founded   an Afrikaner party,   Hat  Volk.    Louis  Botha set  as 
his  ideal cooperation between  the  two white nationalities and   full 
participation of  the  Boers   in  administrative affairs.     In the activities 
of Het   Volk Botha was  the acclaimed leader with undoubted prestige  and 
popularity.     It was  Smuts,  however,  who  formulated  the  arguments,  pre- 
sented   the Boer  case,  devised   the  strategy of encounter with Sir Alfred 
Milner   and his officials,   composed  every major document   that was used 
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in  the   Hot  Volk  fight  against   "Milnerism." 
15 
The   letters  during this period  show Smuts   as still distrustful 
of British   intentions  though   feeling  that   the worst wounds  of the war 
could  be healed by  the achievement  of  self-government   in   the  conquered 
republics.     In a  letter  to Emily Hobhouse on July 4, 1904 Smuts notes 
the appearance of a movement   for responsible government  among the "mod- 
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erate English"  in the Transvaal. 
Things  out here   (Pretoria)   are moving slowly  but I hope  surely; 
there  is   a strong agitation  in favour of representative and, 
if possible,  responsible  government   springing  up among  influen- 
tial sections at Johannesburg.    Our   friend Lord Milner   is  acting 
as an  irritant  on all  classes and   the prolongation of his  stay 
may yet  be   for our real  good, who knows?^ 
When a  strong Liberal  government  under the   leadership of Sir 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman came   to power  in Great Britain  in  December 
1905,   Smuts was  sent   to London by Het  Volk to state   the  case   for self- 
government   for   the ex-republics  and   for a place for   the Boers   In its 
administration.     Smuts   took with him a supporting memorandum which he 
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presented  to   the Colonial Office. His   talks with Liberal   leaders 
Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Morley,  and Winston Churchill,  and  the details 
of  this mission are not  recorded   in his  papers.    However,   in a private 
message  to Smuts, Winston Churchill,  at   this   time Under-Secretary of 
State   for the  Colonies,   thanked  Smuts   for  the Memorandum on  the Transvaal 
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Constitution. Churchill wrote: 
Let me  thank you  for  the Memorandum on  the Transvaal Constitution 
which you have been good  enough to send me.     I will read   it with 
attention.     We shall  I hope be able  to  come  to a  settlement 
accepted as   fair to both parties  in South Africa.     In any event 
I   shall always  be glad to  learn your  views  and hope you will not 
hesitate  to  communicate them frankly.   * 
While  in London Smuts  convinced Prime Minister  Campbell-Bannerman 
that  cooperation and partnership between  the Boers and  the British was 
16 
practicable and  desirable.     Sarah G.  Millin and J.   0.  Smuts  in   their 
biographies of Smuts,   relate  the   following: 
I went on explaining  (Smuts said).     I   could see Campbell-Bannerman 
was  listening  sympathetically.     Without  being brilliant he was the 
sort of personality—large-hearted and honest—on whom people de- 
pended.     He reminded me of Botha.    Such men get   things  done.     He 
told me  there was  to be a Cabinet meeting the next day and  said, 
'Smuts,  you have convinced me.'   55 
By July  11,   1906 Smuts  had drafted  the programme  for get   Volk 
in readiness  for  the election to come.    Smuts wrote   in a letter   to 
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J.  X. Merriman of his draft   for the  party programme. 
Meanwhile I have drafted a programme  (both of ideal aims and 
practical measures)   for our party and shall  be most thankful 
for  any hints   or suggestions or  criticisms   from your experienced 
pen.5/ 
Full responsible  government   for both  the Transvaal and the  Free 
State came on February 24,   1907 when  the get  Volk Party captured   37 
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seats   in   the Lower  House,   giving it  a seven vote majority.       Louis 
Botha became Prime Minister  of  the Transvaal with Smuts as  Colonial 
Secretary and Minister of Education. 
John X.  Merriman's  victory over  Starr  Jameson  in  the Cape Parlia- 
mentary election of February  1908 marks   the point at which Smuts urged 
union   for  the South African states.     The   first  stage of union was  the 
Intercolonial  Conference of May  1908 which resolved to call a National 
Convention  to draft  a Union Constitution.     Smuts's preparation  for  the 
first  meeting of  the National   Convention  on October  12,   1908 are described 
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in The Unification of South Africa,   1902-1910. Smuts  drew up a complete 
Draft   Constitution  of South Africa in August   1908 which  contained 133 
sections, many of which were   followed  by references  to corresponding 
section::  of  the Constitutions  of Australia, Canada,   and  the Transvaal 
17 
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Colony.       In September Smuts drew up two alternative plans,   dealing 
mainly with the  relations  between the central  government and the 
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provinces  and the provincial  Constitutions. 
The National  Convention,   considering the possibilities of a 
Federal  or a Union   form of government  for the ex-Republics  and  the 
Cape and  Natal,   chose the  latter.     Smuts's  Draft Constitution was   con- 
tained   in  the South AfricaAct  of  the British Parliament.    The Union 
became an accomplished fact  on May 31,   1910.     Louis  Botha became  the 
Union's   first Prime Minister and  Smuts assumed   three  important  port- 
folios  in   the new Cabinet-Defense,  Mines,  and  Interior.    Ceneral 
Hertzog became Minister of Justice. 
Smuts's   first  major  task as  Union Minister was   the Defense Act 
which  took him eighteen months  to  complete.     This comprehensive bill 
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became the   cornerstone of the Union's defense policy. 
General Botha  reformed his  Cabinet on December   19,   1912 to  ex- 
clude General Hertzog whoso  boldly expressed  sentiments against Great 
Britain and   the "foreign fortune-seekers" in South Africa precipitated 
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a split   in   the Cabinet.      At a demonstration of support   for Hertzog in 
Pretoria on  December   28,  1912 General C.   R.  de Wet  stood on a large 
manure pile   to address   the crowd and  said,  "I would rather be on a dung- 
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heap with my people  than in  the palaces of the  Empire."        As a result 
of Hertzog's withdrawal   from the  Botha government  and  of his amalgama- 
tion of discontent  among various  Boer Nationalists  such as de Wet,   the 
Nationalist Party was   organized  in November 1913.     Its  policy,   in general 
terms,  envisaged eventual secession   from the British Empire and non- 
part icpatlon   in any war   in which Britain happened   to be   involved.     The 
18 
Nationalist Party,   slowly  but   steadily growing  in strength,  bitterly 
opposed Botha and  Smuts. 
The supreme crisis,   the  outbreak of  the First World War,   and 
the Government's  decision  to  take part   in it,  put upon Smuts,  as 
Minister of Defense,  the  task of organizing forces for the  invasion of 
65 
German  South-West Africa. The  first World War  thrust Smuts  to   the 
forefront of British politics  and set   the  stage   for his emergence   into 
world politics. 
Smuts   calculated  that  South Africa no longer had anything to 
win by challenging the British Empire,  but had  everything to gain   in 
combination with  free nations who were  transforming the  empire into 
a commonwealth.     Having fought  the  British Empire  in the Boer War, 
he realized a.<-   the outbreak  of the  First World War  that South Africa's 
cooperation with Great Britain was  vital   in  furthering  the  interests 
of his   country. 
"William K.  Hancock's  two volume biography of Smuts remains  the most 
definitive  work on  the  life and political  involvements of J.  C.  Smuts, 
and   it  has  been  influential   in   the   formulation of some of the  ideas  pre- 
sented   in  this paper.     I  have relied more heavily,   however,  upon the 
seven   volume  Select ions   from  the  Smuts  Papers. 
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CHAPTER   II 
THE GREAT WAR 
As Minister of Defense,   Smuts had   the task to organize South 
African   troops   for the invasion of German South West Africa.     These 
activities were,   however,   interrupted by an  internal  crisis of rebel- 
lion and   civil war.    This   struggle,   though brief and regional,  heightened 
the conflict  between British and Afrikaner  elements within the Union. 
When Louis   Botha announced   in Parliament  on September  9,   1914 
that  South African  troops would   invade German South West Africa Hertzog 
and   the  Nationalists bitterly opposed  the expedition.     In a letter   to 
Smuts,   Colonel  Deneys Reitz describes   the situation prior  to  the abor- 
1 
tive rebellion  in   the Orange Free State and  the Transvaal. 
The Hertzog  leaders are,   of  course,  making capital out  of the 
German South West expedition and  the Boers  in   this district are 
in commotion.     If they are  called up I   feel  sure  that   serious 
disturbances will  take place.     They stand   in groups  on every 
street  corner   inveighing against  the Government and  even the 
Commandant declares that  he will  support   the burghers   in resist- 
ing any commandeering orders.   ...    Of course   if the Government 
can occupy German South West  by means  of the various  existing 
corps   and make a  clean  job of  it,   the public will,   after a  few 
months,  see  the  matter   in another  light,   but at  the moment  the 
way people are  going on  here-about   is nasty. 
This brief armed rebellion of a group of nationalistic  Boers 
was  confined to a  section of  the Orange Free  State  and the Transvaal. 
The  leaders, General   Solomon G.  Maritz and General  Jacobus H.  de  la 
Rey,   saw an opportunity in the outbreak of the First World War  to 
3 
strike a blow for restoration of Boer Republican government. 
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Against  this opposition Smuts  organized effectively the Union 
defense  forces and suppressed   the rebellion by the end of December 1914. 
4 
In a   letter  to General Charles P.   Crewe    Smuts remarks that  "the col- 
lapse  of the rebellion came  sooner than he   [Botha]  had ventured  to 
think and  it would  have been  quite complete but  for the escape of Kemp 
5 
with some  600 men   of a very good stamp  to German West." 
In a letter   to Arthur  B.  Gillett   on September 27,   1914 Smuts 
expressed his  feelings about Great  Britain and  the  events   leading up 
6 
to the Great War.        He wrote: 
Let  us remember   the deeper   import  of  the events   through which we 
are passing and   not simply  curse our  statesmen.     It  is  difficult 
for me  to see what other  alternative   there was   for English states- 
men.     In  1907   the great  C.   B.   [Prime Minister Campbcll-Bannerman] 
made  a move towards limiting armaments and war  preparations. 
Germany made not  the slightest response.    As  the  burden became 
too  great   for  England,   tacit  arrangements  came  to be made with 
France,  and her   fleet was   taken to  the Mediterranean to protect 
also British interests,   and   England  became morally responsible 
for   the  northern   coasts   of  France.      I   don't   think  England  could 
have done otherwise then,   nor  could   she without   infamy have backed 
out   now.     I  love  German   thought and   culture and   hope it will yet 
do much for mankind.    But  a stern  limit must be   set  to her political 
system which is   a menace  to  the world  even worse   than Bonapartism 
was.     But   I must   admit   the   future  is   to me very dark.    If Germany 
wins--but what   if Russia wins.'    Let us do our duty according to 
our  best  lights   and leave  the ultimate   issue to  that Providence 
which  somehow turns evil   to good and  makes poor  erring humanity 
reap   'the  far off  interest of tears.'7 
As Minister of Defense  Smuts played a major role in organizing 
the military campaign  against   the Germans   in South West Africa.    The 
area was divided   into   two zones  of command.     General  Botha operated 
in the northern half   of the   territory and  Smuts assumed  command of 
the southern zone.     Botha divided   his   force  into four   columns   and drove 
in a wedge   from west   to east  and  occupied  the capital,   Windhoek,  on 
8 
May  12,   1915.    On July  9 the German  forces  surrendered  unconditionally. 
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Meanwhile,   in the  south  Smuts had  organized a  three-pronged 
attack,   taking all   important  communication centers  and roads  leading 
to Windhoek.     Smuts avoided  frontal attacks,   using instead  an enveloping 
flanking movement which  the  Boers  had used  effectively  in  the Anglo- 
Boer War   fourteen years  earlier. 
Since  the outbreak of the war British and German troops had 
been  skirmishing on  the  frontiers   of German  East Africa.     Under 
General von Lettow Vorbeck the Germans had  a well-trained  and efficient 
9 
army of 2,000 Germans and   20,000 native regulars.      The  active  campaign 
in East Africa had begun under  the   command   of General  Smith-Dorrien. 
He   took  ill   in January 1916 and  Smuts  accepted   the offer  from Lord 
Sydney Buxton,  Governor-General  of South Africa,   to command   the British 
forces   in East Africa with  the rank of Lieutenant General.     On February 
8,   1916 Smuts became a Lieutenant-General   in  the British Army thus be- 
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coming  Britain's  second youngest  general. 
Smuts  had been offered   the   command on November 28,   1915 but 
declined because he believed  his party needed him  in South Africa. 
In a letter  to Arthur B. Gillett   in  England  Smuts  stated: 
The  British Government asked me   to go and   take  the  command   in 
German East Africa but our  parliamentary majority11   is  such that 
I  do not want   to leave General  Botha alone,   especially as   the 
feeling in  the  country is  still  very bad  after  the  rebellion. 
Maybe I  shall be able  to go to  England after  the end  of the 
Session next April.12 
On the day of his appointment   Smuts described to Margaret Gillett 
13 
the events  leading up  to his becoming a General. 
When  I  refused   the offer of the   Imperial Government  last November 
they  sent  out  Smith-Dorrien who  became seriously ill  at  Cape Town. 
So  the Imperial Government   renewed   their offer   to me,   and   in view 
of this situation and the  20,000 South Africans we are  sending there 
my   colleagues were  strongly of opinion that  I  should go.     I  shall do 
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my best   to succeed where several predecessors have already  failed. 
But I   feel  it   is  a terrible risk.    Pray   for your old   friend who in 
these  times   is   forced  to do  soldiering against his will.    The old 
world which   interested and   fascinated  us   is   lying in ruins,  and 
what new birth  of time will  succeed  it  no one  knows.     Let  us  face 
the situation bravely and hope  that  something better may emerge.^ 
A secret   telegram from Lord  Byxton,  Governor General  of South 
Africa to Andrew Bonar Law,  British Secretary of State,  explains  the 
circumstances  surrounding Smuts's   appointment. 
It would,   I   think,   be advantageous,  as removing any jealousy on 
part of  British officers,   or any possible  feeling that   Smuts has 
ousted  Sir Horace  Smith-Dorrien,   if something  like the   following 
statement   in connection with   the public announcement  of Smuts's 
appointment  could  be made. 
Begins:     His Majesty's Government  last  November, when  the Union 
German  East  Contingents were being formed,   offered  the   command 
in German East   to  Smuts.    At   the  time  he was,   for various  reasons, 
unable  to  undertake  it.     When   ill health necessitated  S.   D.'s as 
his  successor.     His Majesty's Government  again offered   command 
to Smuts,   and   in   the circumstances he accepted   it.15 
General  Smuts   commanded  the  Britisti   forces   in  East Africa until 
January 21,   1917,   by which time  the   campaign was all  but over.     Few 
letters are   found   in  the Smuts Papers which  relate  to  the  East African 
campaign.    Smuts's own brief account   of the  campaign appears   in a pre- 
face to a history of the campaign:     General  Smuts's  Campaign   in East 
Africa,  by J.   H.   V.   Crowe. 
In December  1916 Louis  Botha  and the  South African Cabinet de- 
cided  unanimously that   Smuts  should  represent South Africa in   the 
Imperial War Conference.     He was reluctant   to extend   the already long 
separation from his  family,  but   it   is   clear  that a growing anxiety 
about   the course of the war in  Europe,   and a desire  to get   closer to 
the  center of action,   influenced his  acceptance  of  the  cabinet's 
decision.     He   felt he would be   in Europe only   for a short while and 
16 
would  return "for good"   in April or May. 
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Writing  to his wife on December 27,   1916 while he was  actively 
campaigning in  the  field  in  East Africa,   Smuts sums up his  feelings 
prior  to his departure  for Great   Britain. 
What  do you  say of the new Government   in England witn Milner 
and  Curzon   in it?     I  think very  little of them.     It   is  a   'damn 
the  consequences'  Government,   and I expect  little good of them. 
And  then the half German Milner  in it!   .   .   .    Yesterday a  tele- 
gram came  from General  Botha  that he has been   invited   to the 
London Conference but  cannot  go and proposes  to nominate me  in 
his place!   .   .   .     This   is a great nuisance and   still more so 
that  I   shall   have to leave my work here at  this moment,  but  if 
General  Botha  cannot  go  there   is no other solution.   .   .   . 
But  I  shall probably be needed   in London only for a few weeks 
and  shall not   stay there  long.17 
On March   17,   1917 Smuts arrived  in London at   the  invitation 
of David Lloyd George  to attend  the   first meeting of  the Imperial 
War  Cabinet.     This  cabinet  consisted of visiting Dominion Prime 
Ministers who were attending  the Imperial Conference  together with 
18 
members of  the British War Cabinet. 
Three  bodies met  concurrently   in London in trie spring of 1917 
and  again,   in the   summer of  1918.     One,  the  Imperial War Cabinet, was 
composed of Dominion Prime Ministers,   the representatives of India, 
and  the  five members of  the  British War Cabinet,  together with Lord 
Balfour,   and Walter Long,   the Colonial Secretary.     It  held  fourteen 
sessions,   opening on March 20 and  closing on May 2,   1917.     Its business 
was   confined  to making recommendations on war strategy and possible 
peace   terms and had  no real  power. 
The  second body was the Imperial War Conference, which held 
fifteen sessions--March 21 to April  27,  1917.     Even  though only one 
British minister was  usually present   (the Colonial Secretary who pre- 
sided) ,   and  the Australians were absent,   the conference was   the  same 
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size  as the Imperial War Cabinet--four teen members.     Included  in this 
group were   four  Canadian ministers  and  four representatives of India. 
The   largo numbers present at   such Commonwealth meetings were  to lead, 
already in  1918,   to the  transaction  of some of the most   important 
business in meetings of the prime ministers,   a procedure to which 
19 
recourse would  be  had   frequently  in  subsequent years. 
The  third  body was  the British War Cabinet of Five, consisting 
of Llc.yd George,   Bonar Law, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner,   and Sir Arthur 
Henderson.    Of the   five,  only Bonar Law had departmental responsibilities, 
he was  Chancellor  of the  Exchequer as well as   leader of   the House of 
Commons,  and   it was   in  the  latter capacity that he sat   in the War 
Cabinet.    The other members were "relieved  of  the day-to-day preoccu- 
pations of administrative work" and were thus  "entirely  available  for 
initiating policy  and   the work  of  co-ordinating  the  great   Departments 
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of State.        When  the Imperial War Cabinet was not sitting,  the. British 
War Cabinet  still  had a   large volume of work relating to  British domestic 
affairs   and war business  of primary concern to the United Kingdom.     The 
head of a department was   summoned  to  the War Cabinet when a matter was 
discussed affecting his Ministry.     Balfour as  Foreign Secretary was 
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present   at most  of  the meetings. 
It had  become  customary  to  invite a visiting Prime Minister to 
22 
British   Cabinet meetings.       Thus,  before  the  first meeting of the 
Imperial War Cabinet  on March  20,   the  Dominion Prime Ministers,  and 
Smuts who was  not at   the  time Prime Minister,  had attended   some War 
Cabinet   meetings.     Smuts was   to be a member of  the British War Cabinet 
23 
from June  9,   1917  to December  14,   1918.       There were only   five members; 
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Smuts was  the sixth,   a sort of minister without  portfolio,   but with 
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powers  equal  to   tlie others. Actually,   it was  impossible  to legalize 
or define his position, because he was  still Minister of Defense of 
South Africa and not  a British Minister. 
In his War Memoirs  David Lloyd George relates how Smuts was 
accepted   in the British ruling circle. 
So deep was   the   impression that General Smuts made at  this  time 
upon  his colleagues,  nay,  upon  the nation,  that we would  not   let 
him leave us when the Conference was ended.'-'    We  insisted on 
keeping him here   to help us at  the centre with our war efforts. 
In very aspect of our multifarious  tasks  he was a valuable helper. 
He took his   full  share of the numerous   committees set up   to  in- 
vestigate,   to advise,  and  subject to Cabinet assent,   to direct 
action on vital   issues of policy and  strategy.     He became and 
remained until   the end  of the war,  an active member of the 
British Cabinet   for all  the purposes  of war direction.2" 
At   the request  of the Prime Minister Smuts paid a visit  on 
April   27,   1917  to France to observe   first-hand the war.    Upon his 
return to London he submitted  to  the War Cabinet a  lengthy survey 
of  the "General   Strategic and Military Situation and Particularly 
that on the Western Front."    This  document  has been published   in 
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Lloyd George's War Memoirs.       "Britain was   fighting," Smuts  stated, 
"for destruction of  the German colonial system with a view to  the 
future security of all   communications vital  to the British Empire," 
for  "tearing off  from the Turkish  Empire all parts  that might  afford 
German opportunity  of expansion to  the Far East and of endangering 
our position as an Asiatic Power"--two objectives which,   in effect, 
had been achieved.     Croat Britain was  also  fighting for  the restora- 
tion of conquered  territory and  the  crushing of German militarism in 
Europe--two   objectives which remained  to be achieved. 
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While asserting that  Germany had  to be defeated he stated: 
I  repeat here  my frank opinion   that  that will  not  be merely or 
even entirely a military defeat.     A certain  substantial measure 
of military   success will  be necessary and must  be achieved not 
only because   it   is necessary  for our ends,   but also as  a  lasting 
lesson   to Prussian militarism. 
But   greater   forces  are   fighting for us  than our armies.    This 
war will be  settled  largely by the  imponderable--by the   forces 
of public opinion all over  the world which have been mobilised 
by German outrages   ...   we should ever  strive   to keep  this 
world opinion  on our side  and  not  be deflected by German methods 
of barbarism   . 28 
In the course of his  report  to the War Cabinet  on the military 
situation on the Western Front   Smuts advocated placing greater emphasis 
on the Palestine   theatre of operations.    On April  23,   1917 Lloyd George 
offered   to Smuts   the  command   of the  British army  in Palestine. 
In  reviewing  the  course  of   this   (Palestine)   campaign on 23rd 
April,   the War   Cabinet  came  to  the  conclusion  that   it was de- 
sirable   to introduce more  resolute  leadership  into  the command 
of  the Egyptian  Expeditionary Force.   ...  In regard to the 
choice of a successor to Sir Archibald Murray,   it was pointed 
out   that General  Smuts  had  expressed    very decided  views as 
to   the  strategic importance  of Palestine  to the   future of the 
British  Empire.     He would   therefore be  likely to prosecute  a 
campaign   in that  quarter with great determination,   and there 
was   a strong feeling that   he would  be one  of the most suitable 
selections   for   the  Chief  Command   of   the   Egyptian   Expeditionary 
Force. 29 
According to Lloyd George and General  Sir Archibald Wavell, 
Smuts declined because he had   little  confidence in the policy of Sir 
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William Robertson,   Chief of Staff at  the War Office.       Sir William 
Robertson had  asserted  that France appeared unwilling  to  continue offen- 
sive operations and   a  change  in  strategy was warranted,  whereas  Smuts, 
in his report   to the War Cabinet,   had  stressed   the need   for continuance 
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of the offensive. 
In Lloyd George's account  Smuts believed   that Palestine would 
merely develop   into  one of the many  forgotten  fronts,  with too  few men 
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to carry out decisive maneuvers and   that stagnation would   set   in. 
He believed  that he   could  serve a more useful purpose by remaining 
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in Britain at   the center of action and by helping whenever possible. 
In a letter  to his wife on June  9,   1917 Smuts gives  a clear 
assessment of  the political  situation and his   feelings  toward his own 
role   in  the war. 
You know I  have been asked   to attend  the War Cabinet   regularly 
and,  with General   Botha's   permission,   I have agreed   .   .   .--never 
in  our life  or  in history will  there again come a time  so critical 
for mankind,   and   it would  be  cowardly and  selfish   if I were  to 
refuse all  requests   for help and   co-operation.     I have  refused 
the   chairmanship  of  the Irish Convention as well as  the command 
in Palestine; but membership of the War Cabinet   is much better 
than  either and  gives me  the right position  to do good work in 
connection with our war  policy.     The Government was very  insistent 
on  this  and  I   could not refuse.     I  am told  that   I have made an 
amazing impression on the public by my activities.    Lord Wimborne, 
Viceroy of Ireland,   says   that no one can recall a comparable 
impression made by a foreigner.    My speeches  are now being printed 
in pamphlet   form.     Old Members of Parliament assure me that my 
speech at  the  House  of Lords  dinner has made a greater  sensation 
than  any other speech of their  lives.     I hope all   this applause 
will   not   turn  my   little   head,   but  will  give  me  a   chance   to 
accomplish good work both  for war and peace and   for my  fellow- 
man.   -* 
A banquet  given  in honor  of Smuts by the  combined Houses  of Parlia- 
ment was  held on May  15,   1917  in   the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords. 
This was   the first  such honor accorded  a  Dominion statesman.     Sir John 
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French presided and  introduced Smuts. Sir Alfred Milner  sat beside 
Smuts and   also gave a brief  introduction.     In his speech Smuts  spoke 
consistently of his belief  in  the   importance to Great Britain  in main- 
taining a   British Commoircrealth  of Nations.    He stated   that   the  funda- 
mental   fact   his  listeners have  to bear  in mind was  "that  the British 
Empire,   or   this British Commonwealth of Nations,  does not  stand  for 
unity,   standardization,   or assimilation,  or denationalization;   but   it 
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stands   for a   fuller,  a richer,  and more various  life  among all  the 
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nations  that   compose  it." This   idea remains a constant  theme  in 
both Smuts's  private letters  and   in his public statements  for  the 
extent   of his public career. 
Smuts   took an active part  in   the decisions  taken by the British 
War Cabinet and  corresponded   frequently witti David Lloyd Ceorge on 
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military as well as  political matters.       Smuts believed  that  Great 
Britain  had  locked  up too many of its resources  in opposing  the 
Germans.    The Allies must be  ready to  seize any new opportunity and 
they must equally be  ready  to ward off any unexpected   thrusts   that 
the enemy might make.     To achieve these ends  they must   at  all   costs 
establish a strong  strategic reserve   force.     In his report of April 
30,   1917  to Lloyd George Smuts  related  that   the British had been 
shouldering too  large  a share of what was essentially the French 
burden--the defense   of French soil.     The British must   shed part   of 
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this  load   in order   to create  their strategic reserve. 
With this  strong reserve Great   Britain  should begin an offen- 
sive at  its own place  and choosing.     The great  opportunities, in  Smuts's 
view  in the British War  Cabinet, were  to be  found  in Palestine.     A 
strong offensive  there would  be   the biggest  threat   that  Turkey had 
had   to face since  the Gallipoli  campaign and would  give   to the Pales- 
tinian front an  importance eventually second only to that  of the western 
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front. 
According  to  the Smuts Papers and Lloyd George's Memoirs   Smuts 
seemed  to   favor Lloyd  George's military  strategy.    Lloyd George,   a 
convinced   Easterner,  would have preferred  to let  the Germans attack 
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the defensive  lines   in France while   the British  took the offensive on 
one or more of the  other   fronts.     His  professional  advisers,   Haig and 
Sir William Robertson, C.I.G.S.,  were   convinced Westerners,   and were 
committed  to  the project  of a great  British offensive  in Flanders. 
Smuts's desire for  an offensive   in Palestine  lessened  appreciably 
as the Flander's offensive   planned by General Haig gained prominence. 
The general  reserve   to be   created  by  shortening the  line  in France 
would  be assembled   in the north  for  action in Flanders,   possibly even 
in The  Netherlands,  which  seemed  to be   under threat  of a German  invasion. 
All  this,  after  the  strong  case which   Smuts had made   for a big effort 
in Palestine,   looked   like a   complete  volte-face.    For  this there was 
only one explanation  that Lloyd George   could  see.     Smuts was  carried 
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away by  the argument   of Sir   Douglas Haig. 
The Haig plan  had been  to smash   the German  front   in Flanders 
and  let   the  cavalry  through   to Ostend,   Zecbrugge,   and  beyond.     These 
plans had  the  support  of the C.I.G.S.,   Sir William Robertson.     Before 
they were submitted  Smuts examined   them.     Smuts had  always been opposed 
to   frontal attacks and  a great practitioner of  flanking movements.    He 
had already emphasized  the costliness  of   frontal  attacks   on the Western 
front   in his discussions  in  the War Cabinet.    Smuts believed  that  a 
special   case would need  to be  made  for  the assault  that Haig had   in 
mind.     Haig and  his  staff had   their  special  case ready,   point by point: 
the  need   to bolster the French,   the need   to anticipate  a German   invasion 
to The Netherlands,  the need   to drive  the   submarines   from their advanced 
bases. 
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Smuts did  not yield, however,  to  this  argument.    He did not recom- 
mend Haig's  plan to the War Cabinet but  recommended  that   it should be  ex- 
amined,  along with any alternate plans. 
On June  5,   1917 the War  Cabinet established  a small   commit tee--the 
War Policy Committee--to  investigate all   the   facts of  the military,  naval 
and political situations  and  to deliver a  full report.    The members of the 
committee were the Prime Minister, Lord Curzon and Milner,   Smuts,   and  Bonar 
Law.    At  this   time,   the French army was very shaken after  the  collapse of 
General Nivelle's  offensive on   the Chemin des  Dames.     Haig and  Robertson 
believed  the British  army to be  by  far the most  formidable   fighting force 
on  the  allied  side.     They held  no doubts   that   it  could break through  at 
Flanders.    Lloyd George believed  then, and has  argued  since,  that   they held 
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back essential  information from the War Cabinet.       These discussions   took 
place on June   19 and  20,   when Haig and Robertson were summoned  to   the War 
Policy  Committee.     They argued   strongly  for  the Flanders offensive.    Lord 
Milner and Bonar Law shared Lloyd George's misgivings;   Curzon inclined   to- 
ward  the  side of the  generals;   Smuts also spoke   in their  favor.     Lloyd 
George wrote   later  that  Smuts  "was strongly of the view that  the Generals 
had made out   their   case  for at   least having a good try.    Personally he 
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thought   the  chances were highly  favourable."      What Lloyd George  had   failed 
to emphasize  is  the emphasis which Smuts  laid upon two conditions:     first 
that  the French should give a guaranttee to hold on their  front  all the 
enemy division  and reserves  already located  there;   secondly,   that  Haig 
should arrest  his offensive  if he   found it   impossible  to complete his  full 
plan without  excessive  casulties.     To these  conditions  the War Cabinet 
gave  its   consent  to the offensive  after a further day of discussions. 
In  stragegy,  however,   Smuts would not  have  considered himself a 
Westerner.     During the June meetings of the War  Cabinet  and of the War 
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Policy Committee he urged  the opportunities  of offensive operations  in 
the Levant.     One of these was  a landing at Alexandretta in  support of 
Allcnby's  thrust northwards.     The deep commitment of British power  to 
the Flanders  offensive,  however,  made his plans unworkable.     Smuts had 
been wrong  in his expectation  that   this  commitment would  or  even could 
suddenly be  cut   if its costs proved  to be excessive.    There can be no 
doubt that Smuts regretted   the War Cabinet's decision to push  forward 
with the  Flanders offensive and  his own part   in making  it. 
In a letter to his wife on August 29,   1917 Smuts  reveals his deter- 
mination  to remain in Great Britain and continue his services  to  the 
Government and   shows his  concern   for  the suffering and dislocations  caused 
by  the war. 
...   I  am sorry to say  that I doubt  if I   can be with you in October, 
or even get   away from here.     I have asked General Botha  if he will be 
satisfied   to  leave me here until our parliamentary Session [January 
18,   1918].     My work here  is really very  important and  I do not  see 
how I   can be  spared here  in  the   immediate   future.    The  English Govern- 
ment will   fight very hard  against  my going away.    The  army authoriti- 
ties  also plead with me   to stay here.    If peace comes quickly,   it   is 
very necessary that  I  stay here,   for I expect  a great  row over  the 
German  colonies,   in which we   in South Africa have such a radical  in- 
terest.     I  do not know what  to do.     I get  constant  invitations   from 
the American Government   to go  there,   as they think I   can do a great 
deal  of good   there.     I  am even asked to Russia.    So your heart-ache 
will not  end   in October.   ...    We are going through a period which 
will probably always be marked   in history as   the greatest  and most 
critical  in  the story of mankind.     And how  can our personal heart- 
aches be balanced against  the   immeasurable pain and sorrow of millions 
and millions?42 
That   the prestige  of Smuts within British  government   circles was 
immense is  revealed  in a letter  from Leopold S.   Amery, Assistant  Secretary 
of the Imperial War Cabinet,   and on the staff of  the War Council  at Ver- 
sailles  1917-1918,   to Smuts  on August  21,   1917. 
My dear Smuts,   I see  the Cabinet  are  considering sending someone  to 
Solonika to  see what   is really happening,   and are undecided  as  to 
whether  it  should he  a soldier or a politician.     It should be both 
and you, my  friend,   are the man.    Given proper   facilities  in the way 
of a destroyed  or a light  cruiser  to travel  on you could  do Salonika, 
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Athens,   Egypt,   and  all   in  three weeks or  a month and  come back with a 
real grip  of things,   and  with  the power  to make  the Cabinet   fall  into 
line.     I  could  come with you as staff,   and  tell  you who  the difficult 
people  are out   there,   and we could work out  some real plans while 
traveling.    Get your Air   thing through  first  and your Air Minister 
appointed   (someone who  can  appreciate what General Staff work means 
and will   see   to  it   that  a good General Staff for Air   is  created at 
once on an adequate  scale),   and  then,   say about   1-8 September,  hey 
presto  for the blue Mediterranean,   size up Salonika,   see how General 
Sir  E.  H.  Allenby is  doing and  come back with a  clear plan.   3 
Near the end  of October   labor discontent within Britain reached  a 
crisis  point  due to the dislocations,   shortages,   and hardships which  the 
war   caused.     The situation in  the South Wales  coalfields had become par- 
ticularly serious  due to the resistance  to the draft   among the  coal miners. 
The  British War Cabinet decided   that   it  must   face this challenge to  its 
authority.    Lloyd George was  prepared   to have  the ringleaders  arrested. 
He decided,  however,   to make one  last  effort  at persuasion.    He asked Smuts 
to go  to  the   coalfields   and address  the miners. 
Smuts departed London on October  29.     The War   Cabinet was due to meet 
that day to discuss  the Italian disaster at Caporetto  and  the previous 
night   Smuts had written a strong letter  to  the Prime  Minister which 
stressed  his  views. 
I  suggest   that we declare at  once  to  the Italian  Government  our readi- 
ness  to send   four or  five divisions with a great   proportion of heavy 
artillery  to  the   assistance  as  fast as   the movement can be effected. 
.   .   .     The  transportation arrangements   should be pushed with  the great- 
est   energy  so as   to bring our reinforcements  to  Italy before  the dis- 
aster has become   too great.** 
Smuts,thus, went   straight   from an urgent military  crisis to an equally 
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urgent   crisis on the home  front. In these speeches   he declared   that  the 
war was   fought   to safeguard  individual  freedom and self-government, which 
were  the bases of the British Empire but did  not exist   in Germany.     He said 
that Germany would be defeated,   and  that peace must  be   followed by disarma- 
ment   and   the  establishment   of  small  nations.     At   a  large meeting  at  Tonypandy, 
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Wales he thanked the audience for the hymns they had sung and said that 
he had found "a beautiful spirit" in Wales. His tour from Tonypandy to 
the other   towns became a triumph. 
In his War Memoirs,   David Lloyd Ceorge wrote the  story of the sing- 
ing at Tonypandy as  he heard   it  from Smuts. 
I  started by  saying:      'Gentlemen,   I  come  from far away  as you know. 
I do not belong  to this   country.     I have   come a long way  to do my bit 
in this war,   and  I am going to talk to you  tonight   about  this   trouble. 
But I   have heard   in my  country that the Welsh are  among the greatest 
singers   in  the world,   and before  I  start,   I want you first of  all  to 
sing to me  some  of the  songs of your people.' 
Like a flash,   somebody  in that  huge mass struck up   'Land of My 
Fathers.1     Every  soul present  sang  in Welsh and with the deepest 
fervour.    When  they had   finished   they just  stood,   and I  could   see 
that   the  thing was ovcr.^" 
When Smuts returned on October  30, Lloyd George  took him to a con- 
ference at Rapallo.     There   the two men made  arrangements with   their  Italian 
and   French  colleagues   for assistance  to Italy along the  lines   sketched 
earlier by Smuts.     They also made arrangements  for a Supreme War Council, 
a notable step  forward  towards   the  coordination of strategy among the al- 
lies.     By early December the  Italian  front was  reestablished  in strength 
on the Piave River,   stretching through  Venetia,  northern Italy to the Adri- 
atic.     Here  the Italians entrenched  and withstood Austrian attacks  until 
the end  of the war. 
The question arises now as to what kind of victory and what kind of 
peace was Smuts aiming at? In an unsystematic way, these questions have 
already been raised in various contexts: for example, in the discussions 
of his reasons for joining the War Cabinet, of his advice on strategy, of 
his views about the Commonwealth. It has been seen that he was asserting 
South African national interests under the two heads of status and secur- 
ity;   that he was   the  advocate of  limited  objectives   in war,   and  the primacy 
39 
of politics over military strategy;   that his picture of  the peace settle- 
ment  contained  a League of Nations   created   in   the image of the British Com- 
monwealth.     All  these   scattered observations,   however,   are bound  to  leave 
a blurred   impression  unless some attempt   is made  to pull   them together. 
By examining  correspondence between Smuts  and L.   S.  Amery during 
their service  in  the  British War  Cabinet a clear picture  can be drawn 
of Smuts's   ideas  and  view on the   future of the war and  its outcome.     Smuts 
had   first met Amery when the latter  came  to South Africa on the eve of the 
Boer War as   correspondent of The Times.     From 1899 to  1909 he was on  the 
editorial  staff of The   Times,  organized  its war   correspondence  during the 
Anglo-Boer War,   and   edited The Times  History of   the South African War. 
During the war Amery was Assistant  Secretary of   the Imperial War  Cabinet 
and  Secretary under Sir  Maurice Hankey in the War  Cabinet.     He was also 
on the staff of the War   Council  at  Versailles  from 1917 to   1918.    As  First 
Lord  of the Admiralty  from 1922  to   1924,   and as  Secretary of State for  the 
Colonies and   for Dominion Affairs  from 1924 to   1929, he acquired  a wide 
knowledge of Imperial Affairs.     In  1938 and  1939  he was  a leading opponent 
of "appeasement."     In  1940 he became  Secretary of State of India. 
When Smuts arrived   in England  on March 15,   1917 Amery revealed 
his personal  views on  the urgent  questions  that would  come before the 
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Imperial War Cabinet.       These   fell  under two main  categories:     the 
conduct  of the war and   the terms of peace.     Concerning the  terms of 
peace,  Amery was working  on a memorandum which dealt with  the strategi- 
48 
cal requirements  of  Imperial security.       The menace of enemy bases 
must be  removed;   that meant holding on  to the conquered German  colonies. 
Air communications must   be   safeguarded  no less  than  sea communications; 
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that meant British  control over the  land bridge  from the Mediterranean 
to India—an objective which  could  only be achieved by dismemberment 
of  the Turkish Empire.     Amery  related   in this memorandum that   a  cen- 
tury earlier,   the British had   taken  from the defeated French all   the 
territory they needed   for  the security of their overseas  empire,  with- 
out denying  to France a position of power and  influence  in Europe. 
Amery's desire was  to  give  similar  treatment   to Germany.     In   1948, 
when  compiling his memoirs, Amery recalled  the sudden and sweeping 
victories of  1918 which destroyed not  only the enemy's will  to resist 
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but   the allies' will  to practice moderation. 
Smuts   agreed  in a  limited way with Amery's views.     Smuts's 
plans   for South West Africa  fitted well  into Amery's new  Imperial 
map.     Smuts's   insistence  upon  limited  objectives  in Europe was  har- 
monious with Amery's  ideas  about an equilibrium among the Great  Powers. 
He differed,   however,   from Amery  in   looking  forward   to a  new and 
improved  system of  international organization.     Smuts  felt  that   the 
balance of power was useful  as   far as a means of minimizing hostility, 
but   it was an   insufficient  safeguard   for   international  liberty and 
order.     Smuts,   as will be   shown   later,  believed   that   he had an  individual 
contribution  to make  to the League of Nations.     On the other hand, Amery 
was  satisfied with the existing habits and practices  of  international 
politics. 
In a letter  to L.   S.   Amery Smuts reveals his acute perception 
of Germany's   importance  in   the   framework  of world  stability. 
The League of Nations and America will  be all right.     I  am much more 
perturbed  over Germany.     Germany is necessary for   saving Europe, 
even more  than France was   in   1815.     To restrict her to  100,000 sol- 
diers  seems   to me   to hand her over definitely to Bolshevists  and 
otiier   cults whose numbers,   unfortunately, we  cannot limit.50 
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On September  9,  1917 Lord R.  T.   Reid Loreburn      wrote  to 
Smuts asking him to make a personal   effort, with the assistance of 
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someone  like Lord James Bryce       to get   in touch with the German govern- 
ment   concerning the possibilities of peace  talks. 
(I  have  learned   in years  of official  life  to distrust   the accuracy 
of Foreign Office estimates.)     If you and  another,   such as Lord 
Bryce,   could meet face  to  face someone on  the enemy side,   with   the 
concurrence of  our Allies,   ostensibly to discuss some minor ques- 
tion such as Lord Newton  lately discussed with them,   and   then 
were authorized   to enter  on the  larger  field quite   informally and 
ad referendum we  might   in  that way  learn  if there  is a way which 
might  open  the  prospect  of peace.     It might  thus be done without 
exciting a sensation." 
Smuts circulated Lord Loreburn's   letter among the War   Cabinet 
but   returned with a depressed hope of achieving positive results. 
He replied  to Lord Loreburn  on September  12,   that: 
.   .   .  while  I   largely agree with what you say I am at   this  time 
profoundly   impressed with   the enormous difficulties  and perplexi- 
ties   surrounding  the whole   subject  of peace.     Difficult  as   it has 
been  to wage  this   terrible war, I  am not  sure  that  the making of 
peace will not  be  an even more difficult business,   requiring 
greater  courage and statesmanship and  far-sightedness.5* 
Despite Smuts's pessimism  toward  the possibilities  of a  peace 
conference a chance did seem  to  come in December  1917.     Since   the death 
of Emperor Franz Josef on November 21,   1916,   the  Habsburg government 
appeared willing to engage in  peace negotiations.     From January  to 
July  1917 Prince Sixte dc Bourbon, brother-in-law to the Emperor Karl 
and an officer  in  the  Belgian army, had   sounded  opinion among  the allies, 
particularly  the French.    These attempts had come  to nothing,  mainly 
because   the Austrians   could not  bring themselves   to consider any  sub- 
stantial  concessions   to   the Italians;  but  by the end of the year,   despite 
their victory at Caporetto against  the Italians,   their condition had 
grown much worse and  their need   for peace urgent. 
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In November  1917,   predominant  opinion in the British Foreign 
Office was  that Austria was so  bound  to Germany politically and mili- 
tarily that   she  could not   conclude a separate peace,  and   that  a  further 
decline   in  food and  economic conditions would be needed   to produce 
either a revolution or  such discontent  as would  lead  the ruling classes 
to break with Germany.    When,   therefore,  on December 3 Count Ottokar 
Czernin, Austrian Foreign Minister,  sent word   to the British Foreign 
Office  that  he desired  a meeting between British and Austrian emissaries 
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of very high rank,   the response   from the  Foreign Office was  cool. 
Arthur James  Balfour,  British Foreign Secretary,  was  at   first 
opposed  to  any meeting and   favored asking the Austrian representative 
to set down his  views   in writing   for the  consideration of the British 
government,   a procedure hardly calculated  to  lead  to quick progress. 
At a Paris   conference,  however,  at   the  end of  the month Lloyd George 
spoke  strongly  in  favor of a positive response  to Austria and Balfour 
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agreed  that  a representative  should be sent. 
Lloyd George's   first   choice  as emissary was Lord Reading who 
refused.    He   then turned   to  Smuts.     Smuts   traveled  to Berne to meet 
the Austrian representative,  Count  Mensdorff,   on December   18.     Smuts 
held  the  conviction that military   victory   for the allies would be 
difficult even in  1919-1920,   even with American help.     Unless a counter- 
poise  could be  found  to Germany in   central-eastern Europe,   the war would 
end with a Mittel-Europa bloc  in existence which would be a standing 
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threat   to the peace  of  the world. 
Smuts   interpreted his   instructions  as  follows: 
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First,   to instill  into  the minds of the Austrians  that   in case 
they   freed  themselves   from German domination and made a   fresh 
start   in sympathy with  the British Empire   they would have our 
full  sympathy and support;   and  secondly,   to gather as much in- 
formation as  possible while declining to enter  into a  general 
discussion of peace  terms  so  far as  the Germans were  concerned. 
...  A third object which 1 had  in mind was,   if possible,  to 
induce   the Austrians   to conclude a separate  peace;  but   the subject 
was   from many points  of view a risky one to   open,  as I  was anxious 
to avoid  laying ourselves  open  to the charge   in future of having 
intrigued with  the Austrians   for a separate  peace.58 
Smuts advised Mensdorff that  the British  people saw no prospects 
for a free  and peaceful  Europe so  long as German military domination 
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remained  unbroken.     Smuts   also explained   to the  Count    his   conception 
of  the League of Nations and  of the British Empire's destiny as an 
intermingling League.    A similar destiny awaited   the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire,  once   it  broke free   from German domination. 
The best way to  strengthen  the bonds of sympathy between   the 
British and Austro-Hungarian people was  to liberalise as  much 
as possible  the  local   institutions of Austria-Hungary.     We 
had no   intention of  interfering with her internal affairs, 
but we recognised that   if Austria  could become  a really  liberal 
Empire  in which her subject peoples would,  as   far as possible, 
be satisfied and  content,  she would become  for  Central  Europe 
very much what   the British Empire had  become   for the rest   of 
the world.     She would become a League of Free Nations,   very 
largely   free   from the  taint of militarism, and  she would  have 
a mission   in the  future  even greater  than her mission in   the 
past.60 
Count Mensdorff asked  Smuts  for a new statement of British war 
aims which would make it clear to the nations of Europe,   including the 
Germans,   that  the allies'   aims were not to ruin them.    As  soon as Lloyd 
George received  Smuts's report he brought  it before  the British War 
Cabinet.    The War Cabinet decided on an early declaration of  British 
war aims which would  go to the extreme  limit  of concession and  prove 
to the world   that   the destruction of enemy nations  was not an  object 
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of British policy.     Lloyd George  entrusted   the   task of drafting the 
war aims  statement   to Smuts, Philip Kerr,  and Lord Robert  Cecil. 
Smuts was  hopeful  that  the Austrians would do  their best   to persuade 
the Germans   to accept  peace.    His  talks with Mensdorff had   convinced 
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him that   they were close  to  the   limits of their endurance. 
Following Smuts's return  from his meeting Lloyd George  entrusted 
Philip Kerr   to travel   to Switzerland to undertake a preliminary probe 
of Austrian  intentions.     After two unsuccessful  encounters with Count 
Skrzynski,   Counsellor  of the Austrian embassy  in Berne,   all hopes of 
a separate peace were  dashed when  the Austrian diplomat   told  him on 
March 12,   1918 that Austria would  always be allied with Germany.     It 
was  this volte-face  that marked  the end of negotiations  between Great 
Britain and Austria in  the Great War.    The Austrians had  clearly de- 
cided   to place all their  hopes on  the success  of  the German offensive 
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in France. 
Smuts's mood at   the beginning of 1918  is perhaps  best  expressed 
in a letter  to Mrs. Margaret  Clark Gillett  in which he  stressed   the 
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need  for  immediate peace  above anything else.       He wrote: 
May the Good  be with us  during  this year.     After the  storms  and 
tempests may it come  silently but  irrestibly  like a  tide  from a 
better world.   .   .   .   Certainly  to many, death--'gentle and  soothing 
death'--would  seem preferable  to this measureless agony which is 
convulsing  the world   today.     But  I   feel  in my soul  that   the  end is 
coming.    May  the peace  be,  not  a German peace  or an English peace, 
but God's  peace enveloping all   the erring nations as with  the arms 
of an Everlasting Mercy.    To that  sort of peace I would  contribute 
my last  scrap of strength."4 
On January 5,  1918 Lloyd George addressed   the  trade union   leaders 
at   Caxton Hall  in London where he enumerated  British war aims.     This 
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speech was based   in large measure upon the draft  Smuts  had  prepared. 
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Lloyd George's speech  contained  the principles  enunciated a  few days 
later  by President Wilson's  Fourteen Points,   except   for  "the   freedom 
of  the  seas." 
In a  letter   to Mrs.   Smuts,   Ernest  F. Lane, private secretary 
to General Smuts  from 1910 until   1925,  mentions  the role  Smuts played 
in  the Prime Minister's  speech  of January  5. 
One of  the most   important  things   that   the General has done  is, 
as  a member of a sub-committee,   to draw up a statement  of  the 
British  war  aims.     The  report  of   the   sub-committee  was   considered 
by  the War  Cabinet,   and Mr.  Lloyd George's  speech of  three or 
four days  ago was   the result.     I  expect  you will have  seen all 
about   it   in the  papers, but   it will   interest you now even more 
than   it  did when you know that  the man responsible   for most  of 
the   frame was   the General.     Three of  them were on  the sub-com- 
mittee,  and   the General's  effort was   taken as  the main  frame on 
which   to  build  the  statement. 66 
Prime Minister Lloyd Ceorge's  statements on January 5 were 
largely   in accord with what President Wilson was  to say   three  days 
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later.       The principle  of self-determination was accepted  as   the 
basis of settlement   in Europe,   and  in Turkey.    The disposition of 
the German colonies was   to be settled by a conference which should 
have  primary regard   for  the wishes of  the native  inhabitants  as   to 
their most   suitable protector.     Three  conditions were essential   if a 
lasting peace were to be achieved:     "First   the sanctity of treaties 
must  be re-established;   secondly,   a territorial settlement must be 
secured  based  on  the right  of self-determination or the  consent of  the 
governed;     and   lastly,  we must seek by  tne  creation of some   international 
organisation to  limit   the  burden of armaments and diminish  the  probabil- 
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ity of war." 
As   a  member  of Lloyd  George's  War  Cabinet  Smuts  had  been  deeply 
involved   in strategy.     He was a member of the War Cabinet's  Committee 
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on Manpower, which  completed   its work  on January 31,   1918.    The govern- 
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ment  acted on its  recommendations.       On the basis of the estimates   sub- 
mitted  by the War  Office  the allocation  of manpower  to the Western 
Front was  adequate;   but   the War Office  kept  changing its   estimates 
as its   fears grew of a massive German offensive.    As a result of this 
anxiety over an  impending German offensive the Prime Minister sent 
Smuts  on January 12   to France  to report  on the  condition   of the British 
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Army.     His  report   revealed undertones  of anxiety. 
Though he */as  satisfied that  the  army's morale was   good he had 
found  the  British   troops  greatly in need  of rest after the Flanders 
battle.     He had also  found   them in need  of training.     He   stated  that 
the defenses still  needed much work put   into them and  this must  fall 
primarily upon the   troops,   at  the expense both  of  their  rest and  their 
training.     Smuts,   however,   reported  that  a very  strong defensive system 
would be   completed  within about  six weeks  and  the Cerman army appeared 
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hardly  likely to make  their big attack before  then. 
Several weeks   later,   on February 5,   1918 Lloyd George  sent Smuts 
to study  the war situation   in  the Middle  East and   to report   to the War 
Cabinet on  the opportunities  and means of driving the Turks  out of the 
war.    Smuts's small   staff   included his  friend Leopold S.  Amery,  his 
private  secretary Captain E.F.C. Lane,  and Brigadier-General John W. 
Stewart,   a  Canadian railway expert.     The report  stressed   the need  to 
assure the Turks that  Constantinople would not be detached,   and,   that 
they would  be given every assistance  to organize  themselves   as a national 
state which would  comprise  the areas   in which they possessed   a numerical 
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majority.       It also  stressed   the need   to assure  the Arabs   that  their 
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national   claims wore  accepted   in good   faith and would not be preju- 
diced eitner by   the  Sykes-l'icot  agreement  or by the  Balfour Declara- 
tion.    The  report rejected  the military plan  of two converging offensives, 
one  from Mesopotamia,   the other   from Palestine,   in  favor of a massive 
concentration of forces  in Palestine and a breakthrough to the North. 
It  expounded the   logistics  of this operation—troops,   supplies,   rail- 
ways,  port   facilities,   shipping—and offered  suggestions about   tactics. 
Smuts kindled General Allenby's  enthusiasm for a hammerblow to destroy 
the Turkish lines and  a deployment of  forces   to mop up  their armies. 
In a  letter  to Smuts  on September  25,   1918,  L.   S.   Amery made mention 
of Allenby's success  and of Smuts's role   in planning the  strategy. 
"I  can't help thinking  that  your   (Smuts's)   continuous urging of  the 
idea of a  great  cavalry raid upon  him nadn't  a good  deal   to do with 
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his present   achievement." 
Upon   Smuts's arrival   in London on March  1,  1918 from his mission 
to tne Middle East  the Germans were about  to unleash  their great offen- 
sive upon France.     This  last   great offensive  on the Western Front began 
March   21,   1918 with an attack which  forced  the British armies into 
rapid retreat with heavy losses  of men and  guns.    By March 25 the Ger- 
mans had advanced   15 miles. 
Throughout   the  three month period of the German onslaught  Smuts's 
resolution never faltered.    On March 26 he wrote to Mrs. Margaret Gillett 
and viewed an allied victory as  the only nope  for future generations. 
The Germans  had just opened  their massive offensive and  the allied 
leaders were   conferring at Doullens,  France.     General  Haig was envisag- 
ing a British  retreat nortnward to  the Cnannel  ports;  Petain was making 
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preparations   for a French retreat   southward;  Foch was  insistent   upon 
holding  the united   front. Smuts did not know how the discussions were 
going at  Doullens but   he tended   to side with Foch. 
He wrote to Margaret Gillett: 
It   is  undoubtedly  a dark hour   for this  country and   the world. 
The Cermans are within sight  of victory but   the little distance 
between them and   their desire may be  large  enough for  the miracle 
once more  to be wrought.     If not,   then in our day anyhow ttie   Devil 
triumphs,   and  this   generation will drill and prepare and scheme 
for  the greater wars which will engulf the next generation.   .   .   . 
A German victory wliich will mean for  the West what   it   has meant 
for Russia will  be  horrible  to contemplate.    May God  give strength 
to our boys who are  standing  in  the breach.™ 
Three problems   trouble Smuts  during this  period.     His letters   to 
Alice Clark, Margaret  Gillett,   David Lloyd George, and  to his wife  re- 
flect his  concern over Ireland,   trie   state of public opinion to trie 
great   issues of war and peace,   and   the inactivity of the American 
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army. 
Two events had   brought  the  Irish question   to a  crisis:     first, 
the military emergency,   which forced   the government,   if only to satisfy 
British public opinion,   to bring Ireland within  the conscription  law; 
secondly,   the report of  the Irish Convention which forced   it  to face 
the problem of Home Rule.     From the beginning,   Smuts  took his stand 
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upon the principle "Home  Rule before Conscription  is applied." 
Meanwhile,   the nationalist Irish were   falling into  line behind Sinn 
Fein and moving rapidly  toward rebellion.    On May  9 Smuts  took his 
stand  on  the  Irish question in a forceful  letter  to David Lloyd George. 
He declared   that  Irish home rule would  have to be dropped   for the present 
and with  it   Irish  conscription. 
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I   feel  very much perturbed over the Home Rule Bill,  and I  look 
upon   it as  the most  dangerous  snag on the path of  the Govern- 
ment.   ...    My advice  in regard  to this matter was not   followed 
before, viz.   not   to touch conscription in Ireland  till  Home Rule 
was  an accomplished   fact.     Even so I would again tender you advice. 
Inform Parliament   that before   introducing the Home Rule Bill which 
the  government have prepared  you are trying to obtain  the adhesion 
of both Irish parties  to it,   as at  such a time you do not  feel 
justified  in asking Parliament   to divert  their attention  from the 
war   to a Home Rule  Bill which does not meet with a substantial 
measure of agreement   from the people of Ireland and as  a whole. 
...   I do not  consider  the enforcement of conscription  a prac- 
tical measure  in the present   temper of Ireland.   ...   In respect 
of Man-power   the Americans must make good  the  failure of  the 
Irish.7/ 
In  the spring and  summer of  1918, while he was  considering the 
worst possible consequences of a German victory,   he was  also  consider- 
ing the worst possible   consequences of an allied victory.    What he 
particularly   f'.ared was   tnat   trie allies,   after having repelled  the 
German offensive,   might  be  tempted   to prolong the war until  they had 
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achieved a  "knock-out blow."        He   feared  that   they would   let   themselves 
slide   into   the unlimited use of force for unlimited objectives,   regard- 
less of the   consequences   of the nations  involved. 
The  theme of victory but not  overwhelming victory and resolu- 
tion  to achieve just ends permeates  Smuts's speech of May  17 when he 
appeared   in Glasgow to receive the Freedom of City.     His   speech was 
fully reported   in Glasgow but not   in  the London papers.     The Times 
report stressed  the passages  on the need  to achieve victory and  the 
dangers  of pacificism,  but  omitted  those on the impossibility of de- 
livering a knockout  blow and  the undesirability of smashing Germany 
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and   imposing a dictated peace. Smuts offered several reasons why 
the German offensive would  be  contained and repelled.     These were the 
heroism of the  British army,   the achievement at  long last  of unity of 
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command  under  Marshal Foch,   the  inspired   leadership of David Lloyd 
George,   the  sacrifices of  the British people,   and   the assistance of 
the American people. 
Smuts  now moved  to  the contrasting German and allied  concep- 
tions of victory:     the Germans were fighting an offensive war   for 
unlimited   objectives,   the Allies  a defensive war  for  limited objec- 
tives.     The Germans must march  to Paris,   the Allies  need not  march 
to Berlin. 
...  We have not  gone   into  the war with any aggressive or 
offensive  spirit.     When   this  nation made  its  great  choice 
of August   1914,   it went   into  the war  as a war  of defense, 
of defense of  the  liberties  of mankind,  of the rights  of 
small  nations,  and of  the public law of Europe.     That   is 
what we are  out   for.     That   is   our   idea of victory.     That 
is  our war aim,  and  for   that  we shall   fight until we  have 
succeeded,   and until we  have won.    We are not  out  to   smash any 
country or Government.     We are not making this war drag on 
uselessly  in   order   to attain   some   impossible  victory.     We 
have  a   limited   object.    .    .   .     When  we   talk of  victory  we  don't 
mean marching   to the Rhine, we  don't  mean marching on  Berlin, 
we don't mean  going on with the war until we have smashed 
Germany and   the German  Empire,   and are able  to dictate  peace 
to  the  enemy   in his   capital.°0 
Whether or  not  the objectives enumerated  in Smuts's  own draft 
for Lloyd George's   Caxton Hall speech,  and   in President Wilson's   Four- 
teen Points were all "defensive" may well  be disputed.     Smuts was, 
however,   justified   by his  interpretation of  the allied objectives   in 
calling him "limited."    He was  justified   in emphasizing the dangers 
of a prolonged war   for  the sake of undefined  objectives. 
The result may be that   the civilization we are out  to save and 
to   safeguard may be  jeopardised   itself.     It may be  that   in  the 
end  you will have  the  universal  bankruptcy of government and 
you  let   loose   the forces of revolution,  which may engulf what 
we  have so  far  built up in Europe, because civilization   is not 
an   indestructible  entity. n 
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In  liis  Glasgow  speech  Smuts   attempted   to make  his   audience 
understand   that   a middle way was   possible  between  yielding,   as   the 
Russians  had   done,   and  fighting  for   a decided  military  victory. 
Diplomacy,  Smuts declared,   must assist military power to bring the 
war to a victorious  end.    These steps  he had  in mind:     first,   informal 
soundings  such as  he and Philip Kerr  had conducted with the Austrians; 
secondly,   acceptance  by  the   enemy  of  preliminaries   of peace   embodying 
the essential  allied  demands;   thirdly,   a formal  peace  conference  to 
fill   in   the details. 
Smuts's Glasgow speech resulted   in misunderstandings  and mis- 
representations.     On July 30 Lord Lansdowne claimed   the support  of 
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Smuts   for  his  own  program of   peace  by   negotiations.        Emily  Hobhouse 
wrote  to Smuts  to implore him  to make   just another such speech and he 
would bring down Lloyd George.     "A  strong man,"  she declared,   "who 
will snap his   fingers  at  the Press and who has a policy for peace 
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could bo Prime Minister of England before Christmas." 
Between May 28 and June  14  the  Germans made their  last   violent 
bid   for  total victory.     Their   threat   to  the French army and  to Paris 
itself brought  to a head  the   third of   the  issues which  had been bother- 
ing Smuts.     Since  the opening of  the  great German offensive at   the  end 
of March Smuts believed   that  the American army should   show its   strength. 
In  a private  letter  to Lloyd George on June 8,   1918 he  offered   to lead 
the Americans  into battle. 
Smuts  believed   it  possible  that   the Germans  might  make  a  peace 
offer  in  the winter.     He believed that   the Germans might  think   it  a 
good  policy,   in view of  their  victory  in   the east,   to propose a 
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moderate settlement   in the west.    They might  begin with an agreement 
to evacuate  Belgium and northern France.     Smuts did not  see how the 
allied  governments  could refuse an   invitation to a peace  conference 
on  such  a  basis. 
The American Army will be  there   [in France]   but  it will  be without 
a reliable Higher  Command.     Pershing  is very  commonplace, without 
real war  experience,  and already  overwhelmed by the  initial dif- 
ficulties  of a job too big  for him.     It   is also doubtful whether 
he will  loyally  cooperate with the Allied higher commands.   .   .   . 
What   is  to be done? 
I  would propose  that we  suggest  to President Wilson a re- 
organization  of  the American  Command.    ...      I   am naturally most 
reluctant   to bring  forward  my own  name as you  can well understand. 
But   I   have unusual experience and  qualifications to   lead  a  force 
sucli as the American army will be   in an offensive campaign.     I 
think  if American  amour propre could be  satisfied  I   could   in  that 
capacity render very great   service  to our Cause.°* 
Lloyd George did not  allow Smuts's  suggestion go beyond him, 
either  at   that   time  or   later  when he  published  his  War  Memoirs. 
Smuts's   letter  of June   8 was   first  published   in   1954  in  Tempestuous 
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Journey. It was  early in June that  he made his   suggestions   to 
Lloyd George and  there was  still  no sign of  the German offensive 
weakening.     Nor was   there any sign of  the American   forces  going  into 
offensive  action.     Smuts was not  arrogant when he  offered  himself as 
leader of  the American   forces.     Perhaps   the real motive was his passion 
for action and  for personal  commitment   in a cause and at  a  crisis which 
he thought   crucial.     Smuts himself thought  that American pride would 
stand   in  the way but  he did not   lay himself open to  the charge of 
tactlessness.     This was  a private  letter   to David Lloyd George and 
Smuts   trusted Lloyd George  to supply tact   if he took up  the proposal 
with  President Wilson.     Lloyd  George  decided   to  let   the  proposal   go 
no  further. 
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Smuts   believed that  by prolonging the war the British Empire 
could make sure o£  crushing the Germans but might  find   itself at   the 
same time reduced  to  the  status  of a  second  or  third rate power.     The 
leadership of   the world would  go  to America and  Europe would have 
fought  herself  to a  finish.     He stated his regret that Lloyd George 
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was "the author of the   'knock out  blow.'" 
As   the   autumn of 1918 approached the allies found within  their 
grasp the "overwhelming victory" which Smuts had repeatedly  stated 
that he did not want.    When allied victory arrived he was   slow to 
admit  it.     As   late as October 22,   in  a letter   to his wife,     Smuts  ex- 
pressed doubt   that  the end of the   fighting would  come before   the  end 
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of the year. On October   23,   in   two  successive memoranda for the 
War Cabinet,   he  asserted  that   it might  take another year   to beat  the 
Germans. 
However,   on October 4 Prince Max of Baden had told President 
Wilson that Germany accepted  his principles of peace and wanted him 
to arrange an armistice.     Smuts had anticipated  another year of fight- 
ing because   the  allies,   in his view,  were trying   to get   the wrong 
peace settlement   in the wrong way.     President Wilson was  discussing 
with  the Germans,  but not with the allies, the  principles,   but  not 
the   terms of peace;  the allies were discussing with each other the 
terms of the armistice.     It was  the President's main purpose  to get 
his Points,  Particulars,   and Principles  accepted;   it was   the allies' 
main  purpose  to  assert   their military power.    As Lloyd George said   in 
his War Memoirs:     "It was not   sufficient  for Germany to express readi- 
ness   to negotiate  on the basis of the Fourteen Points unless we were 
J 
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in a position   to  insist  on her accepting our exegesis  of  the sacred 
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text." 
The proposed armistice terms were so drastic that   there was a 
possibility  that  the Germans might  refuse  to accept  them.     They 
might prefer  to   fight a war of national defense   on their own frontiers, 
thereby putting the  stigma of aggression upon  the allies  and  leaving 
them to argue among  themselves who was responsible for prolonging the 
war.     Smuts  believed   this was a risk which Britain and   the  British 
Empire could  not  accept.     It was principally the   British effort which 
had  contributed   to the dramatic victories of the   summer and autumn. 
The peace,   if  it   came now,  would be  a British peace.     If peace were 
postponed   for another year   it would  be an American peace.     Smuts 
stated   that   it was not  the predominance of America but   the   fate of 
Europe which he  had   in the   forefront  of his mind. 
Smuts  argued  that peace negotiations had  followed   the wrong 
road and  that   it was a matter of priority to get   them back on  the 
correct road.     He proposed   that   the allies  should  make  it   their  first 
objective  to  get   the Preliminaries  of Peace concluded.     He  listed   the 
main heads of   the Preliminaries  of Peace:     first,   the whole program 
of British Commonwealth security which he had agreed with Amery eighteen 
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months  earlier;       then,   the  evacuation and restoration of all   the oc- 
cupied   countries;     the evacuation of Alsace-Lorraine,  to  be  followed 
by a plebiscite;   cession to Italy of the Trentino and some other terri- 
tories;   complete autonomy of Bohemia  in a federal Austria;   complete 
self-determination  of the south Slavic peoples;   independence of Poland 
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with  access   to the sea;  revision of the  treaties of Brest-Litovsk 
90 
and  Bucharest;   establishment  of the League of Nations. 
Through his membership  in  the British War Cabinet   and his  com- 
mission  in   the British army,   Smuts   exerted an active and   sometimes 
dominant  role  in British affairs.     This   is  illustrated by his meetings 
with Mensdorff and   the  fact   that on October 22 Smuts was   entrusted to 
guide  the demobilization plans of all  the British departments and  to 
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assemble  the  British brief  for  the Peace Conference. 
Smuts   looked   forward   to the Paris Peace  Conference.     He  expected 
to establish  a new political   order which would  give  nations,  at   long 
last,   liberty and peace.    The League would promote   international under- 
standing while  the   commonwealth would   bind   together  politically   the 
nations  of  the old British Empire.    Also,  he expected  the  Peace Confer- 
ence to build  a solid  foundation for  this new order  by making a prudent 
and magnanimous peace treaty,   just   like  the pledge   from Prime Minister 
Campbell-Bannerman  in  1906  that  committed Great  Britain to  a policy of 
trust  toward  the Boers. 
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CHAPTER III 
SMUTS  IN PARIS,   1919 
The activities  of Jan C.  Smuts  from January   1919 until July 
1919 indicate   tne great wealth of   influence he  exerted over  tne 
course of tne  Paris Peace Conference.    Some of his writings  served 
as  a basis  for Wilson's  idea of a  league;   his mastery of tne   intract- 
able problems  of tne treaty aided President Wilson  and Prime Minister 
Lloyd George;   and  his  predictions  of a future war with Germany indi- 
cated his perception of the problems at hand.    Tne  Selections   from the 
Smuts Papers   and  David Lloyd George's Memoirs of  the Peace Conference 
snow that Smuts  passionately and persistently searched out and probed 
the   issues of   crucial   importance.     From January to June he wrote 
almost  every day a  letter or a memorandum which dealt with  tne Paris 
Peace Conference. 
Perhaps  his most   important memorandum was   tne   pamphlet,  The 
League of Nations;  A Practical   Suggestion,  made public by the British 
government on  December  16,   1918 and written  two weeks   earlier.     This 
document, more   than any other  served   to synthesize  the  ideas of Presi- 
1 
dent  Wilson  into a coherent  and  reasoned dialogue.       Even earlier,   in 
an address to  the London League of Nations Society on May 14,   1917 he 
had  strongly advocated  the  creation at  the war's  end   of an organization 
2 
to maintain  international rights  and   general peace.       Also, on May   18, 
1918,   six months  before  the Armistice,  Smuts  stated  his disagreement 
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with  the  idea of smasning Germany completely.     "I don't   tnink an out- 
and-out victory is possible  for any group of nations," he  said;   "the 
3 
civilization we are out  to save may be jeopardized itself." 
Earlier  in  the war, proposals   to set up  international machinery 
for the  settlement  of disputes  and prevention of future wars  had come 
before  the British  cabinet.    Lord  Robert Cecil,   then Undersecretary 
for Foreign Affairs,   and   later a devoted advocate of the League, wrote 
4 
the first official memorandum on  the  subject.      His brief state paper 
was submitted   to the  British Cabinet on October 12,   1916 and was studied 
by Colonel  Edward M.   House on September 3,   1917.    Lord  Cecil's  initia- 
tive encouraged  the  appointment of Lord Phillimore's Committee,   a dis- 
5 
tinguished  group which reported   to the Prime Minister  in March 1918. 
Shortly after   the Phillimore Committee's report a similar group  in 
France,   sponsored by tne French government under the chairmanship of 
Leon Bourgeois,   came  up with a similar plan.     In his Le_ Traite d_e  1919 
et   la Societe des Nations,   Bourgeois discussed  the French plan  for a 
league of nations.    Lloyd George,  who wrote  that  the Bourgeois  Committee 
was   formed  by  the French under British  impetus,   found  its  concept  to be 
"bolder and more  imaginative  than  the Phillimore report," particularly 
in   its detailed   and precise   treatment  of the powers and  constitution of 
6 
the  proposed   league.     Since none of these semiofficial schemes,   British 
or French,   appeared  entirely acceptable,   the Prime Minister appealed to 
7 
Smuts to prepare  another.       Tne result was The League of Nations:    A 
Practical Suggestion,  made  public by the British government  on December 
16,   1918. 
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In his   foreword  Smuts referred   to  it  as  a  "short  sketch  .   .   . 
hastily written at  the  last moment,  and  amid other pressing duties, 
8 
in view of the  early meeting of  the peace conference."      In  twenty- 
one propositions Smuts  sought  to demonstrate  the workability  of the 
league  idea, which he considered   the most  important and  far-reaching 
of all matters   that  the Peace Conference would   consider.    A revival of 
the spoils  system at  the war's end,  he warned, would bring despair and 
Bolshevism;   a  league of nations must become in the  broadest  sense the 
reversionary of   the dissolving empires.     "Europe  is being liquidated," 
wrote Smuts  in a phrase which was   to captivate Wilson;  "the  league  .   .   . 
9 
must be tne neir  to tnis  great  estate."       Smuts  tnen discussed   the 
potentials of the  league as  a mandatory power.    Former territories of 
Russia, Austria-Hungary,   and Turkey,   he  believed,   should be disposed 
of in accordance with  the  general   formula,   "No annexations,   and   the 
self-determination of nations."    Germany was different:    Alsace would 
justly revert  to France,   and   the fate of  the German colonies   in  the 
Pacific and Africa,   "inhabited by barbarians"  incapable of governing 
themselves,   should accord witn  the principles of Wilson's  celebrated 
Fifth Point  on tne  impartial  adjustment of colonial  claims, based on 
the  interests of   the populations  concerned. 
Smuts  offered a complete constitutional  scheme,   encompassing a 
general conference   for the broad discussion of  issues,   a council  of 
great powers  as permanent members and other states   in rotation  to   take 
executive action,   and  a secretariat,   and courts of arbitration and con- 
ciliation.     Referring specifically to   two  issues raised by Wilson  in 
the Fourteen Points—freedom of  the seas and establishment of an   equality 
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of trade  conditions  by the  removal of economic barriers between members 
of tne League,--issues highly controversial   in Britain--Smuts  cautiously 
suggested   that  tne  permanent   staff of the council  should make a detailed 
investigation of  tne application of  tnese principles  to the  circumstances 
of various  countries.    Touching on the complexities  of disarmament  he 
argued   for the nationalization and  inspection of armament  factories by 
a league  council  adding,   "There  is no doubt   that  the  influence of  Krupps 
has been harmful  to   the  great peace  interests of the world  and,   in  less 
10 
degree,   the same could be  said of most other similar undertakings." 
His  final propositions, which dealt with means  of preventing inter- 
national disputes   from developing into wars, were in substance a re- 
statement of  the Phillimore  Committee's report,   but   framed  in  language 
certainly   to appeal   to Wilson.     The  final paragraph of nis document 
bears  tnis out. 
For  there  is no  doubt that mankind   is once more on  the move  .   .   . 
tne  great  caravan of humanity is once more on the march.     Vast 
social and   industrial changes are  coming—perhaps upheavals which 
may,   in their magnitude and  effects,  be   comparable  to war  itself. 
A steadying,   controlling,   regulating influence will be required 
to give  stability to progress   .   .   .   (the League)  may well be 
destined   to mark a new era   in the government  of man,   and  become 
...   to all the   embodiment  and  living expression of  the moral 
and   spiritual unity of the human race 11 
Smuts's own words better describe  the  impact of his pamphlet 
upon the President  and the British Cabinet.     In a  letter  to Mrs. Margaret 
Gillett he states: 
It  is now  12 p.m.   (Dec.   27,   1918).     I have just returned  from the 
King's dinner where I had a  good   talk with Wilson.    He  is reading 
my paper.     I  told  him this was the great opportunity  in history and 
the  future would write us down very small people  if we did not mark 
a new stage   in world government. 
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My paper has made an enormous impression in nigh circles. I 
see from the Cabinet minutes that the Prime Minister called it 
'one of the ablest state papers he had ever read1 ... it was 
officially voted that it be given to Wilson to read to see our 
point of view! I feel rather pleased, knowing how hard I have 
fought   for  views,   to find my efforts have  produced   some result.** 
It was while Wilson was making his  first  contacts  in Europe  that 
he  came under  the  influence of Smuts's Practical Suggestion.    Although 
in his memoirs, Lloyd George   suggests  that Smuts  traveled  to Paris  to 
explain his  ideas  to President Wilson in advance of his   (Wilson's) 
visit  to London,   there  is no  evidence of this  in Selections   from the 
Smuts Papers.     Smuts's letter on December 27 to Margaret Gillett  sets 
the  record  straight. 
Wilson left London on December  31  to pay a ceremonial visit  to 
Italy.    While  enroute to Rome,  General Tasker II.   Bliss wrote  confi- 
dentially  from Paris  to the Secretary of War, Newton D.   Baker,   in 
Washington,   to describe the President as "in general   .   .   .  very much 
pleased" after  the various interviews with Lloyd  George  and  Balfour. 
"He was surprised  at  the mildness of the attitude of Mr. Lloyd George 
and  his  substantial  agreement with him [the President]   on various  impor- 
tant points.    He  [Wilson]   confessed he could not   feel quite sure as   to 
the permanence of Mr. Lloyd George's views."    Bliss's  letter  continued: 
He [the President]  was very much  impressed by a document which he 
described  as   thoroughly statesmanlike  in character which  nad been 
prepared by General Smuts.     He had nad  time  to study only part of 
this  and   intended  to finish it on his way to Italy.     He was struck 
by trie extraordinary resemblance of General Smuts'   views on such 
subjects as   the League of Nations  to tne American views.     In view 
of General   Smuts'   intimate  relations with the  British  government 
and  tne  fact   tnat he nad heard no criticism of. tne document, he 
hoped   that  these views might  be more or  less   tne governmental 
view.13 
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Wilson returned  to Paris on January  7.    The  following day he was 
ready to discuss with House a revision of   the Magnolia draft,   later 
14 
generally known as trie   first Paris draft. Since  this document was 
compiled after  the President  had had an opportunity to study  the Smuts 
proposals   in full  it  seems   to support  the  contention  tnat  in  several 
instances Wilson borrowed  directly from the  Smuts pamphlet.     He adopted 
the concept of an  executive   council of the Great Powers,   reinforced by 
the representatives chosen   from the lesser  states  in rotation,   and the 
idea of  the veto  in the council by three or more negative votes.    Wil- 
son's Article Two  of his  first Paris draft  borrowed  heavily  from the 
Smuts plan both in  context   and  language,  as  did his  disarmament proposals. 
There was a  specific reference,   in Smuts's  own words,   to the abolition of 
conscription and  to the regulation by tne League of  the numbers   in mili- 
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tia or volunteer armies. There was no  longer any provision  for com- 
pulsory arbitration,  an omission from tne Magnolia draft  also attribu- 
table to  the   influence of Smuts,  and of tne Phlllimore report.    Many 
of Smuts's recommendations  on   the guarantees  surrounding arbitration, 
and  the penalties  facing covenant-breaking states were almost   identical. 
The more  important  addition from Smuts were Wilson's four supple- 
mentary clauses.    These followed almost  exactly Smuts's proposals   for 
the league  "as  the successor   to the Empires,"   though Wilson amended  the 
original   to read,   "In respect   to the peoples  and territories which for- 
merly belonged  to Austria-Hungary,  and  to Turkey, and   in respect of the 
colonies  formerly under tne domination of tne German Empire." 
Wilson himself acknowledged Smuts'   influence on his   thoughts at 
this time  at  his White House  conference with  the members of  the Senate 
15 
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Committee on Foreign Relations on August  19,   1919.     On this occasion 
he explained   tlic origins of the covenant,   saying: 
.   .   .   between that  time  [ the writing of the Magnolia draft]   and 
the  time of the   formation of the commission on  the  league of 
nations,   I had   the advantage of seeing a paper done by General 
Smuts,   of South Africa, who seemed  to me to have done   some very 
clear   thinking,   particularly with regard  to what was  to be done 
with  the pieces  of the dismembered  empires.    After I got to Paris 
therefore,   I re-wrote tne  document   .   .   ,*" 
On January 18 the first  plenary session of tne Paris Peace Con- 
ference adopted tne procedure  greatly  favored  by Wilson of putting the 
framing of a  league  covenant   first on the  agenda.    On January  19 
Smuts and Wilson conferred.     In a  letter  to Margaret Gillett Smuts 
mentions  nis visit with Wilson. 
...   I  spent  last night witn Wilson till  11:30  (Jan.   19,   1919). 
He, Lord  Robert  Cecil and I   discussed  tne League of Nations.     His 
ideas   (may I  confess   it?)   seem mostly  taken  from that pamphlet. 
Even my mistakes  are appropriated.    This  seriously  alarms me,   as 
the paper was very hurriedly written as you  know,   and many things 
I would  now rather put differently.    Not  so Wilson;   for him the 
first   fine rapture is  enough.   " 
On January 19 Wilson sent  Smuts  a copy of his [Wilson's]   draft 
for the  league  of Nations.    Wilson's accompanying  letter  to  Smuts 
reads: 
My dear General  Smuts,   It  is with real pleasure that I send you 
the enclosed draft,   and  look forward  to  co-operating with you in 
perfecting  it. 
Since drafting it I  have made some emendations and additions 
which  I  shall hope   to discuss witn you,  but   tney do  not affect 
the larger   features of the plan. 2Q 
Cordially and  sincerely yours,    Woodrow Wilson. 
During his stay  in Paris Wilson listened   to  the suggestions  of 
Bliss and of David Hunter Miller,   legal adviser  to  the U.S. delegation, 
21 
together witn Secretary of State Lansing's  comments.       According to 
Lord Robert  Cecil, Lloyd George  "having entrusted General  Smuts and me 
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witli  the League negotiations   .   .   .   left  tne details very much  in our 
22 
hands."      In addition to general exchanges of views,   the conferees 
decided   to present  a resolution to the Paris Peace Conference  in 
favor  of tne covenant being  included   in  the  treaty.     This was drafted 
by Cecil and  later amended by Wilson and was accepted  by tne second 
23 
plenary session on January 25. 
On January  25 Wilson heard Smuts  address  the Council of Ten in 
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favor of Soutn Africa's  annexing outright German South-West Africa. 
Smuts, who supported his Premier, I.ouis   Botha,   argued   that   the area 
concerned was good  only for pastoral use and  could  be developed  only 
as a part of trie Union.     Apparently,   this was all he  could   find   to dif- 
ferentiate  it   from the other German possessions in Africa which he agreed 
might be   "mandated."    It  is  significant   tnat he prefaced his remarks with 
a statement of the difficulties which  faced  South Africa when the   issue 
of invading South-West Africa  had  formented  a serious rebellion there 
early  in the war.     The fact was   that Botha and Smuts   feared   to return 
25 
home  from Paris empty-handed. 
On January 26 President Wilson  invited Smuts and Lord  Cecil to 
his offices  in tne Palais Murat   to discuss   the British and American 
drafts.     Wilson showed  tnem his  now completed second Paris draft which 
contained  Smuts's   ideas.    Lord  Robert Cecil   considered  the document 
"verbose," and  spoke  to Smuts of "some propositions which appeared 
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obscure and   irrelevant." Smuts,   possibly aware that  Cecil was  criti- 
cizing  indirectly Smuts's  own views and phrases,  remarked,   "Neverthe- 
27 
less we must work with  it as our  basis." 
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Smuts was  by now more  concerned,   as was Lloyd  George,   about   the 
deadlock between  the  British  and Americans over  the   colonial question. 
On January 29,  after discussions with Lloyd George,   he delivered  to 
Colonel House  for Wilson's  consideration  a draft of his  compromise pro- 
posal.    His  plan was   that  in   the specific  cases  of  the so-called  "back- 
ward  areas," i.e.,   the Pacific  islands and German South-West Africa, 
the   territories   should be administered by  tne states   contiguous   to 
them,   as  an  integral part  of  their domain  and subject   to  their  laws. 
Formal  title would remain vested   in  the League,  which would safeguard 
the  interests of  tne native populations,   and to Which  an annual  report 
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would  be made. It   is  obvious  that  the   Smuts  resolutions, while 
respecting  the  letter of Wilson's mandate  proposals,   virtually per- 
mitted  annexation.    After debate,   an Anglo-American compromise was 
reached  on January  30, when Smuts's  proposal was  adopted subject  to the 
face-saving  formula that  it might be  reconsidered should   it  conflict   in 
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any way witn the   league  covenant as   finally drafted.   With Wilson's 
acceptance of the   first  of Smuts's  compromises the way was  cleared  for 
tne  creation of an Anglo-American draft of   the covenant. 
This was done after a meeting on January 31 of Wilson,  Smuts, 
Cecil,   and House had resolved  the Anglo-American differences on the 
league  scheme.    At Lord Cecil's   insistence   it was  decided  that   the   legal 
advisers   to  the British and American delegations,   Sir Cecil Hurst  and 
David Hunter Miller,   should put  the President's draft   into a form accept- 
able to  the British.     In evolving a compromise text much of the wording 
was  changed but,  according to Cecil,   "the substance was   for  the most 
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part  unaltered." 
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Smuts related his problems  at arriving at  a suitable  compromise: 
Our work continues  fairly satisfactorily.   .   .   .     The Americans 
and ourselves are  in tne main agreed on the lines  the League 
should   take.     But  of course   tiiere are many other parties  to 
consult and  influence.   .   .   .     The troubles are over the  tran- 
sient  things which now bulk very largely but will be forgotten 
in history.    Whether the boundary is  just nere  or  just there 
leaves me  stone   cold.     But   it   is over that boundary,  and not    .„ 
future world  government,   that  the principal heat   is developed. 
The resulting Hurst-Miller draft was   later accepted as  a basis 
of discussion  in the  league  commission, and  to the  embarrassment of 
Leon Bourgeois,   former Premier and   league advocate,   the French  plan 
was almost completely   ignored.     The  French,   however,   took revenge by 
their delaying tactics  and by several modifications   of  the covenant 
"essential to their  security,"  including abandonment  of  tne Wilson- 
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Smuts proposal   to abolish conscription. 
Concerning the many influences on  the  league  covenant David 
Hunter Miller  observed,   "Any definite detailed draft   prepared   in 
advance by one of the parties will  to some extent appear in the   final 
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text.   .   ." It   is  clear,  however,   that when the league  commission 
first met under Wilson's   chairmanship  in House's offices on February 
3,   1919,   it did  so to  consider a working document on wnich Wilson him- 
self had   exercised a commanding influence,  and that  the  impetus   for 
much of Wilson's   influence had come   from the President's  association 
with Smuts. 
During these  crucial meetings  of the league commission prior to 
final adoption of the  covenant, Wilson had  cause  to be  grateful   to 
Smuts  for  his  consistent  support.     Before the full commission,  Colonel 
35 
Stephen Bonsai       noted   that Smuts  spoke  "almost as rarely as House. 
31 
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His   best work was  done  in the committees and   in missionary work with 
recalcitrant delegates when he  could  play  ...  a   'lone hand,'   an activ- 
36 
ity   in which he   .   .   .   excelled."      When on February  8 he was   called on 
by   the President   to  commend   the mandates scheme to  the  league   commission, 
Smuts said:     "What we offer   is not a cornerstone of a new era but we 
hope   it  is   the opening wedge   that   if pushed will open a door  to better 
things.    A year hence, when   the world   has enjoyed a breathing spell and 
men   less war-crazed  have taken our place,  I believe   .   .   .   tnat   it will 
37 
be possible to   improve our plan."        Wilson paid Smuts   the  compliment 
of repeating his words   in his  speech of February 14 when he presented 
the   covenant  to  the  conference:     "A living thing is born   ...   it   is 
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practical and yet   it   is to purify,  to rectify,   to elevate." 
When the Armistice was  renewed on January 31,   Smuts  stated   in 
a letter to Artnur B.   Gillett   tnat tie thought  the  food  blockade was 
being   lifted,   and   that  at last  he  could  see a brighter   future  for Europe 
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and  for mankind. He recognized  a good  many problems,   but   thought that 
they were only transient difficulties which would be  forgotten in 
40 
history. 
On February  16 he revealed   in a  letter to Alice Clark that   the 
draft   of tne  covenant was already   in print.    He  stated: 
So   the draft of  the League   has  seen the daylignt.     It  is almost 
entirely my original  conception and I  am naturally pleased at 
the   acceptance of my  ideas.     I  have kept well  in the background 
so   that  the others might have  the credit for  the League as   in 
that way  their  co-operation could best  be secured. 
A draft   had been presented to  tne Conference on February   14,  and   the 
final draft of  tne   covenant was  agreed on on April  11. 
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In following tlie correspondence of Smuts during the Paris Peace 
Conference  there  appears,  after the middle  of  February,   to be a  change 
of feeling  from hope  that  the  Conference would be successful,   to appre- 
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hension. A break occurred  during this   time   in leadership at   tne con- 
ference.    Although  its  directing body,  tne Council of Ten,  which repre- 
sented   the   five  principal Powers,   continued regularly in session,   the 
chief personalities were  temporarily absent.     Wilson returned  to America 
and Lloyd George  returned  to London.     Smuts was  not an important  person 
in the official  hierarchy,  as  he himself put   it,   "only the  second rcpre- 
43 
scntative of South Africa." On February 15  he went  to England   to see 
about  some problems  that had arisen over South African demobilization and 
to settle  some pressing business.     There he  fell   ill with  influenza.    On 
February  11  he had  a violent  gastric attack during a visit   in cold weather 
to the old battlefield on the Marne,   and on his   return  to London,   suffered 
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a serious  relapse.     He was unable to return to Paris until March  23. 
While  recovering  in London,   the  conviction began to grow that 
the work   in Paris was progressing too  slowly.    The Peace Conference 
lacked a united purpose and goal.    The Council  of Ten (later  the  "Big 
Four")   could  have been an effective steering committee  if only it   could 
have made up  its minds on a united goal.    It  spent  the majority of the 
time treating  the symptoms of European disorder without diagnosing  its 
causes.     The Council began with  the  idea that  they would  call  in  the Ger- 
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mans    later     to negotiate   the treaty,   but they soon abandoned  the   idea. 
Meanwhile,   the nations of  central and   eastern Europe were  encouraged by 
the allies   to  stake out their  claims   in written memoranda and oral  argu- 
ments.    The  territorial committees were not given definite powers  and 
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terras of reference.     Thus,  the treaty began to  take shape   in a hap- 
hazard manner, without  any central   focus,   unless  the French were giving 
it onn.     The French had a clear view of what they wanted.     Their desire 
was to secure their own security by perpetuating the present military 
and political weakness of Germany.     For this reason they supported the 
effort of  the new eastern European states   to reverse  the predominance 
of power which the Germans of  the Habsburg and  Hohenzollcrn   empire had 
possessed   there. 
When  Smuts arrived  in Paris on Sunday, March  23 he  had   only a 
general  idea of the way things had been developing during his absence. 
In a letter   to Margaret Gillett he stated,   "I have not yet got  the hang 
of things  here and will only begin this morning to find  out what stage 
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has been reached by  the   innumerable committees." On March  26 he 
wrote to Lloyd George his  reflections  on what he had  observed  and 
learned about   the present  state of peace negotiations. 
I am seriously afraid   that  the peace  to which we are working is an 
impossible peace,   conceived on a wrong basis;   that   it will not be 
accepted  by Germany,   and,  even if accepted,   that   it will  prove 
utterly  unstable,   and only serve  to promote  the anarchy which  is 
rapidly overtaking Europe   .   .   . 
To my mind certain points  seem quite   clear and  elementary: 
1. We   cannot destroy Germany without  destroying Europe. 
2. We  cannot   save Europe without  the  cooperation of Germany. 
Yet we  are now preparing a peace which must destroy Germany,   and 
yet we  think we shall save Europe  by so doing!     The  fact   is,  the 
Germans  are, have been and will continue   to be  the dominant   factor 
on the Continent  of Europe,  and no permanent peace  is possible which 
is not based on that  fact.     The statesmen of the Vienna Congress 
were wiser   in their generation;   they looked upon France as  necessary 
to  Europe.     And  yet  we  presume   to  look down  upon   them and   their 
work!    My   fear  is  that  the Paris Peace Conference may prove one of 
the historic failures of the world;   that   the statesmen connected 
with it will return  to  their  countries broken,  discredited  men, 
and that   the Bolshevists will reap where   they have  sworn.   ' 
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At  first reading  this   letter  contains an obvious contradiction: 
Germany, Smuts said, was being destroyed;  Germany,  he  also said, was 
bound   to remain the dominant   factor   in Europe.    The contradiction  is 
resolved, however,  when one looks beneath the surface.     Smuts  combined 
his views of   the short-term and  long-term prospects.     He wanted  to 
stress  both   the harshness of the punishment planned  for Germany and 
its  inevitable impermanence.     To give an example of the harshness of 
the verdict  against Germany,   Smuts   cited the proposal  to restrict   the 
German  army  to 100,000 men. 
In poor unarmed Ireland, with her four or five million inhabitants, 
we had to keep more than 100,000 troops at the crisis of the war in 
order to maintain order. Germany with her seventy millions, with 
her intolerable internal conditions, and the most threatening ex- 
ternal dangers, has to be restricted to that number of troops . . . 
No government seriously determined to maintain order could possibly 
accept such a condition.   ° 
Smuts  did not believe  that  the penalties   imposed  upon Germany 
would prove effective   in the long run.     The Germans were  bound  to break 
free of  the bonds and  to   take their revenge,   starting with  the states 
which were built at  their expense.     His March 26  letter  to Lloyd George 
further reveals his  unique  grasp of the mood of the future. 
The  fact   is, neither Poland nor Bohemia will be politically possible 
without German goodwill  and assistance.   ...    My view is that   in 
trying to  break Ccrmany  in order  to create and  territorily satisfy 
these  smaller States, we are   labouring at  a task which  is bound  to 
fail.    We  shall get no peace  treaty now,  and Europe will know no 
peace hereafter.     And   in  the coming storms  these new States will 
be the  first  to go under.   y 
In  conclusion Smuts   stated   to Lloyd George  that   the allies should 
not  demand a large indemnity unless   they were  prepared  to supply  the 
Germans with the  raw materials and other  facilities   that would enable 
Germany  to pay  in goods.    The  last  sentence of his March 26 letter sums 
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up his  feelings   toward   the future   course  of Europe:     "... I greatly 
fear our present panic policy towards Germany will bring   failure on 
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this  Conference,   and   spell ruin for Europe." 
At   the end of March 1919 Smuts believed   that he had returned 
to Paris  in time  to prevent the   total subjugation of Germany.    On March 
27,   in his   letter  to Margaret C.  Gillett,   Smuts related  the effect  of 
his  actions   upon Lloyd  George. 
I   find  the Prime Minister still   leans on me more   than I  thought 
he was doing as we  had  tended   to drift  apart  since  the  general 
election and   its orgies of wild   statements  and doings.     However, 
the still,  small voice  is always   there  and   sometimes  something 
happens which makes  us listen  to  it.   ...     He  is  at  present 
leaning on me  again,   but one never knows  the orbits of minds 
like his.    As  usual  when 1 am pressing very hard on his   conscience, 
he wants   to send me   on some distant mission.5i 
Meanwhile,   on March 25 Lloyd  George  stated  the   fundamentals of 
a just  and durable peace,   and attempted to ensure  that   the  draft   treaty 
was built upon  these   fundamentals.     This was  the  Fontainebleau Memoran- 
dum, which was discussed   at  the meeting of the Council  of Four on March 
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27 and 28. This memorandum emphasized the potential  expansionist 
force of Bolshevism and   the weakness   of the   chain of new states which 
were strung out  along the western borders of Russia.     If the   outposts 
were weak there would be  no barrier behind  them.     The Habsburg empire, 
for all   its  faults,  had been an effective barrier.     Only the German 
barrier remained.    The memorandum concluded  that   it would be   folly to 
pursue  towards Germany a policy which would   leave  her helpless  in the 
face of Bolshevik attack and political   subversion.     Germany was,  there- 
fore, well placed  to act  as   the barrier against   its westward  expansion. 
Lloyd George,   therefore, had   committed himself to  a large part 
of the program which Smuts was urging upon him.     The Fontainebleau 
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Memorandum was divided   into two parts:     first,  "Some Considerations   for 
the Peace  Conference before  they  finally draft  their terms" and secondly, 
"An Outline  of the Peace Terms."    Basically,   it attempted  to  tone down 
the demands which   the French wished   to have  enforced against Germany. 
It offered   the French an alternative means of ensuring their  security, 
a British and American guarantee of  their  frontiers,   instead of pushing 
back the German frontiers. 
Until   the  time he wrote the memorandum to Lloyd George,   on March 
26,  Smuts was  busy day and night with routine business  of the proposed 
league as well as detailed  questions  such as   the future capital of the 
League,  and   the Japanese  attempt  to get racial  equality affirmed  in the 
covenant.    As   if these were not enough problems,  Smuts allowed himself 
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to become  involved   in  the  controversy over reparation. 
On  the night  of March 30 Smuts prepared  a "legal opinion" on 
Germany's  liability  to pay reparation.     The document  he submitted  has 
done more damage  to his reputation  than probably any other document 
that he ever  produced  in his entire  life.     He had not been a member of 
the reparation  committee,   he possessed no expert knowledge of economics, 
and he made a mistake by allowing himself  to give a snap judgment  on a 
crucial question which he did not at   the  time understand. 
The document  opens with a reference  to a clause contained   in the 
Lansing Note  of November 5,   1918, whereby  the obligation was put   upon 
Germany,   and  accepted  by her,   to make  compensation for the damage done 
to  the civilian populations  of the allies and their property by her "aggres- 
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sion" by  land,   by sea,  and   from the air. Smuts summed up his argument 
in   the   final  paragraph. 
79 
.   .   .  What was or   is   spent on   the citizen before he became a soldier, 
ox   after he has ceased   to be a soldier, or at any time  on his   family, 
represents  compensation  for damage done to civilians   and must   be made 
good by   the German Government  under any fair   interpretation of the 
above reservation.     This   includes  all war pensions and   separation 
allowances; which the German Government are  liable to make good,   in 
addition  to reparation or  compensation for all damage done to property 
of  the Allied peoples." 
The  charge   levelled against  Smuts as  the man responsible  for  im- 
posing upon Germany the   cost of the allied war pension and   separation 
allowances was put   into  circulation in 1920 by the publication of  the 
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History of the Paris Peace  Conference,   edited by H. W.  V.   Temperley. 
Though Smuts's responsibility for  intensifying the reparation  issue 
has been acknowledged only a small part of the responsibility actually 
rested  upon Smuts.     As has been noted, he had been remote  from the 
complexities  of the reparation problem up   to the  time he wrote his 
memorandum.     He wrote it   in a hurry on the eve of his departure for Hun- 
gary.    He made a mistake and he acknowledged the  fact. 
Apart  from  the reparation issue another problem developed which 
required   Smuts's  energies.     By March  1919  the political situation  in 
Hungary  commanded   the attention of  the Paris  Conference.    On March 29 
Orlando initiated a discussion of the Hungarian situation in   the Council 
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of Four. The   issue evolved out of Bela Kun's proclamation of a Soviet 
state and   the developing tensions between Rumania and Hungary. 
The war  had  not  caused as much suffering in Hungary as   in Austria, 
since the   country's wheat plains had  guaranteed her against  starvation. 
Yet,   the Allied blockade had   imposed  severe restrictions,   and was not 
lifted with  the armistice.     On March  20,  1919 the allied powers had re- 
quired that a neutral   zone  should be established between Hungary and 
80 
Rumania. This involved a reduction of Hungarian territory which the 
Hungarians suspected would become permanent. They therefore refused 
to withdraw from it. 
The   left   extremists,   led by Bela Kun gained  strength and on 
March 20 he became the effective head  of the government.    He proclaimed 
the Hungarian Soviet  Republic with the  political organization based on 
the Soviet  system of Soldiers', Workers'   and Peasants'  Councils. 
In a memorandum circulated at   the Paris Conference, Bela Kun 
stated  that  Hungary's  alliance with Russia was an informal "entente 
cordiale" of two   identically   constituted   governments which did  not  "in 
any way imply an aggressive  combination";   that  the Soviet republic was 
"ready to negotiate territorial questions on the basis of the principal 
of self-determination";   and  that   it would  "gladly welcome a civil and 
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diplomatic  mission  of   the  Entente  in  Budapest." 
Lloyd George seized this opportunity and promptly volunteered 
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the services  of General   Smuts. After   some discussion among Lloyd 
George,  Clemenceau,   and Wilson  it was agreed that Smuts  should  be sent 
to Hungary  to "investigate the   treatment   of our missions and to  examine 
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the question of the neutral zone."      As   for Smuts's   instructions,   they 
were rather open-ended.     He was  to explain to the Hungarian government 
that  the neutral  zone was established  "without any  intention of prejudicing 
the eventual  settlement   of the boundaries   between Hungary and Rumania;" he 
was empowered   to "make any adjustments  in  the boundaries of the neutral 
zone or  the method  of its   occupation by Allied troops" which might   further 
"the objects  of the Allied and Associated  Governments";  and he was  authorized 
"to proceed   to any place   .   .   .   and to  take  any steps which may enable him 
to carry out  these objects or others  closely connected with them." 
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Sir Henry Wilson  thought   it  "a curious business  that  a Welshman 
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was sending a Dutchman to  tell a Hungarian not   to fight a Rumanian." 
In order to reserve  the   full veto power of   the Conference,   the mission 
was  to be essentially British.    As  aides Smuts selected Allen Leeper 
and Harold Nicolson,   of  the Foreign Office;   Colonel Heyward,   of Military 
Intelligence;   Cyril Butler, of the Food Control  Commission;   and  Ernest 
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Lane,  his personal Aide-de-Camp. 
Smuts  and his  party arrived   in Budapest  in the morning of April 4 
and determined  to avoid any gesture or word which might suggest approval 
or recognition of the new regime.     He and his party refused   to reside 
at   the Ritz Hotel,  preferring to stay  in their railway cars.     Bela Kun 
sought,  however,   to use the mission to raise his  government's prestige. 
He  created  the  impression that  the  Soviet government had succeeded   in 
getting the respect  and attention of the Peace Conference and   that   the 
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visit  foreshadowed d_c   facto recognition. 
In his   initial  conference Smuts  explained   that   the line suggested 
at the Paris Conference,   the Vix note,   "was  not   intended  to be a perma- 
nent  political   frontier."    He went  on  to say   that  the neutral zone,   to 
be occupied by  the allies,   in order   to prevent disorders and military 
clashes, would  "in no way prejudice   the Hungarian case."    Smuts also 
promised removal  of the blockade and   friendly relations with the allies. 
Bela Kun countered that compliance with the terms would precipi- 
tate the immediate fall of his government. Should the allies insist on 
evacuation of  the neutral zone "there was no other party capable of 
assuming power" and of preventing chaos,  so that  the allies would have 
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to step  in and rule the country themselves. 
82 
During their second meeting Bela Kun offered  a counterproposal 
that  the Rumanian troops withdraw eastward to the Maros  line as origi- 
nally stipulated   in the Belgrade Military Convention of November  13, 
1918, while units of the Big Four  occupy the vastly  enlarged neutral 
zone.    After reading the  counterproposal  Smuts decided that   it was  too 
extravagant,   since the  Conference would not and could not  force  the 
Rumanians back  to  the Maros   line.     Smuts reiterated  his insistence  on 
an unqualified  acceptance of his  earlier memorandum.    While  Smuts was 
determined   to break off negotiations  then, Bela Kun  expected him to 
propose further  discussions and set  another meeting  for the  following 
morning.    Smuts,   however,   courteously broke off the  conversations and 
at 8:00 p.m.   order his   train  to move out  of the station. 
As  they stood   the train gradually began to move.     Smuts brought his 
head  to a  salute.    We glided out   into the night,   retaining in the 
retinas of our eyes   the picture of the four bewildered  faces  look- 
ing up  in blank amazement."" 
The Hungarian Soviet Republic was hopelessly  isolated.     Russia's 
Red Army was  a thousand  kilometers  away;   the Austrian government  sur- 
vived  as a satellite of  the allies.     Smuts'a mission had the effect  of 
strengthening  the  Big Four's resolve   to keep up the quarantine.     The 
Rumanians  in particular were eager  to exploit this favorable   situation. 
In the  early summer of 1919 the  Rumanian army advanced  on Budapest.     On 
August   1 Kun resigned and   fled   to Russia. 
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The newspapers proclaimed   the mission to have been a fiasco.       For 
Smuts,   the economic   collapse of  the Empire and its appalling human suffer- 
ing became an   "ineffaceable memory."    The day after his  return  from Hungary 
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Smuts wrote to Lord  Parmoor: 
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The world   is   literally going  to pieces unless the  cement of a 
new fellow  feeling can succeed  to bind  the broken  fragments  to- 
gether. .   .   .    What I  have  seen in Austria-Hungary will  remain an 
ineffaceable memory.' 
In combination with John Maynard Keynes,   economist and Principal 
Clerk to the Treasury,  and   its representative at  the Peace Conference, 
Smuts worked out  a plan  for getting the Danubian economies   functioning 
by means of an   international   loan guaranteed by  all  the powers. 
Smuts returned   from Budapest with hopes   that a  draft   treaty would 
emerge  that he   could   support.    Lloyd George was   fighting for  the Fontaine- 
bleau programme  and was achieving some measure of success,  particularly 
in the defeat  of the  French  plans   to detach  the Rhineland from Germany 
and  convert   it   into a buffer  state.    With strong encouragement   from Smuts, 
Lloyd George resisted   the strong pressure put on him by William Morris 
Hughes, Australian Prime Minister, who wanted to make   the reparation 
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harsher. In conversation with Smuts, Lloyd George expressed   fear that 
this pressure would  soon prove too strong.     Smuts's reply dated April 11, 
congratulated him on his  success  so   far and asked  him to stand   firm which 
reveals  his hope   for progress. 
My sole reason  in writing  is   to encourage you  in the  firm stand you 
have made,   and  to assure you of my whole-hearted support of the 
peace terms   in so  far as   they are settled.   .   .   . Upon our  shoulders 
rests  the responsibility of making peace,  and   if we   think that  the 
terms  so far  drafted  are  fair  and  just, we must  take   the responsi- 
bility and   face the music, whatever Parliaments or  peoples may  say.'1 
This  letter appears as  the  last of the hopeful  letters   that  Smuts 
wrote during the Peace Conference.     From Smuts's point of view,   the situa- 
tion now changed rapidly for the worse.     One  reason for   this change of 
attitude was President Wilson, who on May 15 accepted Clemenceau's  proposals 
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for the military occupation of Germany.    Smuts,  meanwhile,   had been 
fitting his proposals  for  getting  the wheels of Danubian industry   to 
turn again into the John M.   Keynes  plan for a general   financial settle- 
ment   in Europe,  propped up  by an international  loan.     These   ideas were 
far ahead of their   time.    On April  23 Smuts  delivered  his proposals   to 
the Supreme  Economic Council   (which had been  set up on February 8,   1919 
to deal with such matters  as   finance,   food,  and  shipping control during 
the period  of  the Armistice)   but   failed to win its support.     The Supreme 
Economic Council was   composed of five  delegates   from the  four principal 
powers and reported  directly to the Supreme  Council.     It did  not  take 
part   in drawing up  the economic  clauses of the Peace Treaty.     Smuts   said 
of the Committee:     "That is  another  talking shop which  does  nothing. 
Will  the Lord never rid us of these useless debating societies?    I   find 
myself  in a world where despair  seems  already  to have settled  on men's 
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souls." 
By the end of April Smuts was hard at work reviewing the reports 
of the  commissions as   they were sent  in for  incorporation  into   the draft 
treaty. 
General Botha and myself were going through  the   'Reparation'   clauses 
this  morning and  both agreed  that  some of the provisions were  impos- 
sible.   ...   I am much troubled over the peace  terms.     I  consider  them 
bad.    And wrong.    And they may not  be accepted.    The world may  lapse 
into  complete  chaos.'-* 
Smuts began to  think that  the Germans might  refuse to sign  the 
treaty,   or,   if they did  sign  it, would  fail to carry it  out.    He was 
at a loss as to what he   could do.     He did not want  to attack his  own 
side while the negotiations were still  going on,   but afterwards   it 
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might  be   too  late. 
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He decided   to write  to Lloyd George  summarizing his  objections 
to the draft  treaty.     This   letter,   dated May 5, was moderate in tone, 
but   in substance  it was more serious and  to  the point.     Smuts  stated 
that   important  changes   could be made   in the document  without  changing 
its  "structure or main contents," but  the  total  effect  of the  changes 
which he proposed would have been  far-ranging.     He emphasized  the  tactical 
advantage of making  these changes  before the draft  treaty was published. 
In his  letter Smuts   listed his proposed changes under  eight  categories: 
the  territorial   clauses,   the  occupation  terms,   the  denial   to Germany  of 
all aircraft,   the destruction of  all  aerodromes behind  her   frontiers, 
the reparation clauses,   the provisions as regards rivers and railways, 
the occupation provisions.    Under each head he wrote  a few words  giving 
the grounds  of his  criticism and  stating his remedies.     With these prin- 
cipal  changes he believed that  the draft  treaty could  be made acceptable 
and reasonable.    Otherwise,  Smuts   claimed,   the Germans would probably 
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refuse  to sign it. 
His appeal produced no result. Two days after he had composed the 
letter of protest to Lloyd George the treaty was presented to the Germans 
at Versailles. According to Smuts, the ceremony of presentation seemed 
"to have been   conceived  more  in a  spirit of making war   than making peace." 
From the period  of May 7 to May 29--the day when  the Germans de- 
livered   to the  allied  and associated Powers  their observations on  the 
draft   treaty and  their  counterproposals—Smuts's   letters  show a note of 
urgent warning.     He believed that Europe,  under  the treaty,   "will know 
no peace;  and   the undertaking to defend France against  aggression may 
76 
86 
77 
at any  time bring the British Empire also into  the  fire." Smuts and 
Botha took counsel as how best  to warn Lloyd George   that   in a future 
war Great Britain could no  longer   count  upon South African support.    On 
May 6 Smuts asked Lloyd George  for an assurance  that South Africa was 
not  committed  by  the proposed  treaty which promised  British military 
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support  to France  in the event of a German attack. On May 10 Lloyd 
Ceorge replied   that  the proposed peace treaty would  not be  binding on 
the  Dominions  until   it was  ratified by the Parliament of the Dominion 
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concerned. 
On May  14 Smuts  sent  a  letter  to Lloyd George and  to President 
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Wilson which warned   them of  the dangers of the peace   treaty.      Wilson 
replied on May  16  to state  his  belief that  the treaty on the whole was 
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not unjust  and   that Germany should  be held responsible   for   the war. 
Wilson's   letter reads  in part:     "I  feel the terrible responsibility of 
this whole business,   but  inevitably my thought goes back to  the very 
great offense against civilization which the German State  committed, 
and  the necessity for making  it evident once  for all  that such things 
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can lead only to  the most  severe punishment."        There   is no record of 
a specific reply by Lloyd George  to Smuts's   letter of May 14.     In a letter 
to Margaret C.     Gillett on May 19,  Smuts, however,   states  that "the Prime 
83 
Minister  is very angry with me." 
Smuts's   letter to Wilson and Lloyd George reads: 
The more I have  studied  the Peace Treaty as a whole,   the more I  dis- 
like it.     The  combined effect of  the territorial and reparation 
clauses   is  to make  it practically  impossible  for Germany to carry 
out   the provisions of the Treaty.   .   .   .     Under  this Treaty Europe 
will  know no peace; and   the undertaking  to defend France against 
aggression may at any time bring  the British Empire   into  the  fire. 
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I  am grieved beyond words that   such  should be  the result of our 
statesmanship.   ...     I   pray you will use your unrivalled power  and 
influence  to make the  final Treaty a more moderate and reasonable 
document. 
Democracy  is   looking to you who have killed Prussianism--the 
silent masses who have suffered mutely appeal  to you to  save them 
from the  fate  to which  Europe seems  now to be lapsing." 
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A  few days  after Wilson's reply  (May 16),  Smuts wrote a letter 
to Margaret Gillett,   giving  the  impression that Wilson had  failed him. 
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In later years,   though, he defended Wilson's reputation. 
In another   letter to Margaret C.  Gillett on May 16 Smuts appears 
to be at  a complete   loss as   to what to do about  the  treaty. 
I  am still  looking at  the Porcupine of mine,  I mean  the Peace Treaty, 
and   considering what  to do with the damned  thing.   .   .   .     Something 
else will have   to be done,   but  just exactly what?87 
But  on May 2  he arrived  at  the  answer.     He wrote a letter to his 
wife  telling her that he would  refuse  to sign  the  treaty unless  important 
changes were made  in   it. 
It  is  a  terrible  document,   not a peace  treaty but a war treaty,  and 
I  am troubled  in my conscience about putting my name   to such a docu- 
ment.     Under this Treaty  the  situation in Europe will become  intoler- 
able and a revolution must   come, or again,   in due course,   an explosion 
into war.   ...     I have already protested against  this,  and  I shall, 
if necessary,   go   further   in my resistance.   ...     I   feel my responsi- 
bility greatly,  and that   is why I  first want to do my best   to get   the 
Treaty altered.   ...    If the Germans  refuse to sign,   I  shall very 
probably set a campaign going  in the press and  on the platform in 
England and America  ... 
Smuts presently renewed his efforts for revision of the treaty. 
In a letter to Lloyd George two days later (May 22) he listed the most 
important  provisions which  in his opinion called  for amendment.     The 
terms were mostly the  same as  those he had  listed   in his letter  of May 
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5, but he  expressed more concern  at  the necessity of revising the  treaty. 
The Big Four,  however,   would not   contemplate in any way his proposals. 
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On May  26 Smuts   replied   to a  letter  from Lloyd George who had 
invited him [Smuts]   to   serve on  the Commission on Austrian Reparation. 
In the letter Smuts stated  that  he was against  payment  of all repara- 
tion by those   countries   for damage  done by the dead and dismembered 
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Austro-Hungarian Empire. In another  letter he  said   that  no matter 
what abstract  principles   of liability might be  affirmed,   the attempt 
to apply them to  the countries   carved out  of  the  former Austrian Empire 
would  lead   to nothing but  trouble,   friction,  and  economic difficulties, 
and would  probably drive   all  those  countries  some day "into league with 
91 
Germany against us." 
On May   29  the Germans submitted  their observations  and counter- 
proposals.     As   soon as he   saw the German reply  to the peace terms  he 
made  its basic argument   his own. 
They raise   the  point   to the  very  forefront which I  have always  con- 
sidered vital,  viz., that we are bound by the correspondence of  last 
October and November   to make a Wilson peace—that  is,   one within 
the  four  corners of  the Wilson Points and Speeches.     This was  a 
solemn  international  engagement which we must  keep.     It would be 
dreadful   if,  while the war began with a "scrap of paper,"  it were 
also to end with another "scrap of paper" and  the Allies'  breach 
of  their own undertaking.    I  am going to  fight   it out  on this 
basis.'^ 
In a  letter  to Woodrow Wilson,   Smuts raised  the same  issue:     was 
the treaty to be a  "Wilson peace" or a "scrap of paper"? 
If the Allies  end the war by  following the example of Germany at 
the beginning,   and also  confront   the world with a   'scrap of paper,' 
the discredit  on us will be so great  that I  shudder to  think of   its 
ultimate effect on public opinion.   ...     I   think the Germans make 
out a good  case  in regard to a number of provisions.     All  the one- 
sided provisions,  which   exclude reciprocity or equality, with which 
the Treaty  teems,   seem  to me  to be both against  the letter and 
spirit of your Points 93 
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In his  reply the next day Wilson ignored   totally  the main argu- 
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ment of Smuts's   letter. The only door remaining open   to Smuts now 
was  to prevail  upon Lloyd George  to be his advocate.    Appeals   to Lloyd 
George  since mid-March had been  ineffective.     Smuts shifted his plea  to 
his colleagues  of  the British  Empire Delegation.     The meetings  of the 
British  Empire Delegation at  the Peace  Conference, which were held 
after  the Germans had submitted   their   counterproposals, were attended 
by nine principal members  of the British Cabinet,   by all  the Dominion 
prime ministers,   and by all  the  other   overseas statesmen attending the 
peace conference.     According to Lloyd George,  they constituted   "one of 
the most  remarkable Cabinet  Councils  ever held by   the British  Empire." 
At  the meeting of May 30,   and again at the morning meeting of 
June 1,   Smuts  spoke.     Lloyd George had   given an account of some particu- 
lar criticisms which Smuts made  against   the draft   treaty,   but  not of the 
strong stand which he  took upon  the ground of fundamental principle. 
The pre-armistice   correspondence,   Smuts   declared,   constituted a  solemn 
agreement.     It  bound  the two parties  to make a "Wilson peace," and if 
the allied  and associated powers did   the opposite,   the war would  have 
ended with a "scrap of paper."    Smuts  did  not win  the meeting's  assent 
to that proposition,  but,  according to much of Smuts's  correspondence, 
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he won stronger support  than would  appear   from Lloyd George's account. 
At   the June   1 meeting of the British Empire Delegation,   the Prime 
Minister made a speech which was not  to review the main arguments  and 
proposals  that had  been put   forward but  to enumerate  those proposals 
which he was prepared  to urge upon   the Big Four.    These proposals were: 
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modification of the  clauses in the draft  treaty dealing with Germany's 
eastern frontier;  earlier entry of Germany  into the League of Nations; 
modification of the  clauses dealing with  the army of occupation;  and 
modification  of  the reparation clauses. 
In Lloyd George's program there were some items which pleased 
Smuts,  such as   the proposed plebiscite in Upper Silesia, but  the program 
as whole fell  short  of what he  considered vital  to the  future peace of 
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Europe.      On June 2 Smuts wrote a strong protest  to Lloyd Ceorge.    He 
claimed  that   the  limited amendments   that he [Lloyd George]   was proposing 
failed  to do   justice to  the views  expressed   the day before by several 
speakers of  the  British Empire Delegation,   including General Botha. 
No proper regard appears to have  been paid  to the general  feeling 
of the meeting,  and   the  limitation of the resolution to recording 
unanimity  in accepting  the proposals submitted by yourself at  the 
end  of the  afternoon meeting,   though perhaps  strictly accurate, 
cannot be  allowed  to pass unchallenged. 
In any   case,   so  far as I myself am concerned,   I wish to make 
it   clear  that   I  cannot agree to anything  less than  the very drastic 
course I  proposed  at   the beginning of the meeting,   viz.:     that the 
Peace Treaty should  be recast and   transformed,   so as to be more in 
accord with  our solemn undertakings, our public declarations,  and 
the requirements of a reasonable  and practicable policy.98 
Smuts was  now in open conflict with Lloyd George.     From  time to 
time Smuts had   exerted  considerable  leverage and had achieved  some re- 
sults.     Those results had   fallen short   of his aim.    He was now isolated. 
The statesmen of  the British Empire had  gone along with him part  of the 
way,  but  they had  also made  it clear  that they were not about  to go in 
open conflict  against   the British Prime Minister. 
On June  8,   1919 John Maynard Keynes,  economist and  British Treasury 
representative at  the Paris Peace Conference,  wrote  to Smuts  from London 
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to urge him to  carry on the   campaign against   the Peace Treaty.     Keynes 
had  just resigned   from the British delegation  to the Peace Conference 
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in protest  of the   indemnities   charged against Germany.       Keynes wrote: 
I hope   immensely that you  may come to the  conclusion  that   some 
public explanation of what  is really happening and a protest 
against   it  is now the right  course.     If so,   I am at your  service-- 
by pen or any other way.100 
On June  10 Smuts replied   to thank him for his   letter.     Smuts 
then asked John M.   Keynes  to write "an account, not   for the specialist 
but for the plain man,  of what   the  financial  and economic clauses of 
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the Treaty actually are and mean." 
At  this  same   time Smuts   concluded  that  "all accounts  reaching 
us   from England point  to the   fact that  the plain Englishman  is   satis- 
fied with  the Treaty,   just as  he was  satisfied with Lloyd George and 
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the   last   general   election." 
Meanwhile,   on June 21  Smuts sent a secret  telegram to General 
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Botha which  informed him that  he would not sign the treaty. On 
June 23,   in a  letter  to Margaret  C.  Gillett,   Smuts tells of his   talk 
with Prime Minister Botha concerning the  consequences  of their  signing 
the  treaty. 
I am not  going to sign  it  [the Treaty]   on any account.    What   the 
consequences of my act will  be I don't know and  to  some extent I 
don't   care.     Botha and myself were discussing last  night  the posi- 
tion as  it will affect South Africa.    Although he agrees with me, 
he must sign or we are out of the League of Nations.     I regret 
bitterly having to act differently from him or appearing more 
scrupulous   than him.    His  action is certainly nobler than mine. 
But I   can't help myself.104 
By June  28,  however,   Smuts  had reversed his position and agreed 
to sign the  treaty.     His decision  to sign the treaty showed his acceptance 
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of the fact   that he had responsibilities  to his   country, his  office,  and 
his family.     He had been linked   inseparably with Prime Minister Botha in 
creation of  the Union of South Africa and bringing it  to its present 
position   in  the world.     There was no doubt   in Smuts's mind  that  Botha 
had to sign  the  treaty,   for otherwise South Africa would lose her mandate 
over South-West Africa,  her membership   in the League of Nations,  and her 
new status within  the Commonwealth.     Smuts realized  that for him not  to 
sign the  treaty would mean a split   in  the party  and would ruin all  the 
work of state-building which he  and Botha had achieved   in seventeen 
years of working  together. 
Perhaps   the   following excerpt   from a letter  to Margaret Gillett 
reveals his   inner struggle  at  trying to arrive at   a decision on the 
treaty. 
... An  out-and-out attack on the Treaty will   .   .   .   find  a very 
limited  response,  and will  in fact  do much harm by openly playing 
into the hands of the  forces  of disorder.     It   is not criticism 
which  is wanted  but  constructive helpfulness   in building up quietly 
and slowly a new,  better,  more generous and humane spirit.   .   .   . 
I believe   in time and  tide  in the great affairs of the world,   and 
the present   time seems   inopportune  for the  things I  could   say. 
When he made up his mind   to sign  the  treaty he had in mind  the 
future of Europe as well as   the   future of South Africa.    He  thought  the 
treaty unworkable,   but he also thought   it necessary.    As he said  to John 
M.  Keynes,   a  formal peace was  needed to allow Europe and the world  to 
have a chance of regaining stability and peace.     To help  there would be 
the League of Nations.    The League was  embodied  in   the treaty and with- 
out  the treaty  there would be no League.     This  consideration by  itself 
probably helped  Smuts  change his mind about signing  the treaty. 
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In his many letters  from Paris,   Smuts  recalled his  belief  in 
the recuperative powers  of societies.     He believed  the war-ravaged 
countries  of Europe would make a recovery as rapidly as his  own South 
Africa had  done  after  the Boer War.     Before  this  could   happen they must 
have peace and a  treaty,   even  if  it were a bad one. 
In his   farewell  statement  upon   leaving England on July 18,   1919 
Smuts stated  that he had opposed   the  treaty,   "not in criticism but   in 
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faith."        He gave a list  of amendments which he believed would prove 
necessary and,   in  the years   to  come,  would become possible  as  "a new 
spirit  of generosity and humanity" sprang to life  in the heart  of the 
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peoples. This was a  familiar   list which he had enumerated  so often 
in his memoranda of the past  three months.    The  list  included  terri- 
torial   settlements  to revise,  guarantees  to waive, punishments  to 
forego, and   indemnities   to scale down.     This was a full revisionist 
programme.     Its achievement,   he said,   depended  upon two things:    upon 
the Germans proving themselves ready to  fulfill  the treaty as   far as   they 
were able; and  upon the allies recognizing that God had given  them the 
victory to use,   not   for their selfish ends,  but   for the highest  ideals 
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of humanity. 
A letter  to Margaret Gillctt  seemed to indicate that  Smuts had 
allowed  himself to cast doubt upon  the validity of everything which he 
had believed   in and   fought   for since  the  outbreak of the war.     "The 
last battle of the war is being fought out  in Paris and we  look like 
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losing  that battle and with   it  the whole war." 
It would be  contrary both to his   temperament and  to his philosophy 
to have   allowed himself to become  totally disillusioned.     In his 
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statement  to  the Press  on  June 28 he   repudiated   the idea that   the past 
four years of war and peace had  been  altogether   futile.     He  stated  that 
two great achievements had  been gained   from the  struggle and  suffering 
of the war.     The  first was   the overthrow of militarism,   and  the second 
was  the establishment of  the League of Nations.     "But the League," he 
added,   "is as yet  only a  form."    "It  still requires  the quickening life, 
which can only  come  from the  active  interest  and  vitalizing contact of 
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the peoples  themselves." And  in his   final public statement   on July 
18,   1919 before  returning  to  South Africa,  Smuts reminded  the  people of 
Great  Britain of  the 
brutal  fact   that Great   Britain is  a very small   island on  the  fringe 
of the Continent,  and   that on that   Continent  the seventy-odd mil- 
lion  Germans   represent   the most   important   and   formidable  national 
factor.     You  cannot have  a stable  Europe without a stable  settled 
Germany. *H 
Smuts's  concerns at Paris were   the establishment of the   league, 
the trusteeship system, and  the reparation issue.     Though the reparation 
issue embroiled  Smuts  in controversy,   he maintained   close  ties witli 
Wilson and  undertook special   assignments   to    Hungary.    He felt   the treaty 
was harmful  to  the  future of world peace  and seriously considered not 
signing it.    He saw,  however,   that  South Africa,  as well as  the  rest of 
the world, would  gain by being signatories of the peace.    Peace had been 
established along with a permanent League of Nations.    He hoped   that the 
real peace  of the people would   follow and make amends  for the shortcomings 
of the treaty. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE  INTER-WAR  PERIOD 
Upon the death on August   28,   1919 of Louis Botha, Prime Minister 
of South Africa,   Smuts was  selected by the ruling South African Party 
to assume   the  prime  ministership.     Critics   in   South Africa   led   by   General 
James B. Hertzog,   leader of   the Nationalist Party,   tried   to  identify 
his disqualifications   of  training  and  experience but   only  succeeded 
to bring to public attention   two  facts  that were well known.     Twenty- 
one years  had  passed  since Paul Kruger had made him State Attorney of 
the South African Republic but   in all   those years he  had   never once 
belonged  to  the parliamentary  opposition.    He had been away  from South 
Africa  from February 1916 to August   1919,  except   for one week at home 
between his military service   in East Africa and  his political  service 
in London.    After being home   for no more than  three weeks he  found him- 
self Prime Minister of South Africa.     In  the eyes of his political 
enemies,   such  a long absence was by  itself the proof that  he was alien- 
1 
ated from his   country and  thereby disqualified   from leading it. 
The absence had been   imposed  upon him by Prime Minister Botha. 
Smuts had not wanted  the  command  in East Africa and had refused  it when 
it was  first  offered.    Smuts accepted  service  in London upon  the   insis- 
2 
tent urging of Botha and the  full South African Cabinet.       He retained 
their full   support   throughout  his  entire   stay  in  Creat   Britain. 
Botha  and Smuts were   in  complete agreement  about South Africa's 
participation   in the war.     From the start of the war to its   finish they 
104 
held  constantly  in view two paramount   objectives:     national security 
and national status.     The  struggle  for  status was at   its  high point 
when Smuts reached London  in March  1917.    The protagonists of Imperial 
3 
Federation,   inspired  by Lionel Curtis,     were making their bid  for 
4 
victory.       Their  effort was   foundly defeated  by Smuts.     On April   11, 
1917,   in   conjunction with Robert  Borden,  Prime Minister of Canada,  and 
W. M.  Hughes, Prime Minister  of Australia, he asserted   the right of 
each self-governing dominion   to take  its place at the Paris Peace Con- 
5 
ference among the sovereign  nations of the world.      At Paris,  the out- 
ward signs   of South Africa's   sovereignty   in  international   law was   its 
signature  upon the  treaty and   its  original membership   in   the League of 
Nations.     On May 6 and May  15,   1919 Smuts  drafted and Botha signed   two 
letters  to  David Lloyd George which related to  the British   offer to 
France of a   treaty  of military guarantee.     Botha and Smuts   exacted  from 
Lloyd  George   the   admission   that   such  a  treaty would  be   binding upon  Great 
6 
Britain  alone. 
One result of  the perfectly  correct  exclusion of  the Dominions  from 
the obligation which   it   is  proposed to lay on the British people 
may well  be that   in  some  future continental war, Great   Britain may 
be at war and one or more of the Dominions may stand out and main- 
tain  their neutrality.     But   that  result   is   inevitable,   and  flows 
from the   independent  nationhood  of the  Dominions.' 
Smuts   calculated  that  the union of South Africa no  longer had 
anything to  gain by  challenging the British Empire,  as Hcrtzog of the 
Nationalist   opposition advocated, but  that   she had everything to gain 
in conjunction with  the   free nations  that were transforming  the empire 
into a commonwealth.     Smuts's opinion  toward  the  empire  is  best  summarized 
in his work on  the League of Nations. 
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Nations  in   their march  to power  tend  to pass  the purely national 
bounds; hence arise  the empires which embrace various  nations, 
sometimes  related   in blood and   institutions,   sometimes again dif- 
ferent  in race  and  hostile   in  temperament.     In a rudimentary way 
all   such composite  empires of  the  past were  leagues of nations, 
keeping the peace among  the  constituent nations but unfortunately 
doing so not  on the basis of freedom but repression.     Usually one 
dominant  nation   in the group overcame,   coerced and kept   the rest 
under.    The principle of nationality became over-strained and 
over developed,   and nourished   itself by exploiting other weaker 
nationalistics.     Nationality overgrown became   imperialism,   and 
the empire   led a  troubled  existence  on the ruin of the  freedom 
of  its constituent nations.    That was  the evil of the system,   but 
with however much  friction and  oppression,   the peace was usually 
kept   among  the nations   falling within the empire.    These  empires 
have all broken down,   and  today  the British Commonwealth  of Nations 
remains  the only embryo   league of nations because   it is based on 
the  true principles of national   freedom and political decentrali- 
sation.8 
Smuts made a distinction between national  sentiment and nationalism. 
To him national   sentiment   connoted a man's pride   in his own area and 
people;   it  was   unaggressive,   and,   consequently  compatible with  member- 
ship of free societies  such as   the Commonwealth and   the League of Nations. 
Nationalism was  to him the perversion  of  this pride;   it was  xenophobic, 
and  consequently the  enemy of   international order  in any form.     He be- 
lieved that  this danger of nationalism was evident   in Europe and also 
in South Africa.     While   the Paris Peace Conference was  still   in  session, 
General Hertzog had arrived   in Paris  to demand  liberation from British 
control for the entire Union of South Africa.     Having failed  that  task, 
he demanded   independence  for  the two Boer states.     In Smuts's  view 
these demands typified disruptive nationalism at  its worst.     Smuts  saw 
it as his duty to resist  these nationalist  ideas   in South Africa. 
He saw secession from the British Commonwealth as the  immediate 
issue.    Hertzog had raised  it  at Paris and many of his  followers   in 
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South Africa were  calling  for   it.     Smuts denounced  it  as a defeat   for 
10 
human solidarity,   for the Commonwealth and   for South Africa itself. 
Throughout  the months   from September  1920  to February 1921  Smuts 
was engaged  in a furious parliamentary election  campaign.    In the midst 
of  this   campaign  he   did  not   forget   the  many  problems  and  difficulties 
of the world.     In anticipation  of President Wilson's retirement   on 
March 4,   1921 he wrote for the  New York Times an article  entitled  "Wood- 
row Wilson's Place   in History."     "Wilson erred grievously but he wrought 
a great work  for the world  and   the  future will  justify him.     I want   to 
tell the Americans  something about  it and at  the same  time break a  lance 
11 
for the league." In November   1920 Smuts appointed Lord Robert  Cecil 
12 
as South Africa's  representative at the League of Nations Assembly. 
Believing that   the Great Powers were endangering the  future of the 
League by associating   it with  their own   interests,  he  instructed  Cecil 
to press  for the admission to  the League  of Nations of Germany and  the 
13 
other ex-enemy powers. At   the   same time he was  sufficiently a realist 
to understand  that a small power   like South Africa  could  achieve  little 
by acting  in  isolation.    For  this  reason he welcomed  the news which Lloyd 
George sent   him on October 25,   1920 that June  1921 would be the most   con- 
venient time  for a conference  of  the Prime Ministers of  the Empire. 
Smuts hoped  they would   hammer  out  policies  "to help set   the world  to 
14 
right." 
His  concept  of a world   set   to rights was   thus:     free and equal 
nations peacefully pursuing their  purposes within a  cooperative  inter- 
national order.     This was the  concept of  the Commonwealth which he had 
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15 
expounded   in May  1917;       it was the  concept  of the Commonwealth which 
he had  expounded   in  December   1918 in his book The League of Nations, 
16 
A Practical   Suggestion. He still believed   in  it, despite  the disil- 
lusioning experience  of national rivalries at   the Paris Peace Conference. 
He still   looked upon   the League as the guardian of national   freedom and 
world  peace.     Smuts  hoped that   the statesmen of  the Commonwealth would 
guide  the Great Powers   in the  right direction. 
Smuts wanted   the British Empire  to change  its name and   call   itself 
a Commonwealth;  but   the  change had  not  yet been made.    He made a list of 
the changes  that  still needed   to be made  in order  to establish  beyond  all 
possibility of dispute   the separate  South African nationhood which the 
17 
Paris Peace Conference  had recognized. South Africa's   formal  corres- 
pondence with.Great Britain,   like  that  of the other dominions,   was still 
conducted   through  the Colonial Office;   this also must be  changed.    South 
Africa's Governor-General still  represented  not  only the  king but the 
British government;   this must be  changed.     South Africa's   foreign rela- 
tions were  still  conducted  through the British Foreign Office;   this too 
must change.     The British Empire,   Smuts  insisted,   could  continue  to exist 
only on  the basis of  complete  freedom and  equality.    A new world  had 
arisen and a new empire  had  therefore to be molded.     That was the reason 
for holding the conference.    The major tenets of his  speeches on the 
forthcoming Conference of Prime Ministers were  that  the nations  of the 
world were members  together and  that South Africa's membership  in  the 
League and  the Commonwealth must be positive,  active, and cooperative. 
He said explicitly  that  he wanted  South Africa to exercise her influence 
18 
in the world. South African Party spokesmen countered Republican 
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propaganda by emphasizing the enhanced status of the  dominions  as put 
19 
forth  in Smuts's  speech of May  15,   1917.       These   ideas alarmed  nation- 
alists   in South Africa including James Hertzog and Daniel  F. Malan. 
Malan expressed  the   fear that   consultation at Imperial Conferences 
would drag South Africa into all  sorts of  imbroglios which the  South 
African people would   know nothing about  until after war had been de- 
20 
clared. 
Though Malan  appeared  to believe  that  Smuts was  subservient  to 
British  policy,   Imperialists   in Great Britain had  cause to think just 
the opposite.     They   saw Smuts  as  a danger to  the British Empire,   not 
because he did not  care  for  it but  because he did not understand  it. 
The Imperialists were   custodians of a tradition which maintained  that 
the Empire would stand or  fall by  its  ability  to speak with one voice 
on  the issues of foreign policy.     To the Imperialists of 1920  the day 
of disruption appeared   imminent.     In  logic they could   see one way of 
reconciling the  Empire's  time-honored diplomatic unity with   the   increas- 
ing autonomy of its  several parts:     imperial  federation.    They recalled 
that Smuts had been principally responsible  for killing the hopes of 
imperial  federation in   1917.    The question of the constitutional rela- 
tions of Great Britain and  the  Dominions  came  into open debate  at  the 
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Imperial Conference of  1911. Sir Joseph Ward, Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, presented  a plan,   inspired by Lionel Curtis,   for federating 
the self-governing units of the  Empire.     Sir Wilfred Laurier, Prime 
Minister of Canada,  and General Botha successfully opposed  it  as did 
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all the other Prime Ministers.       At  the Imperial Conference of  1917 the 
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constitution of  the  Empire was again on the agenda.    Smuts helped  to 
frame a resolution which was moved by Sir Robert  Borden,   seconded 
by William F. Massey,  Prime Minister of New Zealand, and  adopted by 
the conference on April  16,   1917.     The resolution stated  that  the 
readjustment of  the constitutional  relations of the Empire should be 
the subject of a special  conference to be summoned after  the war,  but 
added that   "any  such adjustment,  while thoroughly preserving all  existing 
powers of self-government and   complete control of domestic affairs, 
should be based  upon a  full recognition of the dominions as autonomous 
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nations of an Imperial  Commonwealth." 
Smuts went  on to   say that   although  the dominions enjoyed great 
freedom,  their status was   in theory  still  that of "subject provinces 
of Great Britain" and   their standing as equal nations of the Empire 
would have  to be  specifically recognized.     Smuts  expounded   this view 
of the British Commonwealth as   a community of nations linked by common 
allegiance to the   crown in a speech   to members of Parliament   in Great 
Britain on May  15,   1917.     The status of the dominions was  further enhanced 
by their recognition as  autonomous   states at the peace conference and 
their admission as member  states of  the League of Nations.     However, 
legal recognition of their  independence had still  to be secured. 
In June 1921  Smuts  attended  a   conference of Prime Ministers and 
representatives of Great Britain,   the    ominions,  and  India in London. 
This conference was   to decide on the   agenda for the  constitutional con- 
ference  to be held   the  following year.     In anticipation of the up-coming 
assembly Smuts prepared a memorandum entitled "The Constitution of the 
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British Commonwealth, A General Declaration of Constitutional Rights." 
The following section contains the basis of Smuts's  concept of Common- 
wealth : 
...   It has been suggested by Mr.   Duncan Hall  in his  interesting 
book on  the British Commonwealth of Nations,   that  a declaration of 
Constitutional  Rights should be made which would  explain  the new 
developments  in  the Dominion Statutes,  remove obscurities,   set at 
rest doubts   and   abrogate what   is obsolete—a declaration,   in  fact, 
which would become a precedent  and  a most  important amendment of 
the unwritten  law of the   constitution.    Such a declaration would 
set out  that,   as  a matter of constitutional  right,   the British 
Parliament has no legislative power  in respect of the Dominions; 
that   the King has no more  constitutional right of vetoing Dominion 
Bills   than he has   in respect of British Bills;  and  that   the King 
in his Dominion Government has   in respect of foreign affairs affect- 
ing the  Dominions   the same constitutional right  that he has  as King 
in his  British Government   in respect of the United Kingdom." 
Near the  end  of his memorandum Smuts  emphasized   the need  for 
symbolic recognition of the  change  from Empire  to Commonwealth.    He 
proposed that   the  name British Empire should be   changed  to the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.    He  further proposed  that  each sister nation 
of the society should  adopt  its own distinctive national  flag. 
Smuts's memorandum of June 1921  contained by anticipation the 
Balfour Declaration of 1926 and  the entire   constitutional achievement 
from then until  the Statute of Westminster of 1931;  but  Smuts  gained no 
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credit  from it. He  found his plans  frustrated by the principle of 
unanimity, which he himself had declared  to be the  "bedrock"   in all the 
affairs of  the Commonwealth.     The principle of unanimity made  it possible 
for any Dominion Prime Minister  to veto any and every proposal   for con- 
stitutional  change.    William M.  Hughes of Australia declared himself 
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opposed  to  constitutional discussions of any kind. 
in 
Smuts  became the  target  of  his rhetoric and he realized  it.    He 
knew also that Hughes was  carrying the conference with him.    At  the 
July 22nd meeting of the  conference,  after the   important  business had 
been taken  care of—the Anglo-Japanese Treaty,   defense,   and foreign 
policy-Smuts   presented his  "Ceneral  Declaration of Constitutional 
Right."    No other Prime Minister supported him.    The result of this was 
a resolution repudiating not  only Smuts's proposed declaration,  but also 
28 
the constitutional   conference. 
Meanwhile,   the  issue of an Irish free state had  constantly occu- 
pied Smuts's attention since he publicly committed himself to that  cause 
in July  1919,  on the  even  of his return home after his   two and a half 
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years'   service   in Europe. For the next  two years he  saw no sign that 
Britain would heed his warning.     In January 1919 Pail Eireann  issued a 
declaration of Irish   independence and  set up a republican government. 
An Irish  state with  its own  judicial   and executive departments  and  army 
took shape within the United Kingdom.     In June  1920 the British govern- 
ment launched  a campaign to destroy  the Irish state by force.     In Decem- 
ber 1920 the Government of  Ireland Act  imposed  limited Home Rule upon 
the partitioned  areas of northern  and  southern Ireland.    Pail  Eireann 
denounced   the Act as   further British  aggression against an  independent 
Ireland. 
Many of Smuts's   friends wrote  to him to urge him to speak out on 
the Irish issue.     His   friend   and   fellow soldier  in the East African cam- 
paign, Tom Casement,  brother  of Roger Casement, had for some time been 
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sending Smuts  pamphlets  about   the  Irish problem.       Eamon de Valera approved 
Tom Casement's meeting with   Smuts   in London in order to try to get his 
32 
112 
31 
support  for  the Irish nationalist  cause at  the   imperial  conference. 
Also,  Sir Horace Flunkett,  Robert  Erskine Childers, and Lady Catherine 
Courtney believed   that Smuts was  the man  to mediate in the  Irish  crisis. 
When Smuts  arrived  in England on June 11,   1921  to attend the Prime 
Ministers Conference he made no public announcement on Ireland.     However, 
on June 13 during a luncheon  at Windsor Smuts and King Ceorge V discussed 
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the Irish question at   length. They also discussed the speech  that the 
King was  to deliver at  the opening of the new parliament   in Northern Ire- 
land on June   22.    At  the King's request,   Smuts  composed a draft of the 
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message,  a copy of which was  sent  to David Lloyd  George. Smuts  stated 
in this letter  that: 
...   in his speech  to  the Ulster parliament   the King should  fore- 
shadow the grant of Dominion status  to Ireland, and  point out  that 
the removal of all possibility of coercing Ulster now renders  such 
a solution possible.     The promise of Dominion  status by the King 
would  create a new and definite  situation which would  crystallize 
opinion favourably both in Ireland and  elsewhere.    Informal nego- 
tiations   could   then be  set  going with responsible Irish  leaders  and 
details—financial and   strategic—might  be discussed with the Domin- 
ion prime ministers,   if you  like   to do so.  " 
The King's speech,   as   finally drafted by Sir Edward Grigg, Lloyd 
George's private secretary,  reflected   the essence of Smuts's  feeling on 
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Ireland. A  letter  from Sir Edward Grigg to Lord   Stamfordham, private 
secretary  to King George V,   reveals  the importance  of Smuts  as a possible 
mediator between the British  government and  the Irish nationalists. 
am much  impressed by General Smuts's view,  because he has great 
isight  into political   situations;  but  there  is  a very difficult 
I 
in i t   i t li 
balance to be struck between  conflicting considerations.     I  know 
the prime minister has had   the position much at  heart,  and I am 
sure he will give his whole mind   immediately to General Smuts's 
suggestions.*» 
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The British Cabinet had decided to invite to London Eamon de 
Valera as  "the  chosen leader of  the majority of Southern Ireland," and 
Sir James Craig,   as  "the Premier of Northern Ireland."    The King had 
decided   that   its best  intermediary with the southern Irish would be 
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General Smuts. The  two adversaries,  however, were unable or unwilling 
to agree on a meeting.     If Craig went  to Dublin, he would  in effect  be 
recognizing de Valcra's claim to be  the lawful President  of a United 
Ireland;   if de Valera went   to London on the terms which Lloyd George 
had proposed both   to him and  to  Craig,  he would   in effect be recognizing 
Craig as  a  co-equal with himself   in a partitioned  Ireland.    It looked 
like an impasse. 
Smuts himself was  conferring with emissaries of de Valera in 
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London.       The prospects of a military   truce was  emerging  from de Valcra's 
talks with  the minority spokesmen  in southern Ireland and  the representa- 
tives of  the British  government.     Smuts waited  for an invitation from 
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the Irish  to meet with de Valera and   this came on July  1. Smuts 
M 
tried,   but without   success   to keep his mission to Dublin  secret.       Smuts 
insisted  that he had not  come  as an emissary of  the British government; 
he brought no proposals  from  that  government.    He assured  de Valera  that 
an intense desire for peace  existed   in England and  that  the King's  speech 
reflected  that desire.     Smuts  advised  de Valera to leave Ulster alone   for 
the present  and to concentrate his  efforts upon building  in the south a 
strong and   free state, which would   inevitably,   in the course of time, 
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exercise a magnetic attraction upon  the  six northern counties. 
Smuts had no actual part   in the Anglo-Irish negotiations; but he 
remained  informally in touch with both negotiating parties   throughout  his 
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stay in Britain.     He was due on August  5  to board ship   for South Africa. 
On August 4 he enclosed   to the King a copy of a long letter he had written 
the same day to de Valera reaffirming his  conviction that an Anglo-Irish 
settlement would   in the  end be  achieved. 
In his  letter  to de Valera Smuts recalled  the history of his own 
country,  which,  after a start   far  less promising than Ireland,  showed 
that  the dominion solution of her problems  actually worked.     If Ireland 
accepted   the  same  solution,  he said,   she would  find  support  in a great 
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society  of sister nations. 
Yet,   it appeared   that de Valera no  longer wanted  Smuts's advice, 
though he had arranged   for the meeting with Smuts  the   first week of July. 
On July   10,   1921 a military truce was  signed  and proclaimed  in Ireland. 
On July  12 dc Valera,   accompanied by his  lieutenants,  arrived  in London. 
In less  than two weeks,   however,   the Irish were back in Dublin without 
having reached any agreement with  the British on the basic principles 
of an Anglo-Irish settlement.     The British were prepared   to offer dominion 
status to   Ireland, provided  the  six counties of Northern Ireland were not 
brought   into the New Dominion without   their own consent.     The Irish were 
ready to accept  the status  of a dominion provided  they  could have  the 
six counties; but  if they  could  not,   they would accept nothing less   than 
complete  independence  for  southern Ireland. 
On  September  7  the British government   issued a new and  tactfully 
phrased  invitation  to a peace conference;   and on September   12 de Valera 
sent his  letter of acceptance.    The  conference held  its   first meeting on 
October  11  and reached  its   conclusion on December 6, with  the signature 
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of Articles of Agreement  for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ire- 
land. 
This Anglo-Irish agreement  became the prelude to bitter strife 
among Irishmen.     From South Africa Smuts  could not  see   the gathering 
storm in Dublin;  he saw only the   long-awaited miracle of Anglo-Irish 
reconciliation,   the resurrection of a nation,   the redemption of the 
Commonwealth.     He saw  the name Commonwealth written  formally into the 
treaty,  and  the  British  league of  free nations recognizing itself at 
long last  for what  it was.    With  these developments  the  frustration of 
Smuts's plan for  a General  Declaration of Right  seemed  at most  a trivial 
setback.     In the   following message sent   to the New York World  on December 
10,  1921 Smuts  stated  that: 
I congratulate Irishmen  in America and over the whole world on the 
successful solution at   last of the Irish question.     The  settlement 
follows  clearly on the  lines on which I advised  the Irish leaders 
to proceed  last  summer.   .   .   .     The old British Empire has once more 
proved  its wonderful power of combining,   as  it does,   the  complete 
freedom and   independence of each state with  close association in a 
world wide group of free   states.    It  satisfies both  the  sentiment 
of nationality and  the  tendency towards  international  co-operation 
which are  the   two most powerful   forces of our time.** 
His determination  to help  to achieve a workable peace  in Ireland 
underscored his desire  for unity and  cooperation among the nations of 
the world.     His  above statement  to  the press contains the germ of his 
Commonwealth doctrine.    Tbis definition of Commonwealth;   i.e.,   the com- 
bining of the   complete  freedom and   independence of each state with close 
association in a world-wide group of  free  states under the  leadership 
of a strong Britain,   remains   central  to Smuts's   thinking throughout his 
diplomatic career. 
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Back in South Africa Smuts  continually showed his faith   in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations.     His message to America on February 
4,  1924 upon news of President Wilson's death,   reflects this  faith.    He 
had  long forgotten his protests  to Wilson in May and June 1919.     In his 
telegram to Mrs.  Wilson he said  that   the world  shared her grief  at the 
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departure of a prince among  the sons  of men. 
Smuts  considered American isolationism as a major impediment  to 
economic and political recovery.     The departure of America from the 
European scene had removed  a balancing factor which Europe badly needed 
for her  stability.    At Paris, Wilson had been willing to join with 
Great  Britain  in  a  joint guarantee of French security;  but the Republi- 
can Senate refused  that obligation.     Smuts  seemed   to understand America; 
but he  failed  to understand   France.     A good   indication of his mistrust 
of France is evidence in his   letter  to Prime Minister Bonar I,aw on 
November 20,   1922.     Smuts  stated  that: 
Foreign policy   is going  to be  the  acid   test of your rule.    And   there 
I  frankly fear   that your government may lean  too much towards  France. 
French policy was for centuries  the  curse of Europe and  it was only 
the rise of Germany to  first place  that  changed her attitude.     Now 
Germany is down and out,   and  France is once more the  leader of the 
Continent with  all the old bad   instincts   fully alive in her.     Let 
the Germans be  made to pay what  and when and  how they can.     But  let 
the reparation  question not be  a cloak for  the dismemberment  of 
Germany and the  sowing of  the dragon's  teeth afresh  for the world. 
The  French are  out  for world power   . 46 
Smuts declared  that  the British Commonwealth must stand up   to 
France but he did not explain how the Commonwealth was to achieve  this. 
He seemed  to think  that Britain and  the Commonwealth  could be both non- 
interventionist and  authoritative.     He wanted non-intervention;  but  he 
did not want retreat.     Smuts   believed French policy would  inevitably 
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lead to war.     When asked by George Stadler,   Belgian representative  to 
the Reparations  Commission,   about   the  issue of continued German repara- 
tions, Smuts revealed  his   feeling of  futility toward French policy. 
Yesterday   (February 28,   1923)   the Belgian representative here [George 
Stadler]   came to  speak to me about   the Ruhr position.    His point was 
that without reparations  Belgium was bankrupt.     I  told him that  the 
only advice   I  could  give  the French and Belgian governments was to 
increase their armies very largely and to prepare  for the next war 
which  their   action was making a certainty.    He appeared.very much 
disconcerted.    Poor  devils,   they know not what  they do. 
Smuts had  a clear view of the  ends of his policy toward France, 
but no clear view of the means.     He had   instructed Lord Robert Cecil 
to press  for the  admission to   the League first of Germany and secondly 
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of Russia.       Smuts realized  that a small   country  like South Africa 
could not do it.     France  under Poincare was   in a far stronger position 
than Smuts realized.    Unlike his predecessor,  Briand, Poincare had no 
interest  in a British military guarantee for France;   the only guarantee 
that  interested him was  one  that would  support  the entire structure of 
French alliances   in eastern Europe.     He did  not  expect  to receive that 
from the British.     So, without   consulting Britain,   French,  Belgian,  and 
Italian troops marched  into  the  Ruhr on January 11,   1923. 
The Reparation Commission had declared  the German government  to 
be in default on   its payments.     Therefore,   the French and Belgian govern- 
ments claimed that   their   invasion of Germany was   legal.     Smuts believed 
that Britain was   sanctioning French policies  that would undermine the 
prospects of a reasonable  reparations  settlement,  of European recovery, 
of the world's prosperity and peace.     He reiterated   these views  in a 
statement  to  the South African press on February  7,   1923.       He believed 
that he could do  the most   good  at   the  coming Imperial Conference scheduled 
for September  and October   1923. 
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In his opening address  to  the Conference of Prime Ministers on 
October 1 Stanley Baldwin quoted  Disraeli on Britain's role  as "a mod- 
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crating and mediatory power."      The British  government, he   said, did 
not share the view of  the French  government  that   it had a right to move 
into the Ruhr; but   it  had  strained  every nerve  to preserve   solidarity 
with  them and  to  follow  a policy of neither helping them nor hindering 
them.    When his  turn came  to speak Smuts  said  the world was   in a bad 
way; but the British Commonwealth was  still  there and   it had   no need 
to speak with bated breath.     Two years  earlier   it had  opened   the way 
to peace in   the Pacific and now it was  called  upon to make  a great 
united effort   to bring peace to Europe.    That was  its duty.     That was 
its self-interest also.     Smuts emphasized the  fact that a great attempt 
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had to be made to restore   the trade   conditions of Europe. 
In his opening remarks Smuts   further  stated  that  all   the signatories 
of the peace   treaties were   all  concerned with  the aftermath.     He saw no 
reasons why Belgium should  have a voice but Australia no voice at all 
on issues of great   importance to  the world's prosperity  and peace. 
They had  all  fought   the war  to uphold   the sanctity of international 
obligations.    The French   invasion of  the Ruhr was  a violation of inter- 
national  obligation.     Smuts   thought   it  a mistake not to deal  honestly 
and  forthrightly with France  and not  to  stand up to her when  she erred. 
The policies which France was  following were ruinous to  Europe  and to  the 
rest of the world.     He stated his hope  that America could be  induced to 
attend a  conference which would settle both reparations  and  inter-allied 
debts.    If France refused   to  cooperate,   he said,   the conference should 
meet without her.    Meanwhile,   he stated   it was urgent  to get  the French 
to  evacuate  the  Ruhr. 
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At  this  time  Smuts was   looking to America for support.     Since 
his arrival in England,   he had been  in telegraphic communication with 
Bernard Baruch,   the  intimate Presidential advisor on problems  of inter- 
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national  finance and policies.       He had some reason to believe  that 
Baruch's  efforts were proving  fruitful.     On October 9 the White House 
announced   that President  Coolidge endorsed    his predecessor's proposals 
for American participation in  the  financial rehabilitation of Europe. 
This announcement,   though filled with conditions,  became the occasion 
for an  important  British move.     In a note  to Washington on October 13, 
the British government declared   its   intention of enlisting  the  immediate 
cooperation of  its  European allies  in an invitation to the United States 
government   to assist   in  an  inquiry  into the reparations question.    The 
note started  the round of negotiations which led  two months   later to 
the Dawes Committee and   to a temporary workable reparations  settlement. 
Smuts  intended   to   follow up  this move by giving his opinion on 
the European situation.     He delivered   the speech on October   23  to the 
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South African Luncheon Club  in London.       His message, he  claimed was 
urgent.     Four years had  passed  since the peace  treaty with Germany, but 
there was as yet  no peace.     The war between the peoples had merely been 
transformed   to the economic sphere,   and the economic war was proving 
even more devastating than  the military war.    Europe had not much time 
left, he said,   to save itself.    He proposed an immediate  conference of 
the powers which were mainly  interested   in the reparation question. 
Smuts,   in effect,  was  serving notice on  the French  that  they were likely 
to find   themselves  isolated  unless   they changed   their policies.     Repara- 
tion payments,  he added,  would be  the main  issue at  the conference. 
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About  these payments he made  two points:     first,   that the  fantastic 
total  fixed by the  Reparation Commission  in May 1921  could not possibly 
be paid;   secondly,   that  a realistic total  could be   fixed  and must be 
paid.     But  that   could not begin  to happen until the French evacuated 
the Ruhr.    He denounced   the  Ruhr   invasion not only as economic and politi- 
cal folly but as   an illegal  act.     He saw many signs   that Germany was 
falling to pieces.     Germany's   collapse,   if not prevented,  would prove 
more calamitous   than the  collapse of Russia in 1917.     Britain and   the 
Commonwealth,   he  said,   could   not  stand by and watch   the  calamity occur. 
France must be  told   that Britain and  the  Commonwealth  intended   to safe- 
guard their own  interests.     Smuts  stated   that he  felt no hostility 
towards  France.    He recognized her  just  claim to security;  but  he did 
not believe that  she   could achieve  that security by her adventure in 
the Ruhr and by trying to perpetuate her military domination over 
54 
Europe. 
In the British press  the speech made   front page news  and the 
Times printed  it  as   a pamphlet.     British opinion seemed to be solidi- 
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tying behind Smuts. The French government,   however,  still  insisted 
on holding its own ground.     This was   the situation on November 14, when 
Smuts embarked  for Cape Town.     On his departure he wrote a letter to the 
Times,  calling on the  British government  to summon a  conference and  invite 
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the Americans  to join it  even  if the French refused  to  come.       Such a 
drastic move proved  unncessary.     By  the time Smuts reached  South Africa 
the French were  showing signs of willingness  to compromise.    Within two 
months of his return,   the Dawes Committee was  at work on the reparation 
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problem.    Although his own plan had been a different  one, Smuts de- 
served some of the   credit   for   this beginning of a new hope  in Europe. 
Smuts had won acclamation    as   a peacemaker--but more of it   in Britain 
than in South Africa. 
After his  South African Party suffered defeat   in a special elec- 
tion at Wakkerstroom,  Smuts  decided  to dissolve Parliament  and announce 
general elections   for June  19,   1924.    The reason for  this local electoral 
defeat and Smuts's  subsequent  defeat  at the polls   lay  in the  circumstances 
of the Rand  strike  of  1922.     The National Party,   led by General James B. 
Hertzog and   the Labor Party,   led by Frederick E.   Cresswell had,  during 
the Rand strike, made  an agreement,  popularly known as  "the Pact," to 
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join forces   for the  purpose of ousting the Smuts government. 
The strike began on New Year's  Day,   1922 when  the Transvaal 
miners walked  off their jobs,   and were  followed on January 10 by the 
gold miners  and the workers   in  the power stations  and engineering in- 
dustries.    The strikers opposed wage reductions.     The goldmincrs were 
mainly concerned with  the  attempt by the Chamber of Mines to reduce 
costs by increasing the ratio  of black to white miners   in semi-skilled 
jobs. 
After mobilizing the Active Citizen Force and declaring martial 
law on March 10,   Smuts  left Cape Town for Johannesburg to command the 
government  troops against  the  armed  strikers.    While  traveling by car 
from Randfontein to his headquarters  in Johannesburg,  he, I.ouis   Esselen, 
Secretary of the South African Party,  and his   chauffeur repeatedly came 
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under rifle  fire. 
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After  the declaration of the general strike on March  7 the strikers 
committed many acts  of violence  including the killing of native miners. 
On March 10 there was  fighting   in  the entire Rand area.    Government troops 
suppressed  the uprising in  three days.    A number of strikers were brought 
to trial and  of eighteen sentenced   to death for murder,   four were exe- 
cuted.    Government  casualties were   50 soldiers killed   and  237 wounded. 
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Insurgent  casualties  numbered  138 killed   and 287 wounded. 
The general election of June  19,   1924 resulted  not only in the 
defeat of Smuts's South African Party but  also in the  loss  of his own 
seat, Pretoria West,   to  the Labor Party candidate.    The results  of the 
election were:     National Party  63;   South African Party  53; Labor Party 
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18;  Independent   1. 
During  the next nine years,   as  leader of the opposition,  Smuts 
engaged the Nationalist-Labor government under Hertzog on two major 
issues.    The  first was  the conflict between the English and Afrikander 
elements over  the determination of the Nationalists to  give  the country 
a distinctive national   flag.     The  second was Hertzog's   attempt to   legis- 
late a restrictive native policy. 
The  issue over   the national   flag stretched over   two years and 
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in the end  the  government was  forced   into a reluctant   compromise. 
The compromise resulted   in the Union Jack and  the Republican   flags with- 
in the tricolour.    After personal   talks between Hertzog  and Smuts  the 
compromise was reached. 
In response to Hertzog's native bills  Smuts wrote a long [20 
pages]   critical memorandum on the  bills that was distributed by the 
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South African Party throughout  the  country.       No mutual   accord could 
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be reached between the  two  leaders and Hertzog was unable  to attain 
the required   two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament  to pass 
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the bills. 
Even  though  Smuts was  now out  of  touch officially with other 
governments he remained  acutely aware  of European and Commonwealth 
affairs.    This  appears most   notably  in his correspondence with Leopold 
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S. Amery, now Secretary  for  the Colonies.        The l.ocarno  agreements 
and the attitude of the  dominions to   the obligations undertaken by Great 
Britain,  and  his doubts  about   the effectiveness of the League of Nations 
made Smuts  increasingly uneasy.     In a  letter to Arthur Neville Chamber- 
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lain Smuts reveals  his uneasiness over  the Locarno accord. 
I am afraid  the Dominions will keep out of this pact   (the Locarno 
Pact) and will   look upon   this as   a precedent   to disinterest them- 
selves  in   future more  and more in  the foreign policy of Creat 
Britain.    Thus   for the  Empire too  the Pact will become a new 
departure.     This  is a serious matter which no doubt you have  care- 
fully considered.     It  may be that   the future peace of Europe out- 
weighs such  considerations  as arise   in this  connection.     But  I 
look upon the British Empire as,  with the United States of America, 
the main guarantee of any public  life that  is worth  living in the 
world.    And I  should be most sorry  to weaken the voice of the 
Empire as  a united whole   in  the  councils of the world. 
Twice during  the 1920's  [first   in  1924 and again  in  1928]   Smuts 
urged upon his  old   friend L.   S. Amery  an East African policy which would 
67 
create a "great white state or  system of states"  in  that region.       These 
letters   to Amery reveal Smuts's  longing  for a unified Commonwealth with 
greater Africa as a principal participant.    On May 22,   1928 he wrote to 
Amery   that 
.   .   .  The  larger Africa attracts me profoundly.     I believe  that 
there are the makings  on this continent of something very big 
Indeed.    Africa from the equator downwards ought within  so many 
generations  to  take a high place with Canada and Australia,  as 
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one of the  greatest  Dominions   in the Empire.    For this  careful 
planning is necessary now,   and   the reservation of sufficient 
elbowroom for our great white civilization,   leaving sufficient 
land  for  the Native population   for present and future  needs. 
All this sort of work attracts me greatly, but my South African 
preoccupations have been such that I have not had the  time to 
devote sufficient attention to  these  larger problems.^8 
Differences on the native bills, Commonwealth status,  and  the 
flag precluded  a reconciliation between the two major parties.    The 
election of 1929 was bitter and  the  Nationalist Pact won  it by playing 
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on racial   fears  and prejudices. 
This period of Smuts's   life gave him more  time to write and 
lecture than any other  time   in his  life.    The products of   this period 
include:     the publication of Holism and Evolution  in July  1929;  a presi- 
dential address  before  the South African Association for  the Advance- 
ment of Science   in May  1925;   and participation  in a seminar on the 
nature of life  at   the meeting of  the   British Association  in Cape Town 
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in August  1929. 
Between 1929 and  1934 Smuts made four  visits abroad.     He remained 
concerned with  the  inseparable questions of world peace and  security, 
the fostering of  the League  of Nations,  and  the strengthening of  the 
Commonwealth.     In   1929 he visited Great Britain,   the United  States,   and 
Canada to give lectures.     He delivered   the Rhodes Memorial Lectures at 
the University of Oxford   in  November  1929.    These  lectures were published 
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In January 1930 under  the  title Africa  and Some World Problems.       His 
address   to the committee of   the Empire  Parliamentary Association sums 
up the  theme he  espoused. 
...  I   look upon the Empire as the  greatest  actual political achieve- 
ment of time.     The League of Nations  is a great experiment, which  is 
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gradually becoming more  than an experiment;   It  is stabilizing it- 
self and   it  is becoming a reality;  but  the British Commonwealth 
of Nations,   comprising one-fourth of the human race and of the 
globe,   is  an actual  fact   and  is  something far  greater  than has 
ever existed before  in history.     It guarantees peace and  liberty 
and freedom to one-fourth of the human race,   and when  through the 
process of constitutional  evolution you have   achieved a result 
like that,   it   is your  simple human duty  to defend  it  to  the utter- 
most,   to stand  by it,   and  to see   that   it does not  crumble  to 
pieces  simply through negligence  and  through oversight.   72 
At  this   time  he also became  involved  in two different problems 
of British  foreign policy.     These  issues were to  concern him for the 
rest of his  life--the  clash of the Arabs  and Jews   in Palestine and — 
the demands of the  Indian nationalists.    As  a party to the Balfour 
declaration on Palestine Smuts  considered  it his duty to plead  the 
Zionist cause with the British government.     In three telegrams  to J. 
Ramsay MacDonald on October   22-25,   1930 Smuts requested  the British 
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government   to  clarify  its Palestine policy.       Smuts published  these 
telegrams,   the October  22  telegram reading in part: 
As one of those responsible  for the Balfour declaration I   feel 
deeply perturbed  over present Palestine policy which marks re- 
treat  from declaration.     Declaration was definite promise   to 
Jewish world that policy of national home would be actively prose- 
cuted  and was intended  to rally powerful  Jewish  influence   for 
allied  cause at darkest hour of war.    As  such   it was approved 
by governments of  the United  States and other  allies  and  accepted 
in good   faith by Jews.     It  cannot now be varied  unilaterally by 
British government.     It  represents debt of honour which must be 
discharged   in full  at all   costs.7^ 
Smuts  sharply  criticized  British policy in India.    He  insisted 
that  the solution to  the British government-Indian Congress  stalemate 
lay in cooperation with Gandhi.     Following the publication of  the Simon 
report on the working of the Government of India Act of 1919,   the Labor 
government  called a round table conference which met   in London on Novem- 
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bcr 12,  J930 but   the Congress party boycotted   it. Smuts voiced his 
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concern privately in a letter  to Margaret C.  Cillett.     On August  15, 
1932 he wrote   that 
I  frankly  cannot  grasp  the British policy.     It seems  to me  a sheer 
muddle to put  the [Indian]   Congress  in gaol,   to alienate the moder- 
ates, and yet  to think of going forward with  the grant of a new con- 
stitution.     Who will work this  constitution and who will have any 
responsibility for   its  success?76 
The second round   table  conference on India met  in September 1931. 
Gandhi attended   as the only delegate of the Indian National Congress. 
He opposed the main decisions  and   the conference  foundered on  the ques- 
tion of communal  and minority electorates.    While   in London  in  November 
both Gandhi and Lord Irwin [Edward  Halifax],  Viceroy of India,   sought 
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Smuts's  friendly   intervention. 
It was while he was   in England  to preside over the Centenary 
meeting of the  British Association  for  the Advancement of Science on 
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September 21,   1931  that Great Britain went off the gold standard. 
J.   Ramsay MacDonald  at   this   time was Prime Minister of the National 
government formed on August   24,   1931   to deal with the  financial  crisis. 
When a general  election was   scheduled  to be held  the question arose of 
how the government   should  go to the voters and how the party differences 
within the cabinet were  to be handled.    MacDonald  spoke of resignation 
but King George dissuaded him.    On the night of October 5   it was decided 
that  the government would  appeal  to the voters  for  a free hand  to cure 
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the country's  ills,  a so-called "doctor's mandate." 
Smuts described his  involvement   in this governmental  crisis   in 
a letter to his wife on October 6,   1931. 
.   .   .   there was  a  telephone  call   from the King who wished to know 
where I was.     So I went   to London  this morning to see him.    It  then 
appeared that   there was  a big cabinet crisis yesterday; MacDonald 
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was  to resign,  etc.     And   the King,   as in  the Irish difficulty of 
1921, wished   to have my advice about the whole matter.     Fortunately 
for me the  cabinet  crisis was decided during the night  and  all was 
over when I arrived  there this morning.     But  it shows what  faith 
the dear old  King has  in me and how much he likes   to look to me 
for help and  advice.   80 
Smuts urgently recommended   that South Africa follow Britain  in 
going off the gold standard,   but his  advice was rejected by  the Hertzog 
government.    However,   it was  on the  issue of "Off Gold" that   Smuts re- 
turned to office.     The  flight  of capital from South Africa finally com- 
pelled  the government  to  change its position.     The question of coalition 
between the  South African Party and  the Nationalist Party became acute 
when Tielman Roos,   a popular  South African Party leader, resigned  from 
the appellate bench and re-entered politics on a pledge  to force the 
National Pact government  to   leave the gold standard.    His widespread 
support  throughout   the  country  forced  the government to announce the 
abandonment of the  gold  standard  on December  28,   1932.     Roos had enough 
support   in both the National   and South African Parties  to enable him 
to negotiate with Smuts  for   joint  action to overthrow the Pact and 
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form a coalition government. On February 21,   1933 Smuts and Hertzog 
reached agreement  on a coalition government.     Smuts became Minister of 
Justice with wide powers—a post he kept until   1939, when the  Second 
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World War again brought him to  the head  of his Government. 
As Minister of Justice  and Deputy Prime Minister under the Coali- 
tion Smuts administered his  department,  spoke often in parliamentary 
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debates,   and  campaigned   in behalf of his  coalition. Hertzog,   the 
Prime Minister,  treated  foreign affairs as his  own domain.     Smuts,   there- 
fore, had  little   inside information about his   country's  situation  in the 
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world.    Nevertheless,   throughout   the  1930's,   foreign affairs  became the 
main theme of many of his  speeches. 
Smuts's  public speeches  and private correspondence can be grouped 
around the main themes  of the  international  situation In the  1930's— 
the collapse  of the  Disarmament  Conference,   Italy's  attack of Abyssinia 
in 1934, Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland,  and  the rapid  succes- 
sion of crises   in Central Europe,   the Mediterranean,  and Asia.     In each 
of these crises  Smuts dealt with   the  single question:    how best  to pursue 
peace.    Until   the  final   crisis of August-September 1939, he  still pro- 
fessed to hope   that war  could still be avoided. 
By 1934,   the Disarmament  Conference was   in ruins and Germany had 
followed Japan  outside   the League.     Smuts had  a longstanding engagement 
in November to  deliver an address on  the occasion of his  installation 
as Rector of St. Andrews'   University.     In his   Rectoral address   "The 
Challenge to Freedom" Smuts  painted a sombre picture of the new tyrannies, 
disguised  in patriotic colors, which were resurgent  in Europe. 
Smuts  accepted another  invitation to speak as   the guest   of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs at a dinner at the Savoy Hotel 
on November 12,   1934.     The   institute was  formed  at the Paris Peace Con- 
ference in 1919.     In his  Savoy speech Smuts stated that Freudian neuroses 
were at the root of the world's  troubles and  that the remedy  for them 
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was to drag them into  the open.       Fear,   the meanest of human motives, 
was the first  and most dangerous  neurosis:     the remedy for  it was to stop 
the war talk and  to stop  thinking of the League as a coercive body, which 
would bring aggressors   to order by  threatening  them with sanctions.    A 
second neurosis  was  the obsession with equality.     It was Germany's present 
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trouble and  the remedy  for  it was  to treat the Germans  as equals;   they 
would then soon come back to  the Disarmament Conference and the League. 
Smuts stated his assurance that  the neuroses of Europe were curable and 
that before long Europe would  settle down  in peace.    He stated  further 
that whatever  happened,   the Western powers must never depart  from an 
attitude of friendliness  and human good will toward Japan.     Finally, 
Smuts stated   that cooperation between  the British Commonwealth and  the 
United States   could help   assure peace in the world. 
In a personal   letter  to Franklin D.  Roosevelt,  Norman H.  Davies, 
Chairman of the American  Delegation  to the London Naval Conference, re- 
corded his satisfaction with Smuts's Savoy speech.    On  November 27,   1934 
Davies \rrote: 
General Srcuts, with whom T  became well acquainted at the Paris 
Peace Conference,   came  to  see me about a week before he made his 
recent and   famous   speech on world politics,   emphasizing the neces- 
sity for  the British   Empire  to  cooperate with the United States. 
We discussed this Far  Eastern problem fully and frankly,   as a result 
of which I  was quite satisfied with what his  attitude would be, which 
is very important  since he   is generally recognized as the leading 
statesman   in the British Empire.°5 
There appears a contradiction between his mood at  St. Andrews 
and his mood at   Savoy.     If his  theory of the  curable neurosis proved 
sound,   the contradiction would resolve itself as Nazi Cermany,   in response 
to the appropriate treatment,  became not only a peace-loving but also a 
liberty-loving nation.     That was   the   firm conviction of Smuts's friend, 
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Lord Lothian. On January  29,   1935 Lothian visited Berlin and returned 
with the news that Hitler did not want war,   that  he believed  in self- 
determination,   and that he  could be  trusted   to keep the peace for  the next 
ten years,  provided  the British negotiated with him in a spirit of frankness, 
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firmness,   and respect   for Germany's equal rights.       Smuts  accepted 
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Lothian's diagnosis. 
Smuts's  attitude  toward preserving the peace in  the   face of the 
Abyssinian crisis  seems   to repudiate  the words he had  spoken only a 
year before at  the Royal  Institute of International Affairs; he had 
said then that  the League was a  conference table, but  now he was  attempt- 
ing to make  it  into a War Office.     He had  reasons, however,   for his 
change of attitude.     He believed  that  a return  to the age of military 
conquest  in Africa was  dangerous.     At   the  same  time he believed that  the 
struggle  to save Abyssinia was  equally a struggle to save  the League. 
Regarding the Italian-Abyssinian  crisis Smuts related   to L.   S. Amery 
that 
Strengthening the League  therefore remained  the only practical 
alternative,   and  that  again meant  making a reality of the sanc- 
tion clause.   .   .   .   Today it  is  a secondclass power   like  Italy, 
tomorrow it will be  a first-class power   like Germany,   trying t0 
impose her will  by high-minded  action on other countries.89 
Smuts  told Lord Lothian  that   if the League failed there would 
be no use of his dreaming of a world  state--there might be  no world 
left to organize  into a state.    He asked Lothian  to consider  the conse- 
quence to the Commonwealth of the League's  failure.    The Covenant of the 
League,  Smuts pointed out,  provided members of the Commonwealth with a 
common code of practice;   if they lost  that  guidance their foreign policies 
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might begin to follow divergent,   if not opposite,  paths. 
Ethiopia was  an independent   sovereign state,   a member of the League 
of Nations,   and  its  Emperor Haile Selassie,   appealed  four times to the 
League  for protection and   for arbitration of  the Italian-Ethiopian dis- 
pute.     Faced with  such an unequivocal  test,   the League  Council and  the 
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League Assembly declared  Italy an aggressor and voted economic sanctions 
to restrain the Italians.     A partial  and  ineffectual boycott by those 
states most ardent   in defense of League principles was  the  consequence; 
but the resulting  loss of trade was  not acute enough to restrain Italy. 
The boycott was not   applied   to gasoline and  other petroleum products 
without which the  Italian  invasion would have been impossible.    Nor was 
any attempt made  to   close  the  Suez Canal,   through which the Italian 
troops and supplies had  to pass  to reach the  areas of combat.    The  diplo- 
mats of Paris and London,   fearful of bringing Italy and Cermany into an 
alliance,  sacrified   Ethiopia to  the principle of power politics and  ex- 
pediency. 
On June 10,   1936 Neville Chamberlain denounced  the  continuance 
of sanctions and a  few weeks   later,   the Assembly of the League, respond- 
ing again to a British   lead,   called   them off.    When he reflected on   the 
events   from September   1935 to June   1936—the British lead  at Geneva,   the 
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British election,   the Hoarc-Laval pact,       the repudiation of that pact, 
the final  capitulation on  the sanction  issue—Smuts could only consider 
biding for  time,   in  the hope  that  somehow the world's unity might still 
be saved. 
To me  the road appeared  clear  so  long as we were all bound by the 
League as  the basis  of our   foreign policy,but once  that goes, I 
see only dangers   ahead and no  clear daylight.    I am afraid  that 
isolation will be  a most difficult  policy to carry through   in 
actual practice.     And  if   isolation  is ruled out,  and  the League 
is ruled out  also,  where are we? 
You will  see  therefore why I  am for extreme  caution in dealing with 
the present  situation.     If Mussolini had been told  at  Strcsa that 
an attack on Abyssinia would mean sanctions  to the uttermost, I do 
not   think he would  have embarked  on  the Abyssinian adventure.     I 
am afraid  the League was betrayed  there perhaps more through passivity 
and cowardice than malice aforethought.92 
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On March   7,   1936 Hitler  reoccupied  the Rhineland.     In doing so 
he went beyond his earlier defiance of the Versailles Treaty,   for he 
had declared  the previous  October that Germany would continue  to 
accept neutralization of the Rhineland as  an obligation   incumbent  up- 
on her under the   freely negotiated Locarno Treaty.    It would  therefore 
have been understandable  if Smuts had ranked Hitler equal with Musso- 
lini as a disturber of the peace and had  advocated equal  treatment  for 
both.    He did  the opposite.     Smuts thought  coercion the right  treatment 
for Mussolini but  conciliation  the right  treatment  for Hitler.    To 
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Maurice Hankey       Smuts stated  that  "judging from Hitler's private state- 
ment  to Lothian  and others,   and  his repeated public declarations,   it 
seems a matter  of sincere policy with him to come  to an agreement with 
the British Empire,   and   it would be as well  for  us  to speak with the 
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enemy in the gate whilst he   is   in this mood." 
He was  accepting Hitler's words  at   their   face value.     Tacitly, 
he accepted Hitler's plea that   the Franco-Soviet  pact of 1935 had 
absolved Germany   from her obligations  under  the Locarno  accord.     Smuts's 
plan was  to clinch quickly with  Hitler's offer of peace pacts  and  of 
Germany's return   to the League,   and to proceed   from that basis to a 
program of negotiated   cooperation  in  the sphere of economic policy. 
Only a few months later  Smuts was  asking himself whether the 
opportunity that  had seemed  so  clear  to him in the spring of 1936 had 
ever really existed.     Smuts  refused  to  consider the return of South- 
West Africa to Germany,  and Great  Britain refused   to consider  the return 
of Tanganyika. He  found  himself,   like  so many others,  unable to form 
a clear  idea of what Certnany and Hitler really wanted. 
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During this period   Smuts kept his  feelings  under restraint.    He 
seemed aware that   if he gave his  feelings   free reign he would be com- 
mitting himself to a crusade.    The last  thing he wanted was  a crusade 
or a war of  ideologies,     lie was,   however,   beginning to realize that not 
to have a creed   and a cause might be  just  as dangerous   for peace as 
having them.     But   two events, Palestine and Spain,   convinced him that 
he must  take a more  active   stand publicly. 
In Palestine,   throughout  the mandatory era,  Great Britain con- 
ducted numerous  inquiries  beginning in  1921 with the survey headed by 
Sir Thomas Haycraft, Palestine's Chief Justice.     He reported  that riots 
in 1921 resulted  from Arab   concern with Jewish immigration.     During 
1929,  the Shaw Commission probed Arab-Jewish riots over the Wailing 
Wall in Jerusalem.     Within   the preceding  ten years,   the commission re- 
ported,   there  had  been serious Arab attacks on Jews,   although  in the 
previous eighty none had been recorded.     The cause was Arab  fears that 
they would become   a minority because of Jewish  immigration and Zionist 
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economic and political growth. 
Sharp protests by the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Com- 
mission against British efforts  to curb Jewish immigration led  to the 
economic investigation by Sir John Hope-Simpson in  1930.    His report 
emphasized what he  estimated   to be Palestine's limited  economic capacity 
and warned  that the Arabs might  face a land  shortage  if Jewish ownership 
continued to expand.    This  conclusion became the basis  for the  1930 
Passfield White Paper  limiting  immigration to "economic absorptive 
capacity" and reserving government  areas  for landless Arabs rather than 
for the Jews.     The Jewish leadership denounced the White Paper and Prime 
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Minister J.  Ramsay MacDooald  attempted   to explain away the White Paper 
restrictions   in a  letter to  Dr. Weizmann during 1931.    Jewish  immigra- 
tion would be  continued, MacDonald promised,   and only those Arabs who 
surrendered property to Jews  would receive government  land.    The Arabs 
used the opportunity to intensify   their  anti-British and anti-Zionist 
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propaganda. 
Following an Arab revolt   in  1936, Parliament  sent  Earl Peel, 
former Secretary of State for  India,  to  investigate  the situation in 
Palestine.     The Royal Commission proposed partition of Palestine into 
a small Jewish state populated by  285,000 Jews and 225,000 Arabs;   an 
international enclave   from the  coast  to and  including Jerusalem;  and 
an Arab state  including most   of the country.     The British government 
began to consider  the   imposition of restrictions upon Jewish immigra- 
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tion into Palestine. 
The  first rumor of British  restrictions  upon Jewish immigration 
brought Smuts   to action.    He and David Lloyd George were the two sur- 
viving members of the War Cabinet which had endorsed  the Balfour Decla- 
ration of 1917 and had won    international recognition  for a Jewish 
National Home   in Palestine.     On October  22,   1930 he had cabled Lloyd 
George in protest  against the MacDonald  government's  "incredible breach 
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of fath" as he  called  it—in regard   to the Balfour Declaration.      Now 
on July 23 he made a new appeal  to Lloyd George  in a letter requesting 
joint action to defend   the National  Home.     He stated  that  it was not 
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time to desert   the Jews and  lying down before Arab agitation. In this 
letter Smuts stated   that 
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Whatever view one may  take of  the present government, and of their 
foreign policy,  one  cannot sit   still and see a step being taken 
which  is bound   to have very  far-reaching consequences in the  future. 
The weakening of the Balfour Declaration,   the  lying down before Arab 
agitation,   the   certain hostility of the Jews   all over the world, 
would add  very much  to the difficulties of our future path,  and 
one  feels  bound  to exert whatever  influence  is necessary  in order 
to prevent  a step which may have most regrettable consequences. 
Please see what you   can do  in  the matter.    I  am sure your  influence 
will be most potent   .   .   .1UJ 
Regarding the  Spanish civil war of 1936-1939 Smuts saw the German 
and Italian intervention as a plain   case of  the dictators helping the 
dictators and  as  a bid  for  an important strategic objective—a position 
of strength in   the western Mediterranean which would  enable the dicta- 
tors to threaten  the British entry point at Gibraltar and  the French 
colonies  in North Africa.     He thought   it unwise of the British and 
French to tolerate non-intervention when it was  clearly,   in his view, 
a one-sided and most dangerous  intervention.     He  insisted that  they could 
have kept  the Germans and   Italians out of Spain  if they had been resolute 
104 
and clear   in their  aims. 
In April   1937 Lord Lothian asked Smuts  to come  to Europe  to help 
ease British-German tensions.     Smuts  did not go to Europe but on April  7, 
1937 he wrote Lothian a long letter   in which he said  that Great Britain 
was still  the greatest reserve force   in the world and she was   in a posi- 
tion to take the  initiative without   incurring the  imputation of weakness. 
Germany,  on the other hand,  was  in a   far weaker position  than appeared on 
the surface;  Hitler's Four Year Plan  had proved a failure,  and Germany 
did not possess   the resources for  carrying on a long war.    In his  letter 
Smuts made  a list  of  Britain's bargaining counters.     The British, he 
said, did not  intend   to hold  on  to all   the German  colonies;  they knew 
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that the regimes   in Merael and Danzig were makeshift;   they knew that 
they could  secure American  cooperation in opening large economic and 
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financial opportunities   in Germany. He believed  that  all  these  in- 
ducements might be offered   to  the Germans  for  the sake of peace pro- 
vided two basic  conditions  governed   the negotiations:     first,   it must 
exclude everything prejudicial  to  France  and  Russia;  secondly,   it must 
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include and  settle  every contentious   issue. 
On May 14,   1937 Lord Lothian  attempted   the task which he had 
wanted Smuts   to undertake.     He visited Berlin  as  a self-appointed emis- 
sary,  conferred with Hitler,   Goering,  and Schacht and composed  a memo- 
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randum of his   conclusions.       Lothian reported   that  the Germans,   although 
difficult, were not unreasonable.     They were nationalists,  but did not 
want to dominate other nations.     They were not   jealous of  the British 
Enpire,  but  felt   that   the British were always   frustrating them.     There 
appeared  to be good prospects  of success  in negotiating with Germany 
under the following headings:     Kastern Europe,   the colonial-economic 
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question,  and  the League  and  disarmament. According to Lothian,  Smuts 
made no comment on  the memorandum.     Perhaps Smuts observed  a contradic- 
tion in his own thought—his  notion of achieving a comprehensive and 
permanent settlement with people whose essential dynamism he had  so 
recently diagnosed. 
Meanwhile Smuts's  attention was turned  to  the Chinese situation. 
He insisted that   the war  in China was  more ominous by far  than any event 
anywhere   in  the world  since  the Great War.     He asked himself how the 
Chinese would use their power when  the Japanese had thoroughly militarized 
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109 them?        Hitler, meanwhile  in October  1936,  proclaimed the Berlin- 
Tokyo-Rome Axis.    On November  6,   1937  Italy  joined  the Anti-Comintern 
Pact concluded  a year earlier between Germany and Japan.    Smuts noted 
110 
that announcement as  a new betrayal not only of Asia but of Europe. 
Germany,   Smuts  said, was  doing irreparable wrong in revenge for  the 
smaller wrongs which   she had  suffered  after  the last war.     Smuts faced the 
fact that peace was no longer obtainable except by recognizing German pre- 
dominance   in continental Europe.     His recent assessment of the balance of 
power, Smuts now concluded,   had  proved   fallacious,   in particular,  he had 
been far wide of  the mark when he  saw the Soviet Union as an effective 
counterweight.     If anyone had  told him,  he stated   in a letter   to L.  S. 
Amery, that  the Soviet Union would  sit  still while Japan was  securing 
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mastery of China,  he would never   have believed  it. 
Only a few months   later,   on March 28,   1938,  he saw the  Soviet Union 
again remaining uninvolved while Hitler made further advances   on central 
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Europe.      Smuts's  thoughts now became more pessimistic.    He wrote to Amery: 
.   .   . Today  conditions and  tempers  give the League no chance.    But  it  is 
a great vision,  an   ideal which always has   its value even in  the practical 
affairs of men,  and  even  in  the most untoward  circumstances.    After all, 
the League was only  following the  ideal which was  incorporated  into the 
practice of the British C0mm0nwealth.il3 
Smuts consoled   himself with  two sources of  strength:     British sea 
power and the Commonwealth.     "I  am for our world-wide Commonwealth as  the 
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last remaining—and,   I  hope,   effective bulwark of human liberty.      Looking 
into the  future,   he declared  his   faith  in the staying power of  freedom,   the 
survival of the Commonwealth  and   the re-establishment of a rational world 
order. 
South Africa's decision not   to intervene  in   the event of war had 
been agreed upon  informally by an   inner  circle of ministers-Hertzog,  Smuts, 
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Pirow, and Havenga. It was not,   however,  until September 28,   1938 that 
the full South African Cabinet  approved the decision.    The statement ex- 
pressed South Africa's  desire  to assume the role of a semineutral.    There 
would have been no obligation  upon any belligerent power to recognize  the 
existence of  such a role  and  little  likelihood   that an aggressive belligerent 
would respect  South Africa's desire when  its own interests were at stake. 
The document,   however,  was a careful,   honest,   and laborious attempt to ex- 
press the realities of South Africa's  international situation and of her 
internal political situation.     Smuts,  though he ascribed  to the declaration, 
felt that  the   formula which   fitted  one situation was  not bound  to fit  the 
next.    In a speech before  the South African House of Assembly on August  25, 
1938, he declared his   conviction   that South Africa would take her stand 
with Britain and  the Commonwealth,   if ever the day came when they had  to 
116 
fight for their  lives. 
During  the  intcrwar  period  Smuts developed a pessimistic outlook 
toward world politics.     He  saw the  course of events   leading inevitably 
toward collision and  tried  desperately to stop   it.    He exerted efforts  to 
save the League,  to induce  the British government to take the  initiative 
in Europe  to get restitution for Germany, and  to draw the United States  into 
a partnership of democracies.    He  showed a growing awareness of the evil 
purposes of Hitler and Mussolini and showed anxiety that British commit- 
ments on the continent  might ultimately weaken the Commonwealth.    At 
this time he saw the Commonwealth  as a vital  force in protecting world 
peace. 
139 
NOTES 
XJ.   C.   Smuts   to M.   C. Gillett,  October 4,  1919,  Selections, 
vol. V, doc.   7. 
2See J.   C.  Smuts  to   S. M.   Smuts,   January 11,   1917,   Selections, 
vol. Ill, doc.   711,   for mention by Smuts of  telegram from General  Botha 
saying that  the Cabinet was unanimous   in  its opinion  that  Smuts should 
go  to London. 
Lionel Curtis—administrator and writer.    Born and educated in 
England and  came  to South Africa in June  1900 to  take part   in the  admin- 
istration of the Transvaal  under Lord Milner.     He wrote a number of books 
on Commonwealth and   international affairs. 
Journal  of the Parliaments of  the  Empire, 1:540-551. 
See speech by  Smuts   at   Edinburgh when he received the Freedom 
of the City,   in War Time Speeches,   1917,  pp.  41-45. 
Selections,   vol.   IV,  docs.   968-959. 
7L.  Botha  to D. I..   George   (letter drafted by Smuts),  May 15,   1919, 
Selections,  vol.   IV,   doc.   968. 
8J.  C.   Smuts,   The League  of Nations:     A Practical Suggestion,  p.   13. 
9J.   C.   Smuts   to S.  M.   Smuts,  September  21,   1919,  Selections,  vol.  V, 
doc.   6. 
10Great Britain,   Cmd.   Papers,  1474 of  1921, pp.   9-10,   14-28. 
UJ.  C.   Smuts  to M.   C.  Gillett,  Dec.   26,   1920,  Selections, vol.  V, 
doc. 40. 
12J.  C.   Smuts to M.   C.   Gillett,  Nov.   1,   1920,  Selections, vol.  V, 
doc.  34. 
13 
Ibid. 
140 
14J. C.  Smuts   to M.   C.  Gillctt,   October  25,   1920,   Selections, 
vol. V,  doc.  33. 
15Jan Christian Smuts,  pp.   188-191. 
J.  C.  Smuts,   The League of Nations:     A Practical  Suggestion. 
(London,   1918). 
'See Memorandum of   the Constitution of the  British  Empire, by 
J. C. Smuts, April   16,   1921,   Selections,   vol.  V,  doc.  46. 
18Smuts to J.   H. Hofmeyr,  November 25,   1920,   Selections, vol.   V, 
doc.  38. 
19j.  C. Smuts,  War Time Speeches,   pp.   25-38. 
20Journal  of  the Parliaments of  the Empire,  vol.  I,   pp.   540-551. 
21See Selections   from the Smuts Papers,   vol.   Ill,   pp.  29-30. 
22 Ibid. 
236reat Britain,   Cmd.   8566 of   1917,  pp.   5, 42,  46-48. 
24H.   Duncan Hall,   "The Genesis of  the Balfour Declaration of 1926," 
Journal  of   the  Commonwealth  Political   Studies,   I,  no.   3,  November  1962, 
pp. 169-193. 
25"The Constitution of the British Commonwealth," June 1921, 
Selections,  vol.  V,   doc.  46. 
26Creat Britain,  Cmd.   1474 of  1921,  pp.   25-28. 
27H.   Duncan Hall,   "The Genesis of  the Balfour Declaration of 1926," 
pp. 169-193. 
28, Great Britain,  Cmd.   1474 of 1921,  p.   28. 
29 
IV, doc.   1043. 
nuts's statement to the Press,  June 28,   1919,  Selections, vol. 
30ThomaS Casement  to J.  C   Smuts,  May 30,   1921,  Selections, vol. 
v. doc. 48. 
141 
Dorothy Macardle,  The  Irish Republic,   (London:    Gollancz Ltd. 
1937), pp. 481-482. 
Sir Horace Plunkett--born  in Ireland,  Unionist Member of the 
House of Commons,   1892-1900;   Chairman of the Irish Convention,   1917-1918; 
Senator of the  Irish Free State,   1922-1923;  and Fellow of the Royal Society, 
1902. 
Robert  Erskine Childers--writer and Irish Nationalist  leader, 
served  in the Anglo-Boer War,   junior  clerk  in the House of Commons,  1895- 
1910, served  in  the  royal naval  air  service  in the First World War. 
Joined the Sinn Fein movement  and  took part   in the armed resistance to 
the Irish Free  State  government   set up under the treaty of 1921;   captured 
and executed on Nov.   24,   1922. 
See letter   from Sir Horace Plunkett  to J.  C.  Smuts, June  8,   1921 
and letter from Lady Courtney  to J.  C.   Smuts, June 9,   1921,   Selections, 
vol. V,  docs.  49-50. 
33Harold  Nicolson,  King George V;     His Life and Reign,   (Garden 
City, New York:     Doubleday,   1953),   pp.   349-350. 
34J. C.   Smuts   to Lord  Stamfordham (King George's private secre- 
tary from 1910-1931),   Selections,  June  14,   1921,  vol.  V, doc.   52. 
35
TU-J Ibid. 
36Harold Nicolson,  King George V,  pp.   352-354. 
37Sir Edward Grigg to Lord  Stamfordham, June  14,   1921,   Selections, 
vol. V, doc. 53. 
38"Memorandum submitted   to  the King by Lord  Stamfordham,  June 29, 
1921, Selections,   vol.  V,  doc.   54. 
39Sir Edward Grigg to Lord Stamfordham, June 29,   1921,   Selections, 
vol. V, doc. 55. 
4°J.   C.  Smuts   to Lord Stamfordham,   July 1,   1921,   Selections, 
vol. V, doc. 56. 
41 
Ibid. 
A2For summary of Smuts's   talks with de Valera see "Memorandum 
of a Conversation between the King and General Smuts at Tuckingham Palace, 
July 7,  1921," Selections,  vol.   V,  doc.   59. 
142 
43 Ibid. 
^Statement   to  the Press,   December  10,   1921,   Selections,  vol.   V, 
doc.  67. 
J.  C.  Smuts to Mrs. Woodrow Wilson, February 4,   1924,  and Smuts 
to the Editor of the "New York World," February 4,  1924,  Selections, 
vol. V, docs.  134,   135. 
^J.  C.  Smut   to A.   Bonar Law,  November 20,   1922,   Selections,  vol. 
V, doc.  84. 
47J.   C.  Smuts to Margaret  C.   Gillett, March 1,   1923,  Selections, 
vol. V, doc.   95. 
48J.  C.  Smuts  to Lord Robert  Cecil,   July 5,  1922,   Selections, 
vol. V, doc.   78. 
49Statement   to  the Press,   February  7,   1923,  Selections, vol.   V, 
doc.  94. 
50Grcat Britain,   Cmd.   1988,   Imperial  Conference,   1923, Appendices 
to the Summary of Proceedings,   pp.   3-11,   14-18. 
51Manchester Guardian, October  2,   1923,   p.   3. 
52See Telegrams:     J.   C.   Smuts  to B.  M.   Baruch,  October 1,   1923, 
J. C.  Smuts  to B. M.   Baruch, October  3,  1923,  B. M.  Baruch   to J.   C.   Smuts, 
October 6,  1923,   Selections, vol.   V,   docs.   109,   110,   113. 
53J.  C.   Smuts  to J. M.   Keynes,   October 22,   1923,  and  speech by 
J. C.  Smuts at a dinner  of the South Africa Club   in the Savoy Hotel, 
October 23,   1923,   Selections,  vol.   V,   docs.   119,   120. 
54..., 
Ibid. 
55Sce  letters   from Lord Curzon,  October 24,   1923; M.P.A. Hankey, 
October 24,   1923;  G.   N.   Barnes,  October 24,   1923;   B.  M.  Baruch, October 
24, 1923; J. M.  Keynes, October  26,   1923; G.   Stressemann,  October 29, 
1923, Selections,   vol. V,   docs.   121,   123,   122,   124,   127,   129. 
56J.  C.   Smuts   to the Editor of The Times,  November  14,  1923, 
Selections, vol.  V,   doc.   132. 
Jan Christian Smuts, p.   256. 
143 
58ibid. 
Speech by J.   C.   Smuts   to South African Assembly, March 31, 
1922, Selections,   vol.  V, doc.   75. 
60J.  C.   Smuts  to Margaret C.  Glllett,  June 24,   1924,  Selections, 
vol. V,  doc.   175. 
61J.  C.   Smuts  to S. M.   Smuts,  October 27,  1927,   Selections, 
vol. V, doc.  233. 
62Memorandum, August   1926,   Selections,  vol. V,  doc.  204. 
63Notes of  Conversation with General Hcrtzog on Native Policy, 
February 13,  15,   27,   1928,  Selections,  vol.  V, docs.   240,  241,  242. 
64J.  C.   Smuts  to L.   S.   Amery,   November  25,  1924,  and J.   C.   Smuts 
to L.  S.  Amery, May  22,   1928,   Selections, vol.  V,  docs.   155,  245. 
65The Locarno Agreements were signed on October  16,   1925.    They 
comprised a number  of undertakings  the main one being a treaty of mutual 
guarantee of the Franco-German and Belgo-Gcrman  frontiers between Germany, 
France,  Great Britain,   Italy,   and  Belgium.    Another aspect of Locarno was 
a Franco-Polish and  a Franco-Czech treaty of mutual assistance  in event 
of German aggression.     Article  9 of the Locarno Pact  exempted  the Dominions 
and India from British obligations under  the treaty. 
66 'J.  C.   Smuts   to Arthur  Neville Chamberlain, October 21,  1925, 
is, vol.   V,  doc.   173. 
J.  C.   Smuts   to L.  S.   Amery,   November  25,   1924,  Selections,  vol.  V, 
Selections,
67 
doc.  155. 
68J.  C. Smuts  to L.  S.   Amery,  May 22,   1928,  Selections,  vol.   V, 
doc. 245. 
69J.  C. Smuts   to  E.  F.   Lane,  June  28,   1929,  Selections,  vol.   V, 
doc.  262. 
7°J.  C. Smuts  to I.  B.   Pole-Evans, May 8,   1925 and J.   S    Haldan, 
to J.  C.   Smuts,   December  13,   1928,   Selections, vol.  V,  docs.   loJ,  M*. 
71j. C. Smuts,  Africa and  SP-,P World Problems   (London,   1930). 
144 
Speech  before the  Empire Parliamentary Association,  January 
28   1930,  Selections,   vol.  V,  doc.   274. 
Following a number of  incidents at  the  "wailing wall" which 
culminated  in August   1928  in a major riot   in which 133 Jews  and 116 
Arabs were killed,   Sir John Hope Simpson was sent  to Palestine to report 
on Jewish  immigration  and  land  settlement.     His report was published in 
October 1930,   accompanied by a White Paper  (Cmd.   3692)   defining the policy 
of the British government.     Both documents were regarded by Zionists as a 
departure from the Balfour Declaration. 
74Telegram from J.   C.   Smuts  to J. R.  MacDonald, October 22,  1930, 
Selections, vol.  V,  doc.   284. 
75Simon Report—Sir John Allsebrook Simon,   Foreign Secretary 
under P. M.   Ramsay MacDonald   in  the National Government   1931-1935,    Later, 
he served as Home  Secretary,   Chancellor of  the Exchequer,   and Lord Chan- 
cellor. 
76J.  C.   Smuts  to M.   C.  Gillctt,  August  15,   1932,   Selections, vol. 
V, doc.  318. 
77Lord  Irwin  to J.   C.   Smuts, November 14,   1931,   and M.  K.  Gandhi 
to J.  C.  Smuts,  November 17,   1931,   Selections,  vol.  V, docs.   304,  305. 
78Address:     "The Scientific World Picture Today," Selections, 
vol. V, doc.   298. 
79llarold  Nicolson,  King George V, p.  493. 
80J.   C.   Smuts   to S.  M.   Smuts, October  6,   1931,  Selections,  vol. V, 
doc.  300. 
81J.   C.   Smuts  to S.   M.   Smuts,   January 11,   1933,  Selections,  vol. 
V, doc.  325. 
820swald Pirow,   James  Barry Munnik Hertzog,   (London:    Allen and 
Unwin,   1958),  pp.   156-157. 
83See speech on coalition by Smuts  in Cape Town on March 7,   1933 
recorded by Cape Times  on March 8,   1933. 
84Speech by Smuts at  Royal  Institute of International Affairs, 
November 12,   1934,   Selections,   vol.   V,  doc.   370. 
145 
85 
(Cambridj 
Edgar B.   Nixoa,  ed.,  Franklin D.   Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs. 
Mass Harvard  University Press,  1969),   11:251. 
8°Lord Lothian   (Philip Henry Kerr)--Politician,  editor,  and Ambas- 
sador.    Private Secretary  to  the Prime Minister,   1916-1921,  Secretary of 
the Rhodes Trust,   1925-1939,   sat   in  the House of Lord as a Liberal, Chan- 
cellor of  the Duchy of Lancaster in  the National Government,   1931, and later, 
Under-Secretary of State  for   India,     Ambassador to the United States,   1939- 
1940. 
87 
330-337. 
J.   R. M.   Butler, Lord Lothian,   (London:     MacMillan,   1960), pp. 
J.  C.  Smuts to Lord  Lothian,  February 20,   1935, Selections,  vol. 
VI, doc.  373. 
J.   C.  Smuts to L.   S.  Amery,   December 2,   1935,  Selections, vol. 
VI, doc.   387. 
90 • For Smuts's letter  of August  5,   1935 and Lord Lothian s reply, 
see Lord Lothian,   pp.   209-211. 
91In October  1935 British   Foreign  Secretary,   Sir Samuel Hoare, 
made an agreement with Premier Laval of France, by which Britain and 
France agreed  that Mussolini  might  annex large parts of northern Ethiopia, 
become entrusted with the economic exploitation of southern Ethiopia, 
and assume even a kind  of veiled protectorate over what was  left of 
Haile Selassie's   empire. 
92 
doc.  399. 
J.   C.   Smuts to L.   S.   Amery,  June 29,   1936,  Selections,  vol. VI, 
93Maurice Hankey,   soldier and government official.     Secretary of 
the Cabinet,   1916-1938,   British Secretary at  the Peace Conference,  1919, 
Minister without portfolio,   1939,  author of Diplomacy by Confidence,   and 
Supreme Command.   1914-1918. 
94J.   C.   Smuts  to M.  P.   A.  Hankey,  private,  July  17,   1936,  Selections, 
vol. VI:doc.   401. 
95Nicholas Mansergh,   Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs:    Prqb- 
i£!!15_of_Mernal Policy,   1931-39,   (London:     Oxford Press,  1952-1958),  pp. 
240^252";  
146 
96 
In a press   statement   in Pretoria on July 10,   1936 Oswald Pirow 
South African Minister of Railways and of  Defense,   1933-1939 said that 
South West Africa and Tanganyika would never be returned to Germany, 
that Germany should  be given a  foothold  in Africa and  that  very influen- 
tial quarters   in Britain supported  this view.    On July 16 the  issue was 
raised in the House of Commons.     Baldwin said that he regretted press 
interviews on "matters  that are of some  considerable delicacy." Times 
(London) July 17,   1936,  p.   7. 
97 
J.  C.   Smuts   to M.  P.  A.  Hankey,   July 17,   1936,  Selections. 
vol. VI, doc.  401. 
98, Great   Britain,  Cmd.   3530,   Report  of the Shaw Commission,   1930, 
pp. 106,   111,   125,   139. 
Great  Britain,  Cmd.   3686,   Report  of the Hope-Simon Commission 
1930, pp. 41,   50. 
Great Britain,   Cmd.   5479,  Report  by the Peel Commission,  pp.   110, 
112,  292,   376. 
101 
See telegram  from J.   C.   Smuts   to D. Lloyd Ceorge, October 22, 
1930, and Lloyd George's positive reply on October  23,   1930,   in Selections, 
vol. V, docs.   285,   286. 
102J.  C.   Smuts   to D. Lloyd George,  July 23,   1936,   Selections, vol. 
VI, doc. 403 and  Benjamin Sacks,   J.   Ramsay MacDonald   in Thought  and Action 
(University of New Mexico Press,   1952),  pp.   457-458. 
103J.   C.   Smuts   to David Lloyd George,   July 23,   1936,  Selections, 
vol. VI, doc.  403. 
104J.  C.  Smuts  to Margaret  C. Gillett,   July 27,   1936,  Selections, 
vol. VI,  doc.  404. 
105J.  C.   Smuts to Lord Lothian,  personal and  confidential, April 
?> 1937,  Selections,  vol. VI,  doc.  411.    Lothian,   at  this  time was serving 
as Secretary of the Indian Franchise Committee and Secretary of the Rhodes 
Trust. 
106P.   B.   Blanckenberg,  The Thoughts of General Smuts,   (Cape Town and 
Johannesburg:    Juta and   Company,   1951),  p.   114 and J.  C.   Smuts to Lord 
Lothian, April  17,   1937,   Selections,  vol.   Vi,  doc.  411. 
J.   R. M.   Butler, Lord Lothian,   (London:    MacMillan,   1960), pp. 
330-351,   217-219. 
147 
108Lord Lothian   to J.   C.   Smuts, May  14,   1937,  Selections,  vol. 
VI, doc. 413. 
The Thoughts  of General   Smuts,  p.   117. 
110J.   C.  Smuts  to  S. G.  Millin, November 12,   1937,  Selections, 
vol VI, doc.  426. 
J.   C.  Smuts   to L.  S.   Amery, December 9,   1937,   Selections, 
vol. VI, doc.  431. 
112J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, March 28, 1939, Selections, vol. 
VI doc. 436. In this letter Smuts discusses the Austrian crisis and 
its implications. 
nhbid. 
114J.   C.   Smuts   to L.  S.  Amery, June  8,   1939,   Selections,  vol. VI, 
doc. 465. 
115J. C. Smuts to S. G. Millin, September 14, 1938, Selections, 
vol. VI, doc.  445. 
116Cape Times,   26 August   1938, p.   11 
148 
CHAPTER  V 
THE  SECOND  WORLD WAR  AND  INTERNATIONAL  AFFAIRS 
From the Munich  crisis of September  1938 to the outbreak of war 
in September 1939 Smuts wrote often of his views on the international 
situation.     In  letters  to his   close  friends, Margaret  and Arthur Gillett, 
Sarah G. Millin,  Thomas  and   Corliss Lamont,  and Leopold S. Amery Smuts 
remained preoccupied with  the   looming  threat of war. 
2 
Viscount  Simon    recalled   in his memoirs how Smuts reacted to 
3 
the decisions reached  at Munich  in  1938. 
It was a terrible  decision which  faced  the Czechoslovak Government, 
but there was  no  third   choice.    True,   it was  that Germany would be 
acquiring Sudetenland by   cession and agreement,  but  if there was 
justification  for   this,   and  if Hitler was  to be believed  that this 
was  the  last  of his   territorial  claims,   European war might have been 
avoided. 
It was  this  hope,   far   fetched  as  it may seem in  the light of the 
sequel,   that made  the Prime Minister's return  from Munich the occa- 
sion for  the  applause of  the free world.    The Dominions  approved. 
Smuts called Chamberlain   'a great   champion, who in pursuing the        « 
path of the peacemaker,   had risked  all  and I  trust he had won all. 
In spite of  the   continual  and   inevitable drift toward war Smuts 
remained hopeful  that  the League of Nations  could somehow prevent the 
holocaust of world war.     A  letter  to Lord Robert Cecil reveals  this 
hopefulness.    On December 6,   1938 Smuts wrote: 
It  is our duty as believers   in the League to continue to stand up 
for it,   and  in  that way to  counteract   the general  impression ot 
the League as dead and as  a matter of no account whatever,    ihere 
has of course been a most   lamentable  change in the  fortunes ot the 
that 
in 
League  in  the   last   five or  six years,  but one hopes and prays  tha 
this may be a temporary phase,  and  that  a favourable settlement i 
Europe and  the   absence of  all other machinery  for  international ^ 
purposes may make   the League come into its own again.   .   .   • 
really the defection of  the U.S.A.   that hamstrung the League and 
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lias made  it practically  impossible  for  it  to discharge  its duties 
satisfactorily.   ...     I   therefore still  hope that   it will be pos- 
sible for you  to have  a heart-to-heart talk with Roosevelt, Cordell 
Hull,  and  other men of good will   in America,   and strengthen them 
in  their good resolves.5 
Smuts did  not  subscribe   to the  assertion  that Prime Minister Cham- 
berlain had served  his  country well   by postponing war  to a more con- 
venient   time.     Not   the postponement   of war,  but   the safeguarding of 
peace was Smuts's objective.     On March 31, Neville Chamberlain asserted 
in the House of Commons   that   if Poland's independence were  threatened 
the British government would  give  the Polish government full support. 
In a letter to Margaret  C.   Gillett on April 6 Smuts indicated  that he 
thought   that Chamberlain was  attempting to rebuild collective security, 
but would  find reconstruction a harder  task than  the collapse had been. 
Chamberlain's Polish  guarantee has  simply made us gasp  from the 
Commonwealth point of view.     I  cannot see   the Dominions   following 
Great  Britain  in  this  sort  of imperial policy the dangers  of which 
to the Commonwealth are obvious.   ...    The  British government may 
argue   that  such  a guarantee  is necessary  for   the new policy of 
collective security against  Hitler,   and that   it will mean peace 
and not war  and   therefore not  involve Dominion obligations to 
assist Great  Britain  in war.     For  this argument there is much 
to be  said.     But what   if there  is war—and   that over this  sort 
of guarantee  in eastern Europe?     And  in any  case what a commen- 
tary on Chamberlain's  previous disregard  for   collective security; 
and his calling League sanctions   'mid-summer madness    in  the case 
of Abyssinia?    The real midsummer madness was   letting the League 
down and rendering it   useless  for   future  cooperation in case of 
dire  need.     Chamberlain's League policy and   flirting with Mussolini 
may yet produce other more dangerous consequences.    Time alone can 
show." 
In   an interview in  the London Times on March 27 Smuts  admitted 
publicly that  the League of Nations was  doomed.       Also,   in a letter to 
Florence I.amont   three days   later he stated that   the world "suftered  an 
8 
immeasurable loss   in  its  [ the League's]   downfall. 
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He may bitterly regret  that we allowed  the League to come to the 
pass to which   it  has  fallen now.   ...     I  think we shall never 
again emerge  from anarchy and   the reign  of brutal power until we 
have once more brought  to  the round  table the various peoples of 
the world,   great   and small.9 
During this  period there   is  no record   in the Smuts Papers of 
Smuts having direct   contact with  the "Cliveden Set."    In a lengthy 
letter to Smuts,   however, Florence Lamont describes her contacts with 
the Astors. 
I went  to  luncheon at  the  Cecils  and  after talking with Lord Robert, 
I felt   that Chamberlain and his   foreign policy were dreadful.    I 
then hurried home,   changed my dress and  had  tea with the Astors, 
just  about an hour  after  I  had   left Lord Robert.    You would think 
my convictions would last more   than an hour!     But not a bit of it. 
Waldorf Astor said,   'Now,   Florence, you know Bob Cecil has been 
living in a dreamland  for  seven years.     Tell me everything he said 
to you and  I will  answer  it.'     He  then proceeded to answer  it, 
point by point,   sanely and quietly.     And at  the end of an hour I 
thought Chamberlain was  the greatest man on earth. 
Meanwhile, the  Soviet Union's dismissal of Maxim Litvinov in May 
1939 as Soviet  Foreign Minister,  puzzled him.    Litvinov had been a 
strong advocate of collective  security and  the League.    Smuts asked 
himself whether  the  Soviet Union was   turning to Germany,  and whether 
Hitler was re-insuring himself with  the Soviets  as Bismarck had done. 
As early as July  7,   1938 Smuts  recognized the potential role of the 
Soviet Union as  a mediator  in Europe.     He echoes  this very sentiment 
in a radio broadcast   to western Europe on November  11,   1938. 
On July  7,   1938 he stated  to his private secretary, P.B.   Blanken- 
berg, that   "my only hope   is   that with Russia  in a firm military alliance 
with the Western Powers   a military  stalemate might be produced which 
will make war  too risky an affair   for either  side and compel  them to 
13 
explore ways   to a new peace. " 
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In a  letter  to Margaret Gillett on May 27,  he rated slightly 
14 
higher the  chances of an Anglo-Soviet   agreement.      On May 27  the British 
and French ambassadors   in Moscow    began discussions with the Soviet 
government   for a pact  of mutual  assistance and a military convention. 
By early August  Smuts was  growing alarmed at   the apparent  failure of 
the negotiations   to make headway.     Peace seemed to hang on their out- 
come and if  the negotiations   came to nothing he imagined war was a 
certainty.     In a  letter to Sarah G. Millin he discussed why he became 
alarmed at   the turn of events   in Russia. 
The view I take of  this  Russian business--of course without know- 
ledge of  the real   facts--is  that Russia never wanted the negotia- 
tions for an alliance  to  succeed.     They dismissed their previous 
foreign minister—the  last  real European  among them—because he 
was keen on such an arrangement with the democracies.   .   .   .     Russia 
means  and meant   to sit  out   in  this devil's dance  in  the West.    Hence 
Litvinov had   to go.     She   awaits her day as the overlord of a ruined 
Europe." 
Smuts'8 attitude  toward   the possibility of war had changed with 
the changes  of circumstances.     Four months before the Munich crisis he 
16 
posed himself the  question:     What   can I do to help save the peace? 
After the crisis  on March 15,   1939 when German  troops entered Czecl-o- 
17 
Slovakia he asked:     What   shall   I do  if war comes?      After  the Nazi-Soviet 
agreement of August   23,   1939 he asked:     What must I do  if war comes? 
These phases  of circumstance  and of his  self-questioning were not sharply 
distinct but  overlapping.     Even  in his mood of profound relief after  the 
Munich agreement he had realized  that   the danger of war,   although averted 
for the time being,  might return soon. 
On November  2,   1938,   at   a United Party  Conference  in the Orange 
Free State,   Smuts  expressed his hopes  that Prime Minister Hertzog might 
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be proved right   In  forecasting  a long period of peace--"but nobody has 
19 
a guarantee  that  things may not   be different."     Like Hertzog, he accepted 
South African rearmament   as  a means   to  safeguard the peace, but he was 
more insistent  than Hertzog had  been on  its urgency for South Africa. 
On South African   foreign policy Smuts listed three goals:     South 
Africa could not  isolate  herself,  but  needed friends;  her best  friends 
were Creat Britain and  the other nations   of the Commonwealth; she could 
not count on staying neutral.     Throughout   the summer and early fall of 
1939, Smuts, who was  Deputy Prime Minister,   remained  constantly at odds 
with Prime Minister Hertzog over   the   issue  of South African neutrality 
in the event of war between Britain and Germany.    On September 4,   three 
days after Germany had   invaded Poland,   and  Britain was at war, Hertzog 
introduced a motion of neutrality   into  the  South African House of 
Assembly.     Smuts proposed   instead  to sever relations with Germany,  and 
his proposal was  accepted   in the  House of Assembly by 80 votes to 67. 
Since the Governor-General refused his request for a dissolution of 
parliament,   Hertzog resigned the  next day  and Smuts was  summoned to form 
a government.     The United Party had  to be re-organized when, after  the 
breach between Hertzog and Smuts  on September 4, Hertzog and 36 other 
United Party members of the house   joined  the National Party opposition. 
Now Prime Minister,  Smuts   assumed   the posts  of Minister of Defense and 
of External Affairs.     In  a  letter   to Margaret Gillett  on September 21, 
Smuts  indicated  that his  decision   to ally South Africa with Great Britain 
had general  support.       "My  stand  has of  course the unanimous approval 
of the English and a large  section of the Afrikaners.     But mere approval 
153 
24 
is nothing as  against   strong organization;  so my opponents are organizing 
22 
while I am governing  the  country  and  tackling its  problems." 
Hertzog regarded rejection of  the neutrality by Smuts and by other 
ministers who had been members of his   cabinet as an act of disloyalty 
23 
and a breach of a cabinet  agreement. The core of Hertzog's argument 
was the equation he made between neutrality and  independence.    If South 
Africa joined  the British,  Hertzog declared,   she would do so because a 
section of her people  cared   more   for British  than   for South African 
interests.    Such an outlook was   incompatible with South African freedom 
and independence.     If   it  prevailed,   it would  destroy South African unity. 
South African  interests   constituted  the core of Smuts's argument. 
He reflect a different view   from Hertzog on South African  interests 
because he viewed Hitler and  his  policy differently.    Smuts insisted 
Danzig was not   the real  cause of   the war.    The real   cause was Hitler's 
refusal to admit  any  limit   to his  ambitions.     The recovery of South- 
west Africa was  one of   them and   if South-West Africa were lost  the security 
of the Union of South Africa would   be  threatened.     The time  for defend- 
ing the nation's   independence and   security was  now, while the war was 
remote geographically  and South Africa had loyal and powerful   friends. 
If South Africa disassociated herself  from her   friends  in the British 
Commonwealth the  day would   come when she would   find herself isolated 
25 
in the world. 
Smuts committed  South Africa to war because he could see no alter- 
native.    He saw  a threat  to  values which in his view had  to be defended. 
First among them was  the  security of his  own country.     He repeated 
stantly his warning that  the world  was a dangerous place  for sma 
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which had no   friends  and   this   led him always   to  the commonwealth.     He 
valued the commonwealth   Cor the promise of a cooperative world order 
which he saw  foreshadowed   in  this organization. 
Upon attaining the Prime Ministership on September  6,   1939, 
Smuts pledged   more support   to the  commonwealth  struggle against  fascism 
than Hertzog' s   proposals   for modified   neutrality on September 4.    His 
forecast envisaged a war of  the oceans, quite possibly of the continents, 
into which South Africa must   inevitably be drawn because of her situa- 
26 
tion on the map. 
The  immediate  task at hand as   he saw it was to fend  off the Ger- 
mans in the West while  the Allies  built up their  strength.     He had  no 
doubt that Great Britain and  the Commonwealth possessed the material and 
power to give   their full resources  in  the struggle; but he did not   feel 
so sure of France.    He did  not  anticipate French military collapse;   it 
was French moral  conviction  that  he mistrusted.     In the debate of 
September 4  in which Hertzog's government fell  Smuts had pledged him- 
27 
self not to send  South African soldiers overseas.       By his   interpreta- 
tion of this pledge,  South Africa was   not overseas:    it was   the home 
front.    In a  letter to Margaret Gillett  on September 21,   1939 Smuts 
commented on Hitler's  opening moves   in   the war. 
The spectacular and very early collapse of Poland is going to make 
our position much more difficult.     It will be  said:    why  fight   tor 
a state which had so little  in  it,   and why sacrifice millions of 
lives and  endanger civilization in  the attempt   to revive Po^an°- 
This argument will not   impress  Britain who has   set her teeth;  but 
what of the   French who  I   don't   think were ever keen in this a"a>;r- 
Hitler may   try to concoct   some very  specious  peace offer   in oraer 
to sow dissension,   and   this he  can  do with   impunity as  it will noc 
be accepted.     Danzig was   a bad  start, and Poland has proved a severe 
knock.    Even   so there  is  no  turning back.     This war may go on until 
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Britain and  France are utterly exhausted   and Germany also  is 
utterly exhausted—and  Russia,   the  looter,  strides on to the 
desolate  scene to  collar   the   spoils.    I hate to think of a Hitler 
Europe,  but  no less   to  think of a Stalin   Europe:     it  is a choice 
between the Devil  and  Beelzebub.     Our hope is that  there will be 
an early  internal   collapse of Germany and   that  this devastating 
struggle will not   continue  till  Europe sinks down in utter exhaus- 
tion and despair.     What  an end   to  this glorious mother continent 
of Western  civilization--the proudest achievement of the human 
spirit  to date.     And   into this war  I have   carried my country.28 
The South African Parliament met   in a new session on January 19, 
1940.    On January 23 Hertzog moved   in  the House of Assembly "that the 
time has arrived when   the war with Germany should be ended and  that 
29 
peace be restored." He said  that war was no  concern of South Africa s 
and that she had been dragged  into  it  simply because Great Britain had 
declared war;   that Germany was merely redressing the wrongs done to her 
in the Treaty of Versailles;   that   equality,  not the domination of others 
was Germany's aim.     Hertzog  further stated that Hitler,  after he had 
completed his  campaign  in Poland,   had offered   to discuss peace with 
the Western Powers.     By refusing this offer those powers had put them- 
selves in the wrong.     By continuing the war they were committing a crime 
30 
and South Africa should  have  nothing to do with  it. 
Smuts rebutted  those  arguments  and accusations and   insisted that 
the Union could  not make  a separate peace without forfeiting its honor 
and sacrificing its vital  interests.    Hertzog's motion was put  to the 
vote on January  27,   1940 and,   defeated by 13 votes,  80 against 67 for. 
Now Smuts pushed   for  the War Measures Bill which would  give the govern- 
ment statutory authority  for  action   it would need to take so long as 
the state of emergency lasted.     The Opposition   fought  the Bill at every 
stage and tried to kill  it.     The government replied by imposing the 
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rocedure of guillotine, which in effect  imposed a time-table of three 
days of debate on the  bill.     On February 13 the House of Assembly 
approved the War Measures Bill by  79 votes to  59.    The Parliamentary 
session lasted until May 14.     Later,   in  a speech at Capetown on April 
8   1940    Smuts defined   the circumstances which rendered South Africa's 
participation  in the war essential.     "There  is no isolation in the 
world today.     It  was  a  choice between two friendships.    I   am not an 
Englishman—I have not   a drop  of English  blood   in ne—but   I  do believe 
that Great Britain is  our greatest   friend, and  that Germany  is a dan- 
31 
gerous bedfellow." 
On May 10 Hitler   launched his  attack against The Netherlands 
and Belgium.     This had   the  effect of solidifying Smuts's position in 
South Africa.     He wrote on May 12 that: 
Here in South Africa the   invasion of Holland and Belgium has had 
a stunning effect.     The neutrality of Holland and Belgium has been 
repeatedly thrown at me  by our Nats  [Nationalist   opposition]   to 
show how a small   country   should protect  its own  l"tet«*ta in this 
storm.    They never would   believe that Holland would go   the way of 
the rest.   .   .   .     Politically it  will  help me,   for rightminded 
people will be more  and more filled with disgust and »•£«•*• 
L.ism with all  it  implies   .   .   .  people who have paso™««^ 
against mc are beginning   to ask whether I was not after all right 
on September 4. 
When Smuts heard of Italian entry  into the war on June 10, he 
answered Mussolini's  challenge by two actions:     a declaration of war 
against Italy  and  the  assumption of  supreme command over the South 
African armed   forces.     On May   13,   three days after he assumed the Prime 
Ministership, Winston Churchill  telegrammed Smuts: 
To you,  my  friend  of so .any years,  and ****-*!»£ *lZ? 
war, I  send my heartfelt   greetings.     It U 
that we shall be together   in this hard and long trek,  M ^ 
you and  the government and  peoples of  the Union w 
the heat  of the day  and  that we  shall make a strong laager 
beside the waters at   the  end. 
er 
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As Commander-in-Chief (as well  as Prime Minister, Minister of 
External Affairs and Minister of  Defense)  Smuts was able in the years 
ahead to reply with an  immediate yes or no on all proposals submitted 
by Churchill  and local   commanders   for   the deployment of South African 
34 
forces in the field. The  Selections   from the Smuts Papers indicate 
that Churchill and Roosevelt  carried  on an extensive correspondence 
with Smuts   throughout  the war and  discussed  long range strategy of 
both a political and military nature. 
The government's declaration of war against Italy enraged the 
Nationalists  and injected new passion  into their campaign against the 
war.    Smuts had expected  them to be dismayed by so dramatic a vindi- 
cation of his  argument   of  the past  September  that no small nation would 
be safe so long as Hitler was  in power.    The majority of Smuts*s opponents 
were demanding immediate action to end  the war,  proclamation of a repub- 
lic and secession from the   commonwealth.    They believed that Hitler 
would be victorious within  a few months.     Daniel Francois Malan, Nation- 
alist leader,   stated   in  a speech  to his   constituents that the choice 
35 
confronting South Africa was   "a Republic or Hitler."      At  this  time Smuts 
was preparing   for a short parliamentary  session to begin on August 24. 
He secured a resolution  to continue  the war,  additional powers under 
the Amended War Measures Act   to maintain  internal order,  and an additional 
40 million South African pounds  to   spend on the war effort. 
From the beginning of hostilities Smuts took an active interest 
in the military situation in France. William C Bullitt, U. S. Ambas- 
sador to France,   cabled President Roosevelt: 
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I informed Roynaud  that   today General Smuts had  sent  to the 
British Government  an urgent  telegram stating that he considered 
that it was  the duty of the British Government  to  the British 
Empire to put   into  the present  battle every plane and every man 
that might be available.     I have the  text of this  telegram which 
is worded  superbly and  states   that   it   is  the duty of the British 
Government not  only  to  the people of Great Britain but also to all 
the peoples of  the Empire  to put   into the present  battle every re- 
source of the  Empire without  selfishness.36 
In a radio broadcast  to  the United States and Great Britain on 
July 21,  1940 Smuts gave an  interesting insight into his opinion of 
the French collapse. 
. The overrunning of the  small neutral countries I have mentioned 
is in the nature of such a minor military incident.    Of course,   the 
downfall of France  is no minor  incident;   it   is  indeed one of the most 
serious catastrophes of modern times.     But it may be  fairly completely 
accounted   for by  the  incredible mistakes of the French high command, 
the dcrp  internal  fissures of French politics and  the hopeless weak- 
ness of its political  leadership at  the most  critical moment.    France 
was divided,   sick  soul before  the end  came and her case deserves our 
deepest  sympathy.3' 
Meanwhile,   the balance of power had been altered   in North Africa. 
From the Commonwealth's point  of view the situation could not possibly 
have been worse than it was   in June.     The  scattered  forces  in Kenya,   in 
JO 
the Sudan,  in Egypt,   and   in Palestine  fell  far short of 100,000 men. 
Almost  immediately,   those   forces   found  themselves bereft of French sup- 
port and under  immediate threat   from two large Italian armies in Libya 
and Abyssinia.     Smuts  thought   it  certain that Hitler would send German 
forces to fight  alongside  the  Italians.    In communications with Churchill 
on June 30,  1940 Smuts  stated  the probability of eventually having to 
39 
yield I^ypt.   '     It was  all  tho more urgent,  Smuts stated,   to build up 
bastions of defense   further  south and   to protect  the supply  lines  to 
the Middle East  and  India.     The Cape  route must be safeguarded at all 
costs;  the Empire had been founded on  it and  the commonwealth could not 
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survive without   it.     In his  reply Churchill made clear his determination 
40 
to keep the fleet  in the  eastern Mediterranean and to  fight  for  Egypt. 
On points  dealing with Mediterranean strategy  Churchill  increas- 
ingly turned to   Smuts  for  advice  and  comment.     In a letter to Smuts on 
October 16,  1940, Leopold  S. Amery,  Secretary of State  for India,   stated 
'Meanwhile the   importance of your  point   (about   increasing forces   and 
air power in the   eastern Mediterranean)   is being increasingly appreciated 
by Winston and  the cabinet   as  a whole.    Such air  force as we have in the 
Middle East is being modernized  and  expanded,  and considerable reinforce- 
41 
ments of ground   troops  are  going out  shortly." 
In a letter  to Margaret  C.   Gillett  in June,   1940, Smuts revealed 
his true feelings   on  the role of South Africa in a post-war world   free 
of Hitler.    Smuts   stated: 
Now that the war in France is  over and Hitler's army is without 
occupation  they will very likely join the Italians  in this joy 
ride through Africa.     This menace I have  to deal with at the  same 
time that I  am plotted  against   and  attacked within the gates. 
South Africans  are curious people.     If we were wise and could 
sink differences we could  now secure such a measure of defense 
cooperation among all our neighbours,   including the Belgian Congo, 
that after this war we   could  be  a great United States of Africa 
right up to  the equator.     This prospect of future expansion and 
security is before us,   but  instead of firmly grasping it we have 
to submit  to what passes   for politics  in this  country, but else- 
where is looked  upon as national  sabotage and betrayal. 
Perhaps Smuts viewed a South African dominated United States of Africa 
as a necessary partner with  a  free  united post-war Europe. 
On July 9 Admiral Cunningham won the first of his naval victories 
over the Italians in the Red Sea. In November Cunningham secured a not- 
able victory over the Italian fleet in Taranto by putting out of commis- 
sion a major part   of  that   force as   it   lay at  anchor,  and decisively  swinging 
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naval supremacy in the Mediterranean in Britain's favor.      At the end 
of July 1%0  tlie first  Hurricane  fighters arrived in Malta.    Also, at 
the end of August a British armoured division embarked   for Egypt by way 
of South Africa.    Throughout  these same months air and ground reinforce- 
ments from Britain were reaching Gibraltar and Malta and  large forces 
from Britain,   India,  Australia,  and New Zealand were arriving in Egypt. 
Kenya was the  staging post of the South African forces.     Churchill would 
44 
have preferred   them to  go directly  to Egypt  but Smuts refused.      As 
Commander-in-Chief of South African armed   forces, Smuts was already 
under political  attack for   stretching too   far his promise to defend  the 
Union of South Africa and  he would have been hard pressed to defend him- 
self if he had  moved   South African  troops   to the northern side of the 
undefeated Italian arny   in Abyssinia.    Also,  Smuts believed  that an 
attack from the  south would prove  the most  effective means of overthrow- 
ing Mussolini's  East African Empire.     General Archibald Wave11, Com- 
mander- in-Chief , Middle-East  from 1939-1941  and  later Viceroy of India, 
agreed with him and subsequent  events  in East Africa proved Smuts cor- 
rect.      On December  6 Wavell's   forces began an offensive  against the 
Italians in Libya.    By December   12  they were  in possession of the coastal 
region around  Sidi Barrani  and had   taken a large number of prisoners. 
On October 26 Smuts   flew north  to Kenya to review South African 
troops with Anthony Eden and General A. P. Wavell.    From Kenya Smuts 
proceeded with   Eden and Wavell   to Khartoum to discuss plans for the 
■llitaty campaign in northern Africa  to defeat  the Italians.    Smuts  con- 
curred with the  plan of attack which was agreed upon in Khartoum: 
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Operation Compass  to expel  the Italians  from Egypt;  Operation Canvas 
47 
to overwhelm them in Abyssinia. 
Prime Minister Churchill  asked Smuts on June  24,  1940 by tele- 
gram to deliver a radio   address   to   Europe and America in order to bolster 
allied ir.orale and   to rally support   against Hitler.    On the evening of 
July 21 Smuts broadcast   his   speech.     In it he  envisioned  eventual triumph 
over Nazism and expressed his belief that  freedom remains  the remedy 
for the  ills which human  society suffers.    Also, he described his opti- 
mistic vision of Europe  after  the  holocast. 
As against  this  spectre of Nazi-dominated Europe we oppose the 
vision of a truly  free Europe.     Freedom still remains  our sovereign 
remedy for  the   ills   from which  human society   is  suffering.    We en- 
visage free Europe,   free  for   individual and   for nation,   free  in the 
sense of giving full   scope for  personal and  national self develop- 
ment and self-perfection,  eacli   according to his own individual  lines. 
.   .   . We have   also  learned  that  discipline  and organization must go 
hand-in-hand with  freedom.    The   failure of the League of Nations was 
largely due to   the absence of  a central control which  could harmonize 
the freedom of  each with  the proper functioning of the whole of 
human society.     We  therefore aim at a society of nations which will 
supply this defect  and which will possess a central organization 
equipped with   the necessary authority and powers  to supervise the 
common concerns  of mankind.     Intercourse between nations will be 
free and  commerce,  economics,   and  finance will be   freed of all 
hampering restrictions  and obstructions.    As  between man and man 
there shall be   the rule of law,   the absence of force and violence, 
and  the maintenance of peace.     In such an international   society 
there will be no place  for self-appointed  leaders and Fuhrers. 
He who will be master  shall be   servant .* 
Again, on December   31,  Smuts  broadcast a radio message to Great 
Britain.    He began by quoting the  saying that  the Gods lavish on those 
they love  infinite   joy and   infinite   sorrow.    That had been   the British 
lot during the past  year   and would  be  their lot  again  in the year now 
beginning.     But the year  would also  bring trouble   for Hitler.    People 
no longer looked upon him as  the victor,  and,  although he still held 
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the initiative he would run into great dangers,  however he used  it. 
If he made a second  invasion attempt against Britain he would  find 
Britain  in a much stronger position.    If he carried the war  into the 
Balkans and  the Middle  East he would be overstretching his  lines of 
supply through hostile   countries   and would be unable any more  to ignore 
Russia.     Concerning America,   Smuts  stated,   "I  feel convinced that in  the 
last resort America will not,   as   indeed she cannot afford  to,   stand out." 
He did not   forecast   in detail what he thought would happen  in the coming 
year; however, he  felt  sure of one  thing:     1941 would prove to be a 
49 
"Year of Destiny." 
Smuts's attitude   towards America was positive and  confident. 
He believed   that a moral  solidarity existed between America and  the 
British Commonwealth because  they  shared  the same freedoms  and repre- 
sented the   same values.     In a letter   to Sarah G. Millin on September 22, 
1941, he stressed  the   importance of America in stopping the tide of 
Nazism. 
I sec various English papers  and people are not  satisfied.    They 
want England  to do still more.     They want  the continent   invaded. 
Arc they mad?    At   this moment,  with our limited resources,   the 
continent   invaded!     A different Dunkirk it might be  this  time. 
We have   to wait  for America,   and that's all  there is  to   it.     1 
wonder   if the Americans  think that,  now Russia is  in the war 
we can manage without   them.     They make a big mistake i^tncy do. 
How would  they like,   afterwards,   to manage without us. 
Nine months  earlier,  on December 30,   1940 Smuts wrote  to Margaret 
C Glllett   that  "the moral effect of the United States becoming an ally 
would be enormous  and put  heart   into all  the forces of our  side.     Every- 
body v,ill  then know and   feel  confident  that we cannot lose  the war." 
Smuts believed  that  solidarity of  interest existed between them and 
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that  for her own safety America could not  stand aside when the Germans, 
Italians,  and Japanese were attempting to destroy  the oommonwealth.    In 
the Presidential  election of November 1940 he preferred Roosevelt as a 
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more forthright   friend of the   commonwealth than Wendell Wilkie. 
On March 6,   1.941  commonwealth forces which included South African 
units entered Addis Ababa.     Smuts  now focused his attention toward Hit- 
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ler's  "deadly  counterstroke."      He believed  it might  come any day, 
either in the Balkans  or  in North Africa, or both.     General Wavell had 
begun an offensive  against  the Italians  in Libya on December 6,   1940. 
Smuts believed   that  he had better not extend his forces too  far  in the 
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western desert.     Tobruk was   far enough. 
On March   7,   1941 Smuts  traveled to Cairo to meet with Anthony 
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Eden and General  Sir J. G.   Dill,   Deputy C.I.C.S.      The issue to be 
decided was whether  or not   the   commonwealth forces which consisted of 
Australian and New Zealand troops would  cross  the Mediterranean  to assist 
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the embattled Greeks.     Smuts   favored  taking the risk.      As part of his 
plan to  control  the whole Balkan region Hitler,  having already reduced 
Hungary and Rumania to  satellite  states,   sent German  forces into Bulgaria 
on February 28,   1941. 
On April  6,   1941 Hitler opened his massive Balkan campaign. 
British   forces were defending Greece and Yugoslavia.     On April 13 the 
Germans occuped  Belgrade and Athens   fell by the end of the month.    The 
British Royal  Navy rescued  from Greece 50,000 of the  62,000 men whom it 
had recently landed  there.    It was  a shattering demonstration of the new 
restrictions  imposed upon naval power by air and land   forces operating 
57 
from a continental base. 
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On May 24,   1941,  acting upon the recommendation of Churchill, 
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King George VI  appointed Smuts Field Marshal  in the British Army. 
On September  30,  at  the investiture the Governor-General of South 
Africa    Sir Patrick Duncan,   bestowed on Smuts, on behalf of  the King, 
the rank of Field Marshal.     King George's  letter read: 
I was hoping to present your Field Marshal's baton to you personally 
in England, but I well understand the reasons why you do not want to 
be away from South Africa   so long at  the present  time. 
I am therefore asking the Governor-General as my personal repre- 
sentative to hand it to you on my behalf. I would like you to know 
how proud my field-marshals are to count you among their number.59 
Hitler's attack upon Russia on June 22,   1941 took Smuts by 
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surprise. Smuts was  concerned, as Churchill was,   that  the common- 
wealth forces  in North Africa  and the Middle East appeared unable   to 
use the breathing space afforded by Hitler's  invasion of Russia to 
mount an offensive. 
Meanwhile, on August   3   Smuts received an invitation  from Churchill 
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to meet at Cairo   for discussions on war  strategy.      Churchill reached 
Cairo on August 4 and writing   to Clement Atlee on the  5th he  said:     "I ^ 
am discussing the whole  situation with Smuts who is a fount of wisdom." 
The following is Smuts's account of the meeting: 
I had an unexpected  summons   from Churchill on a Friday to meet him 
in Cairo on  the Monday following,  and on Monday morning I "«**•" 
in due course.    We had a  great time  together, dealing with  the mill 
tary situation in  the Middle  East, discussing the war •««*£» 
over the whole world,   and   finally winding up with war and P°s^waJ 
politics.    Most of  the matters under  consideration cannot be written 
about, but   the changes we m.de in the military command In the Middle 
East you will know long before you receive this.    We stayed at  the 
embassy in adjoining rooms  and spent most  of the «» *J«g*£ *+' 
and day.   ...    He pressed  me to accompany him to Moscow whither he 
was also bound;  but I had  had  enough of  it  and besides Moscow had 
no particular  call on my presence. 
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As a result of the Cairo meeting the following changes in mili- 
tary command occurred. General Sir Harold Alexander became Commander- 
in-Cliief in the Middle East in succession to General Auchinleck, and 
General Sir Bernard Montgomery, succeeding General Ritchie, became Com- 
mander of the Eighth Army. An independent command for Iraq and Persia 
was created and offered to Auchinleck who declined it. Later, Ccneral 
Sir H. Maitland Wilson accepted   it. 
In his Memoirs,  Field Marshal Montgomery indicated Smuts's 
continuing influence on Churchill which lasted throughout  the war. 
Montgomery stated   that 
Field Marshal  Smuts was  in Cairo at   the  time [August  1942]   and the 
matter   (the new commander of  the British  8th Army) was discussed 
with him later that day.    The Prime Minister and Smuts both favored 
(Sort, who had made a great name  for himself in the desert  and who 
was strongly backed  by general  opinion in the Middle East. 
From this  Cairo meeting two   issues of  importance  for the continua- 
tion of the war were agreed upon.     First, was a clearcut definition of 
two areas of  command;   secondly, was  the  inauguration of  the combination 
of Generals Alexander  and Montgomery.    According to  later  testimony 
from Churchill  and Lord Alanbrooke,   Chief of  the Imperial General Staff 
1941-1946,   Smuts   looked   fordward  to victory in North Africa as a deci- 
sive turning point   for the Allies   to  clear the Mediterranean basin and 
to build the  springboard   for a fighting front  in southern  Europe. 
For Smuts  the fate of North Africa was   crucial to  the survival 
of Great Britain.     On May 26,   1942   the Germans had attacked  the Allied 
defensive position  in Cyrenaica from Gazala to Bir Hacheim.    Both sides 
suffered  considerable  losses   in the battle.    On June  21 Tobruk fell to 
the Germans who  took 33,000 prisoners,  among them most of the Second 
166 
African Division of 13,000 men.    The Allied  retreat   in Egypt  stopped on 
July 1 when a defensible  position between the Qattara depression and 
the sea at El Alamein was  reached.     The first  three German attempts 
to break through   there were repulsed by the First South African Division. 
Smuts wrote  from Pretoria on July 21,   1942: 
For,  let  there be no mistake,   the loss of Egypt may, probably will, 
lose us the war.    That has been my outlook from the beginning and 
has largely determined my decision to defend the Union in Middle 
East.    If  the Axis get   Egypt  they pass into the Red Sea,  they will 
recover Eritrea and possibly Abyssinia,  and once more threaten east 
and south Africa.    They will pass on to Iraq and  establish contact 
by land and perhaps by  sea with India.    They will   join hands with 
Japan and,  whatever happens to Britain,  the British Empire will be 
looked upon as  lost.     There will  be political change in South Africa, 
which will   cease   to be a line of Empire communication.    The end will 
have come,   I   fear.    The Mediterranean route may become so precarious 
as to be useless  to us.    That need not be  fatal.     But retreat   from 
Egypt will,   I   fear,  bring us perilously near the edge. 
During the   course of the war  Smuts remained  in  close contact 
with Allied   leaders with his visits   to north Africa and London.    He 
did not go to  tho United  States,  though Roosevelt, on  two separate 
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occasions requested him to   visit. 
On May  7,   1942  the President wrote to Smuts. 
Very often I   rise   in protest against geography, because even with 
modern transportation it   is almost  impossible  for me to see and 
chat with my old   friends who live at a great distance.    There are 
so many  things   that you  and I should talk over-maters relating 
to the old days when we met in London in 1918 and   the equally 
important threats of  the present-that some day and   in some way 
we must meet   again.6" 
On May  19,   1942 Smuts  dispatched  a letter by personal messenger 
to President Kooscvelt.     "To me," he   said,  "The all-important considera- 
tion is our  timetable.     It   is  1942  that matters most.    No doubt we can 
develop and deploy  huge resources in  1943 and  1944, but we must  first 
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pull  through  1942."      Smuts   further   stated  that  if Hitler won successes 
in his summer offensive against the  Russians—victory  in Africa would 
eive the Allies  a firm base  from which to  counter the German thrust  that 
could then be expected   towards the oilfields in the Middle East  and  the 
Persian Gulf.     And  if  things went well in Russia it would give them the 
chance of striking  from across  the Mediterranean against  the "weaker 
members and hangers-on of  the Axis"   in preparation for the assault 
against  the Germans  to be launched   from the British Isles   in 1943. 
While  in Cairo in August  1942  Churchill repeatedly pressed Smuts 
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to make a visit  to London.       Though with reluctance,  Smuts did visit 
London on October  14  and  remained until November 19.    In a letter to 
Margaret Gillett  Smuts explained his  reasons  for his reluctance to 
visit London.     He  stated  that 
I  fear  the  physical  strain and exhaustion of a visit which  is 
certain to be   strenuous   for me and make great demands on such 
small resources  as I  still  command.    I am not what I was  twenty- 
five years  ago,   and even  then I   felt my  strength taxed  to the 
utmost  limit   in London.    And again, what   time will  there be  to 
sec my friends   in all  this pressure?    Taking it all In aU,I 
remain doubtful  about   this  visit  which scarcely accords with my 
own feelings   and  intuitions.    Still there  it is:     team-work is 
essential  in  this struggle,   and I  don't wish to appear to hold 
aloof.    Churchill was most   insistent and kept repeatedly return 
ing to the subject.'l 
While  in London Smuts  attended  meetings of the war  cabinet  and 
on October 21 addressed members of both houses of Parliament  in the 
Royal Callery/'     He declared  that  the defensive phase of the war was 
over and  that  the  stage was  set   for  the offensive phase. 
For the  first   three years of the war our role »M n«^J^ a 
defensive one.     That role was  imposed on us by the intensive 
secret preparations of  the enemy for six years before the var, 
168 
by the  false   sense of security he had sedulously fostered among us, 
and by  the mood of appeasement which had  in that way come about. 
That advantage of  the enemy no  immature offensive on our part  could 
possibly have  overcome.     We  could barely maintain our self defense 
against  the most terrible odds   .   .   . 
I only wish  to emphasize  that one phase   is ended and  another 
phase has begun  .   .   .       Certain points of great importance have 
already emerged.    Thus we have accepted the name of the United 
Nations.    This   is a new conception, much in advance of the old 
concept of a  league  of nations.    We do not want to be a league, 
but something more definite and organic,  even if,  to begin with, 
more limited  and less ambitious  than the League.    The United Nations 
is, of course,   a truthful   conception,  and on the basis of that con- 
ception much of  the machinery  for the  functioning of an  international 
order might well be restored.3 
As a result   of his   frequent visits  to Britain over the years, Smuts 
had established many close  and personal  friendships.    In the  inner circle 
around Churchill he had been  consulted throughout the crises  of the war. 
Smuts also  established  close   friendships with Sir    Alanbrooke, Chief of 
the Imperial Ceneral Staff, Lord Tedder,  Deputy Supreme Commander and 
Chief of Allied air  operations  in Western Europe   1943-1945,  and Lord 
Ismay, Chief of Staff to  Churchill.     Sir    Alanbrooke, following his 
trip with Churchill   to Moscow  in August 1942, recorded his impressions 
of Smuts and  Stalin,   two   contrasting, but equally  interested personalities. 
It has been very   interesting meeting men like  Smuts and Stalin.    Such 
a contrast!    Smuts I   look upon as one of the  biggest of nature s 
gentlemen  that     I have ever seen.    A wonderful  clear grasp of all 
things,   coupled with  the most exceptional charm.    Interested Inall 
matters,   and gifted with the most marvellous   judgement [sic],    ^alin, 
on the other hand,   a crafty.brilliant,  realistic mind, devoid of any 
sense of human pity or kindness.    Cives one  almost an uncanny feeling 
to be in his presence.     But  undoubtedly a big and shrewd brain with 
clear-cut  views  as to what he wants and expects to get. 
Churchill's   secretary,  Sir John Colville,   related Churchill's 
special  feeling toward Smuts. 
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.   .   . When in England Smuts was treated with an intimacy reserved 
for Churchill's   closest   circle of friends and advisers,   and when   in 
South Africa he was  frequently consulted on important matters of 
policy and strategy. 
There were many reasons   for this.     Churchill  took price in the 
part he himself had  played   in establishing a just and generous 
peace  after   the Boer War:     romance and  chivalry,  dominant in his 
emotions,  found   in Smuts   the perfect image of a gallant   foe who 
had become a loyal  and devoted subject of the British Crown.    Like 
Botha and Deneys  Reitz,   he was a living proof that magnanimity in 
victory leads   to goodwill   in peace.    Then,  Smuts had been a member 
of the  Imperial War Cabinet  in the First World War and was a link 
with stirring memories of  an earlier Great Coalition.     Churchill 
respected his   judgement  [sic],  acknowledged his wisdom and was in- 
variably  impressed  by the   clarity with which he presented his views 
and his   arguments.     Finally, even if the two men were unlike in 
character and  philosophy,   the General's  company was  congenial to 
Churchill  and his   conversation stimulating.    There was on most 
questions,  a true meeting of minds and a common faith  in the 
virtues  and destiny of the British Empire. 
Nobody was more  successful than Smuts  in moderating Churchill's 
more  impetuous   schemes and   in offering a constructive  criticism of 
genuinely statesmanlike proposals.   ...    No doubt the transition 
from Empire to Commonwealth, which Churchill regarded with dislike 
and dismay, was a development which his   fellow imperialist was pre- 
pared  to accept with a greater degree of resignation.    However that 
may be,   until  Smut a'S dying day Churchill,   in and out of office, 
turned  again and again for   advice,   comfort and encouragement to the 
enemy General whom he had   persuaded the King to create a Field- 
Marshal   in the British Army.75 
On August  15,   1943, President Roosevelt wrote again to Smuts ask- 
ing him to visit the United States.    Roosevelt wrote: 
Mr. Churchill has been here  at Hyde Park for two or  three days and 
he tells me he hopes  you will soon be able to come  to London.    I 
need not   tell you  that I hope if you do  this you will surely come 
to visit  us  in Washington. . .,„„..  fy,„f 
You will have a wonderful reception here and i    is my fought that 
you might   appear before the  Congress for a short  speech    and speak 
either   in New York or Chicago to a large audience.     I do not think 
however,   that   it would be  at  all necessary  for you to «"**« «"» 
sive tour   of the  country.     I want especially to have a good chance 
to see you personally.'" 
On October  5,   1943 Smuts  made his second wartime visit   to London 
"here on November  25 he addressed a large meeting of the Lords and Colons 
under the auspices of  the Empire Parliamentary Association.       This speech 
170 
was published and   issued by the  Empire Parliamentary Association.    His 
son Jannie, who was on his  staff,  noted that he had never known his 
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father in better  form.       In this  speech he stated that world peace was 
his objective and he enumerated  principles  to restore and to maintain 
it.    The League of Nations had   failed, he said, because the men who 
made it—he  included himself—had  shut their eyes to the reality of 
power.    As a result,   they had   left   the league  leaderless.    Leadership 
and power had  to go  together.     From  this principle he deduced  the need 
for a new world organization with effective peace-keeping authority vested 
primarily  in the Great Powers. 
Great Britain,   the United States,  and Russia now form the trinity at 
the head of the United  Nations  fighting the  cause of humanity.    And 
as it  is  in war,   so will   it  have   to be  in peace.    We shall  have to 
see to  it  that  in  the new international organization the leadership 
remains  in tne hands  of this  great trinity of powers.79 
The rest of his  address was basically an attempt  to justify the 
inclusion of Creat Britain in the trinity.    Smuts did not see in Chiang 
Kai-shek's China  the greatness which he believed the Chinese people would 
some day assume.     In regard   to France  Smuts  felt  that  "France has gone, 
and if ever  she returns   it will be a hard and a long upward pull   for her 
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to emerge again."      On  the new map of power  there would  be a blank where 
the three Creat Powers  of continental  Europe-France, Cermany and Italy- 
had formerly ruled.    Across   this blank would  fall the shadow of Russia. 
Also, America was  casting a  long shadow across the Atlantic.    Smuts hoped 
and believed  that  the Americans would remove  themselves  at long last from 
their isolationist   traditions  to  exercise a stabilizing  influence on 
Europe.    All   the same he  felt misgivings both  for  the freedom of Europe 
^1 peace of  the world   should  these blessings be  left dependent upon a 
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state of equilibrium between  the two mammoth powers,    smuts  felt  a need 
for a third mediating power.     The reasoning Smuts  gave for his nomination 
of Great Britain  for  this role was that  she was  the center of a  common- 
wealth which  could deal with Russia and America upon terms of equality. 
He concluded   the address with speculation upon means which might 
be available to build  up  the  strength of the commonwealth.    He envisaged 
applications  for admission to  it   coming from the  small democratic states 
of western Europe.     The Smuts'   idea was  to offer France, Belgium,  The 
Netherlands,   Norway,   and Denmark something in  the nature of dominion 
status in the   commonwealth.     It would involve such steps as the creation 
of a common  foreign policy;   coordination of military strategy;  combined 
boards of finance,   transport,  production,  supplies,  resources,  and raw 
materials;   a customs  union;   currency agreements;   and a joint approach 
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to civil aviation and  colonial problems.      He foresaw a grouping of the 
overseas dependencies   into units  large and strong enough to manage their 
own affairs without   control   from London but also  close association with 
neighboring dominions.     He believed that was the way to iron out  the 
distinction between commonwealth  and empire and  thereby develop to the 
full the commonwealth's potential   strength. 
Reaction  to Smuts's  speech was generally very  favorable.     Sir T. 
Drummond Shiels,  Secretary of  the  Empire Commonwealth Association, wrote 
to Smuts on December   15  that  "The Times has been enthusiastic in the 
■natter, [publication of  the  speech]   and,  no doubt,  you have seen the 
leading article  supporting the publication.    The press as a whole 
i  „„Mir have been intensely gratified 
responded splendidly,   and the general public have 
at the opportunity of  reading what you said. 
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En route  to South Africa on December 5,   1943,  Smuts  stopped at 
Cairo to meet with Churchill  and Roosevelt, who were returning from a 
meeting with Stalin at Teheran.     Smuts recorded his  impressions of the 
visit  in a letter  to Margaret Gillett. 
At Cairo I had much  to do during the three days of my stay.    I 
attended  the  final   conferences where the resolutions  for our future 
work were taken,  dined  alone with Roosevelt and discussed  the future, 
saw much of Churchill with whom most of my time was spent,   though I 
found   time for many others—diplomats and army representatives. 83 
The year  1943 marks  a watershed  in Smuts's attitude toward eventual 
world peace and postwar  problems.    After  1943 Smuts became less general 
and instead became more  specific  in dealing with issues of war and peace. 
By the early months of 1943 Washington had become the center of British 
and American decision-making.     Churchill  still spoke with authority to 
the Americans  and  to  the Russians,  and he continued  to  take counsel with 
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Smuts. 
As  a member  of  the War   Cabinet of  1917 and 1918,  Smuts had con- 
sistently argued  that political decision should come first and military 
planning second.    He  had  told  his  colleagues to clear their^heads about 
their political ends  and   then decide their military means. 
Smuts's address   in London on November 25,  1943 preached this same 
gospel.    His  speeches on  the military situation from this period on re- 
fleeted at   least  two definite  goals.    First,  the Britain and Americans 
nut go all out   for victory  in   Europe by  1944; secondly,   their road to 
victory must run not merely west  to east  but also from south to north. 
-   •..*••. in 1944.    First, his horror 
He gave two reasons   for  insisting upon victory U> tw. 
..     •->,» f-hric of civilization;  secondly, 
at the damage  the war was doing  to  the  fabric or 
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alarm at the   growing might of Soviet power.     Smuts, however, was not 
anti-communist; he regarded power in  itself as  an evil. 
Where   the war   ended was   just  as important to Smuts  as when it 
ended.    He wanted the British and American forces to be  in positions 
which would give them an equal voice when  confronting the  Russians  in 
the territorial and political settlement of Europe and the world.    Smuts 
wanted   to see   the British-American strength firmly established in central 
and south-eastern Europe,   a policy which coincided with Churchill's 
strategy. 
When I  look at  the sort of problems that we shall have  to deal with 
at  the end  of this war,   the  problems of the new Europe and the new 
world,  I doubt whether any peace  conference will be able  to settle 
those questions in  a reasonable  time unless   it proceeds  by a process 
of oversimplification and  falsification.    I  am myself doubtful whether 
we  shall  ever  come  to a peace  conference at  all at  the end of this 
war.    It may be that we may be faced with questions so vast    so com- 
plicated,   so difficult  and  intractable,   that   in the end we shall 
have to be   satisfied with making a pretty comprehensive armistice 
dealing with  the  general military question of ending the war, and 
leave the rest of  the problems  to a long series of conferences,   to 
a long process of working out   solutions without coming to any general 
peace  conference   at   all. . , 
That  is  one sort  of  situation that I  consider probable--that we 
may never   come  to  a peace conference at  all,   and tha{ ™ «f Jf J * 
be satisfied with  a comprehensive  armistice which will W***»* 
to a long  series of   investigations and researches^ which may take  a 
long number of years before  finality is reached. 
Smuts persistently argued   for an invasion of Nazi-held Europe by 
way of the Mediterranean.       On May 3,   1944 Smuts opened  the Conference of 
Empire Prime Ministers with  a long statement  expressing doubts as to  the 
advisability of  departing  from the Mediterranean strategy for a cross- 
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Channel operation. 
Smuts was  not satisfied with the various British-American war con- 
ferences.    The Casablanca Conference, which was held from January 14  to 
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January 26,   1943,   raised his hopes with the agreement to   the invasion of 
Sicily; but  the subsequent Trident  Conference of June 1943 failed  to 
reach any clear-cut decision for the  invasion of Italy.     With the toppling 
of Mussolini's government  in mid-July,  Smuts believed that the Allies 
lost a golden opportunity to crack the soft underlining of the Axis wide 
open by not  following up Marshal Badoglio's secret negotiations  for an 
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armistice. On August  31,   1943 Smuts wrote to Prime Minister Churchill: 
"While our Middle  East  campaign was  conducted with conspicious vigour 
from El A lame in to  the end   in Tunisia,  I sense a slackening and  tardiness 
in operations  since  then.   It   took us  several months between Tunisia and 
the Sicilian  landing,   and  there  is now another strange pause after Sicily 
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at a stage  in our  affairs when the urgency is very great." 
Smuts had   further reason to be pessimistic of Allied military 
plans.    Another British-American conference,   the Quadrant Conference at 
Quebec in August, had   just  given absolute priority in allocation of re- 
sources to Overlord,   the   cross-Channel  invasion planned for  1944,  at the 
expense of operations   already under way  in the Mediterranean. 
On September  3,   1943 he wrote Churchill  that 
I  feel convinced   that we  can  and should do much more and better than 
the Quebec plan,  which would unduly drag and prolong the war    with 
all the  attendant  risks   and possibilities I have indicated in my for 
mer message [of August   31,   1943].    The bombing policy    the antx U 
boat campaign,  and  the  large-scale attack across  the Channel IiPP»«- 
But in the Mediterranean we should   take Sardinia and Corsica and im- 
mediately attack  in North Italy without fighting our way up the penia 
eula .   .   .       We  should move on  to  the Adriatic,  and from a""IMbl* 
point  there   launch  a real attack on the Balkans and set  Its war£M 
forces going.    This will bring Turkey into  the picture «J-J 
fleet  into   the Black Sea,  where we shall jo In hf
a^ " C^    ^from 
supply her,   and  enable her  to attack Hitler's  fortress  itself 
the East  and South-east.92 
When news reached him of  the Italian armistice he sent Churchill a 
•!,„r,. of  the Dodecanese islands, 
telgram which  advocated   the  immediate seizuit 
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occupied by Italy since 1912,  and,  the  invasion of the Balkans with  a 
force of two to  four  divisions   to prevent the Germans  from disarming 
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the 25 Italian divisions there.      He also advocated stiffening the Greek 
forces    building up a front  against  the Germans on the Danube and Sava 
in northern Yugoslavia and   inducing the Hungarians to  join the allied 
side.    He  further stated,   "I  suggest  that our victories in the Mediter- 
ranean should be followed up   in Italy and the Balkans instead of now 
adopting a cross-channel plan,  which means switching on  to a new theatre 
requirin" very  large   forces and   involving grave risks unless more air 
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softening has been done."      Churchill reminded Smuts that his plan meant 
a complete reversal of  the priorities   agreed upon at the Quadrant Con- 
ference. 
On September  11   the Germans seized Rome and  the next day they 
liberated Mussolini.     The Germans rushed reinforcements to Italy until 
they had  25 divisions   on the Cassino  front to keep  the Allies out of Rome. 
At the same  time  the Germans built up   their strength in the Balkans and 
kept a firm hold  on Greece.     By early October  1943, when Smuts arrived 
in London,   the southern borders of the Axis had been strenthened and 
their position remained   secure. 
While   in London  Smuts  discussed with Chorchilltte military im- 
portance of Italy and   the Balkans  in allied planning.      U.S. Ambassador 
to Great Britain,  John Winant,   recorded his impression of Smuts's argu- 
ment for a Mediterranean strategy in a telegram to President Roosevelt. 
%m weekend Smuts and  I were with the Prime Minister at Chequers.    The 
withdrawing of landing  craft   from the Italian zone of action,  the possi- 
bility of destruction by  the rocket guns,   the Greek islands, and the 
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tirain" of the  second front  all  troubled him.    I think you will find 
that the  staff meetings will develop differences of immediate and 
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future planning that need to be settled." 
Smuts stated  to Churchill  that  in the south of Europe the allies 
had clear run to victory  if only they would see it;   it was  folly to 
throw away that  certainty for  the sake of an operation which could  not 
possibly be mounted   for another six months or more,  even if there were 
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no further postponements.       It  is possible that his  importunity wore 
the allied military  strategists down.    Whatever the reason,  on October 23 
Churchill proposed   to Roosevelt  another conference to review British- 
American strategy  in  the  light of  the recent changes  in the situation. 
In preparation   for   that joint  review,  the British Chiefs of Staff pre- 
pared a paper which   included  several items  of the Smuts programrae-an 
advance in Italy  to   the Piso-Rimini line;  aid to the partisans   in Yugo- 
slavia, Greece,   and  Albania on a regular military basis;  a bridge-head 
across the Adriatic;   a triple bid  to bring Turkey into the war,   opening 
of the Dardanelles,   creation of chaos and disruption  for the enemy in 
the Balkans.    The Chiefs of Staff said that  if this meant a postpone- 
ment of Overlord   it  was a consequence to be accepted. 
At   the Teheran Conference,  November 28 through December  1,   1943, 
Stalin insisted  upon May 1944 as  the date  for Overlord and also endorsed 
a proposal of American origin  for  the invasion of the south of France 
in support  of Overlord.    This operation, whose name was Anvil,  had  the 
object of providing  an additional supply line, of broadening the western 
assault on Germany,   and of satisfying French pride.    However,   it  could 
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only be mounted by bleeding the Allied  forces in Italy of their fight- 
ing men and   landing craft and   thus condemning them to a bitter,  frustra- 
ting struggle  from the  south  to  the north of the Italian peninsula. 
During his  third war-time visit  to Great Britain,   at the Confer- 
ence of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on April 28,  1944 Smuts made one 
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last bid for his southern strategy.      His idea was to scrap the planned 
invasion of the south of France and  to substitute for it  a drive along 
the line Trieste-Lubliana-Vienna.    Thus,   there would be  three main forces 
converging on Berlin:     General Eisenhower's armies from the west,  the 
Russians  from the east,   the Russians, British,  and Americans from the 
southeast. 
While   in London prior  to the cross-channel  invasion, Cencral 
George C. Marshall,  Army Chief of Staff,  wrote a memorandum to Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  requesting a campaign medal for Smuts.    Smuts will meet 
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Marshall for  the first  time on June  11,   1944.        Marshall's memorandum 
reads as  follows: 
General    Eisenhower has suggested  to me that he be authorized to 
present the European-African-Middle Eastern campaign ribbon to 
Field Marshal Jan C.   Smuts, Prime Minister o    *>«f Africa.    The 
Field Marshal visited  the North African theatre on two or three 
occasions   last year and General  Eisenhower feels he jould behighly 
complimented and most  appreciative of the gesture.    «"««^*$« 
t& authorizes awards of those ribbons  to mem e s       ^n ^Naval 
Forces of  the United  States only.    Under the circu .'_.» 
it should be made  clear  that  this prescntation ha« ^'""^Si 
approval and request you authorize it  to be made  m your name. 
j   ™A   initialed  the  memorandum and On May 25th President Roosevelt  approved and  initialea 
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returned   it  to General Marshall. 
In his Memoirs,  Field-Marshal Montgomery related Smuts's apprehen- 
sion in May 1944 that   the world might drift back to its pre-war pattern 
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of alliances  and  power  centers.     Smuts believed that  the present war 
marked  the beginning of a new world  in which Britain stood prominent; 
but in this new world Britain must  remain as  the corner-stone of the 
new structure. 
Smuts is worried we may lose  the peace.    Britain, with American aid, 
won the  1914/18 war.     But when  it was over we tired, and we  stood 
back    allowing France  to  take  first place  in Europe. The result was 
the present war.    lie  then went on to say that we cannot allow Europe 
to disintegrate.    Europe requires a structure—a framework on which 
to rebuild   itself.    A good  structure must have a firm core.     France 
has failed  dismally. 
Britain must stand   forward as the corner stone of the new struc- 
ture.    Nations  that want  security must range themselves on the side 
of Britain;   there can be no more neutrals.     It is a Britain  that 
stood alone   in  1940-41  and  then, with American aid,  stemmed  the 
tide      Britain  is  a continental   nation.    Britain must remain  strong 
and must keep up small,  but highly efficient, forces which are cap- 
able of rapid   expansion.    The  keynote of the armed   force necessary 
in peace time must be  air power;   the army can be relatively small. 
On June  12,   1944  six days   after the alii* invasion of France, 
Smuts accompanied   Churchill  to Normandy,  landing at Courseulles   in the 
Canadian sector.     Smuts recounted  this visit to Admiral Lord Louis Mount- 
batten,  Chief of Combined Operations,   1942-43. 
Today we visited  the British  and American armies on the soil °* *™nce- 
S sailed  through vast   fleets of vessels with landing craft of many 
types pouring more and more men,  vehicles and stores a shore.    We saw 
artificial harbours  in the process of rapxd development      We have 
shared our  secrets in common and helped each other »" »J ^*   ^ 
wish  to tell you at  this moment   in your ardous campaign that we real 
that much of  the remarkable  technique and  therefore thesuecesa « 
venture has   its   origin  in  the developments effected by you and your 
staff of Combined Operations.10^ 
When Operation Overlord was   launched on June 6,   1944 Smuts  con- 
tended to Churchill   that Operation Anvil would be  too late to serve  any 
useful military purpose/05 On June 21 Smuts departed London for Pretoria. 
Enroute, he stopped   in Italy,   at  Ciampino outside Rome,   for discussions 
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with General Alexander,  Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies  in Italy and 
the Mediterranean  theatre.    Alexander agreed with Smuts that Operation 
106 
Anvil should be cancelled. President Roosevelt, however,  concurred 
that the invasion of southern France should go ahead on schedule.    For 
the sake of Operation Anvil,   the British and American forces in Italy 
were decreased by 40 percent.     The landings  in southern France took 
place on August 15  and   the Allied  forces drove rapidly to Lyon and be- 
yond without meeting much opposition.    Smuts called their drive a futile 
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Joyride and  Churchill   concurred. 
At  the  second Quebec Conference  in September  1944  the Americans 
consented  to discuss  the  advantages of preparing alternate military 
plans.    The  conference  gave  the approval to General Alexander to advance 
to Vienna.    With his  depleted   forces he could not even manage to break- 
through  in Italy.     The  conferees  also gave their  approval for a small 
force to be   landed   in Greece  after  the Germans were expelled. 
Throughout   the  autumn and early winter of 1944,  Smuts carried on 
continuous  correspondence  on Greek affairs with the Greek royal family. 
After the German conquest  of Greece and Crete in the spring of 1941, 
members of the Greek royal  family  fled  to Egypt where they were unwelcome. 
They then asked  for  asylum in South Africa and Smuts  invited  them to reside 
as his guests  at Libertas,   a residence adjacent  to his home at Doornkloof. 
They arrived  the first week of July 1941.    The Greek King, George II, 
was accompanied by his brother,   the Crown Prince Paul;   the latter's wife, 
Princess Frederika;   their   two  children, Constantine and Sophia;  and 
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Prince George,   and his daughter Princess Radziwill.    Smuts became the 
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odfather of Princess Frcderika's   third  child,   Irene, who was born in 
South Africa in May 1942. 
In a letter  to King George II of Greece on June 4,   1943 Smuts 
revealed his reasons  for his continued  interest in Greek affairs.    The 
letter reads  in part: 
I know from repeated  talks with British statesmen how sincere is 
their support  for your Majesty and how conscious they are of the 
value  to Britain of her loyal   support  for your Majesty.    They know 
that Greece must play an important part  in Mediterranean policy 
after  the war,   and  her friendship with Britain must be   in no doubt. 
But their support   for the Greek throne is not sufficient.    Far 
better   is  it   for the Greek people to stand unalterably behind their 
king      And   it   is   just here  that  the prince and princess  can be 
most helpful   to you  and render a great service to the good cause. 
I would  therefore respectfully  suggest  that  the  fullest use be 
made of both of them for this   important purpose,  and that their 
active  service in  all  social  and relief measures be utilized to 
secure popularity  for  the Greek royal family.    I  suggest this be- 
cause of  the wise  policy similarly pursued with regard   to members 
of the English royal house. 
In  the fall  of  1944 Smuts wanted to see a synchronization between 
military occupation and  restoration of the Greek monarchy.     At the request 
of Churchill, at   the Quebec Conference, Sir Alexander Cadogan read a com- 
munication  from Smuts on Greece  "who  advocated,  as a matter of fair play 
that the King of Greece  [sic]   not be precluded   from entering his own 
country and resuming his   former position,  subject perhaps to  later deci-^ 
sion by the people of Greece as  to  the future form of the Creek regim." 
Smuts supported  the Crown Prince's proposal  to enter Greece with the British 
forces,  and when that was  refused he resisted  the proposal  to make Arch- 
Ill 
bishop Damaskinos  Regent. 
Smuts   saw happening before him the  immense shift in  the balance of 
world power  that he had  always   feared.    "The  footsteps of ^Russian 
giant," he stated,   "are being printed on the sands of time." 
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Russians would  go  the glory of victory and  the power that victory would 
bring. 
The state of Europe and of the world in early 1945 contained many 
of the features which he had predicted  in his  famous speech of November 
25    1943 to the Lords  and Commons under the auspices of the Empire Parlia- 
mentary Association.    As he had predicted   in that  speech a power vacuum 
developed  in Europe.    He  saw only one victor and  that victor was the 
Soviet Union.    With   t»he  collapse of the three great powers of Continental 
Europe the Soviet Union  inherited much of  the position and power.    In his 
1943 speech he had   identified America as a second Great Power that had 
finally taken a lead   in establishing and maintaining a just equilibrium 
of power  in Europe  and the world.    In 1945,  however,  Smuts seemed to 
think that  the Americans were   shunning the role assigned  to them. 
In a letter  to Thomas W. Lament, Chairman of the board of  the 
J. P. Morgan Company,   Smuts  reveals his pessimism toward  the fate of post- 
war Europe. 
carry out his  own policy  in hi * ™ "J™r*elghbors „ho have  suffered 
chunks will  be   torn off  to  satisfy those ne^ ,.carcciy  con- 
under  the Nazis.     Germany itself as an en      y ^centrated 
tinue to exist.     Only  the German people w 1    remai ^^ 
into a smaller area to  stew in their own J°"e- „cneration 
will go  the way of Wilson's  J^^^'t^i^SLr, of 
hence people will once more be wondering at v 
1945-46! H3 
,   -,     f.f.   i   fhP British Commonwealth as a member In 1943 he had   identified  the Britisn 
1« a nart in world affairs.    By 
of the Big Three,   powerful  enough  to play a part 
1945, however, he  seemed  to believe that  the co^onwealth was falling 
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hort of the.  capacities  and  achievements he had envisaged for  it.    No 
lications  from the democratic  states  of western Europe  for member- 
ship in the   commonwealth had been coming in,  or were likely to come  in. 
0   September 29,   1944,   however, Anthony Eden informed the House of Com- 
mons that  the Government had embarked on a policy of drawing the coun- 
tries of western Europe   into a closer association with the British 
Commonwealth of Nations,   thereby  giving official approval to the ideas 
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enunciated by Smuts in his November 25,   1943 speech. 
Smuts saw Churchill's Parliamentary defeat on July 5,  1945 as 
evidence of the  fragmentation and   erosion of power at the very center 
of the commonwealth.    Relating to Britain's role in world affairs he 
stated that   "with   the rise of the   two collosi in the war and the new 
world,  British  influence  could be   so beneficial in its human,  experi- 
enced, wise outlook.    The world wants  this wise broker between the 
new great powers whose outlooks are so very different."        Privately, 
Smuts offered his   consolations  to Churchill on his  electoral defeat. 
Privately 1 have quoted  to Churchill  the lines  fromMommsen on^ 
Hannibal's end which  I have often quoted before•      °n , 
the Gods  love  they  lavish  infinite joys and  taOnlte 8orr£« 
What  else  could one   say that  is  adequate to each • 81 
such a fall after achieving the most   COW SUCj*«£ ^ £7 
The mountain of Transfiguration alternates favourltes of the 
Cross:     such  is  the   curve of the great one      **£%    ce 0f the 
Gods.    Like life and  death, human Jestxny  xs of  th ^ 
mystery of this world,  and  the good and *« *"e JJ    religion is 
sense of mystery whatever  comes  to them.    AX ^ ^ essentially 
based on this  sense  of mystery    but of B tnyste y^ ^ philoso- 
beneficient in  its longrange effec s       In    P churchlU.    To 
phizing one cannot   forbear  sympathizing ae p > b    the people 
l so decisively rejected  in the ^^J^S g truly the 
whom he  saved by his  courage and stupena u 
unkindest  cut  of all. 
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Smuts  still  retained  some hope that Europe would rise again 
from the ruins of war.    "The United  States is  too far off and ill- 
informed on European matters   to apply a brake.    And  in the next ten 
years the process of decay may  continue  instead of being reversed, 
and the new Europe  beginning slowly to emerge." 
From the start of the war Smuts was confident  that the Allies would 
win the war which he   looked  upon as a crusade of the spirit  in defense of 
Christian civilization.    But as   it  progressed he became more concerned of 
the peace  to  follow.     The rise  of Soviet power  in particular alarmed him. 
As the war neared  an   end he began  to despair of a statesmanlike settlement, 
The part he  took  in   setting up   the new League of Nations at San Francisco 
was dutiful but  lacked conviction.     Though still  looked upon as a figure 
of influence and prestige,   Smuts  understood  that  the decisions affecting 
the peace of the world had  already been decided by the  great powers. 
lie hoped  that   a third power  center based   in Europe would emerge, 
though he reluctantly  gave  up  the  idea that Great Britain would lead  it. 
Other matters   that  engaged his   thought and moved him to such action as 
he could  take were  the weakening commonwealth,  the anomalous position 
of India within it,   the prospects of  the restored monarchy in Greece,  and 
the development  of the  state of  Israel.    In  1948 he welcomed the Truman 
Doctrine and  the Marshall Plan.     He acclaimed them as the portent of a 
three-fold achievement:     first  the Atlantic Community;   secondly, European 
Union; and  thirdly,   Commonwealth  Europe. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE  POST-WAR WORLD AND THE LAST  YEARS 
The end of  the Second World War saw no lessening of Smuts's 
anxieties  about   the  state of world affairs.    He remained convinced 
that evil would remain, as  it had throughout the ages,  a persistent 
and intractable  element of human society.     In his   letter to Margaret 
Gillett he  sums  up   this attitude. 
There   is so much   that  is divine in us,   so near   is man to God, 
that  it  only  increases  the pain and the horror of this tragedy 
beyond  all  comprehension.    One can but bow one's head before this 
revelation of  evil, of the  evil in us and in our human arrange- 
ments.     No devil   could have   conceived  something worse than what 
is our  human handiwork.    And  yet God so  loved   the world!    That 
is the enigma,   the mystery of both evil and good.* 
Smuts realized  also that  human affairs in the twentieth century 
included  scientific  technology,   totalitarian politics, and war  economics. 
Confronted with the possibility and threat of total nuclear devastation, 
civilized man must attempt not merely the regulation but the prevention 
of war.    Somehow man must create   institutions capable of preventing 
future holocast. 
In the early years of the Second World War Smuts had hoped  for 
the reformation and restoration of the League of Nations.    His plea 
2 
went unheeded.      America had never  joined the league and the Soviet 
Union after   invasion of Finland,  had been expelled on December 14, 
1939.    Both  of these powers  insisted on the need to  create a new world 
organization  and  to give   it  a new name.    The  form and make-up of  the 
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United Nations which he saw emerging      were much the same as  those con- 
tained  in The League of Nations:    A Practical Suggestion.    This was not 
very comforting to Smuts because the League had suffered disaster.    If 
the United Nations were   to escape the same disaster,  the shortcomings of 
the old Covenant would  need  to  be made good  in the new charter.    The 
difficult was,  however,   that  there was disagreement   as to what the short- 
comings were. 
In his  speech of November 13,   1934 at Chatham House Smuts made 
3 
himself the  advocate of an international organization "with teeth." 
He did not   carry his  advocacy of the  coercive principle to its  logical 
conclusion;   i.e.,  an  international organization with  its own armed   forces 
under its own executive.    That  would have signified  a super-state, which 
he considered neither  desirable nor,  under existing circumstances, 
feasible.     In   that   speech he made a proposal  that the responsibility for 
keeping the world's peace be in  the hands of the so-called  trinity of 
Great Powers.     Franklin Roosevelt had a similar  idea.     On September 15, 
1944 at Quebec he added  Nationalist China to Smuts's  trinity and believed 
that these  "four policemen" would be able  to keep the world   in peace. 
This   conception of world  order ran  into difficulties.     It appeared 
to contradict   the principle of "the sovereign equality of all peace- 
loving states" which had  been promulgated  in the Four Power Declaration 
at Cairo  in October   1943.     Smuts  did not  think the contradiction untenable. 
He had  insisted on several occasions during the war that small nations 
■■   -J        „„,i     v.,. hrlicvcd  that   they  would 
could no longer  find  safety  in  isolation and, he believe 
wiHingly  accept  the   leadership  of  the Great Powers in the new system 
ts was  probably fairly satisfied with the compr 
of 
omise 
world  security.        Smuts 
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finally arrived  at, which did   justice to egalitarian aspirations by 
giving the smaller powers representation on  the Security Council,  and 
by giving emphasis  upon the prestige of the General Assembly where  every 
nation would  enjoy equal representation in every area except  that of peace- 
keeping.     In  that sphere,   the main responsibility was put upon the Security 
Council,  and within  the Security Council,  upon the Great Powers. 
From San Francisco,  on May 8,   1945,   he wrote in a pessimistic 
6 
vein of the  future,   to Florence Corliss Lamont. 
I am full  of misgivings  and even forebodings.    The enemy has behaved 
so  cruelly and  sadistically and  the trail of hatred and revenge he 
has  left behind   is  such that one  almost despairs of our side keeping 
within  the   limits  of what   is just  and reasonable.   .   .   .    But this 
may be  too much  to hope  for,  and much needless suffering and setbacks 
may be  in  store before we reach the real Peace—the Peace of God as 
they said   in the olden times.' 
Smuts believed   that new institutions by themselves were not a 
sufficient response  to   the challenge which confronted mankind.    What 
was needed was   a change  in attitude   in the minds and hearts of individuals. 
General Smuts and Mrs.  Lamont   corresponded  frequently and discussed at 
length what  stamp these new institutions would  take.     Smuts's requirements 
for human survival becomes  clear from an examination of their correspondence 
beginning in 1935.     Smuts's requirements  for human survival were high. 
Two things were  needed:     institutional reform and  individual rebirth.     He 
considered   individual rebirth the  fundamental requirement. 
u u_- „nt  t-r. come from some new machinery, The reconstruction of our world has not  to  come  rro 
some new social or  international mechanism    but  from *_moral, a 
spiritual  reconstruction from the depths of human »««""•?"' 
'Thy Kingdom  come,'   love,   toleration, pity^ service,  goodwill, 
peace—these   are the  laws of that  kingdom. 
Reviewing   the world  around him Smuts saw numerous  counterfeit 
religions-racism,   nationalism,   fascism,   comuunism-all of which had 
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enough  strength   to power the engines of destruction.    But where and 
how would power  be  generated  to drive  the engine of world peace? 
Smuts  accepted  the  teachings of Christianity as a convincing refuta- 
tion of all  the   counterfeit  religions.     However, he realized  that 
Christianity was   far removed   from the  thought and  imagination of twen- 
tieth-century man.    What Smuts longed  for was to hear the Christian 
gospel proclaimed  again in  such a manner  as  to satisfy the reason and 
touch the heart  of   twentieth-century man. 
We may be living   in a great period  and at a great stage of history. 
And yet  the most  significant  things  are the simple human relations 
which will remain    and   continue when all else has passed  into 
night      It   is   in ourselves and our simple human contacts that the 
mystery of life  is enacted  and  the  finest  flowerings of the spirit 
take place.     It  is  that  in our modern civilization the externals 
have become   too   important  and occupy such a foremost place in our 
lives  that  the   interior   life is dwarfed and driven clean under- 
ground .'■" 
According  to Smuts   the world  could not wait   for  the thing it 
needed  most,   the  religious miracle of individual men and women being 
born again.     The   first moves   in  the struggle  for human survival would 
have to be made at   the  institutional end.    Ml would be   accomplished 
by the establishment of a World Security Organization.    Such an organi- 
zation,   the United  Nations,   assembled at San Francisco from April 25 
to June  26,   1945.     On March 4,   1945 Smuts wrote to Margaret Gillett 
that only his  sense  of duty would  take him to the United Nations Con- 
ference  at San Francisco.    He  also mentioned the rumour  circulated by 
the British delegation to  the United Nations Conference  thatte was to 
be nominated as a  candidate   for President of the Conference. 
He wrote to Margaret Gillett: 
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From London I   shall move on to  San Francisco.    I do not know where 
the ridiculous rumour has  originated that I shall be president  ol 
the conference.     It   is, of course, preposterous.    Russia does not 
like me,  France distrusts me,  even in British circles there is 
divided  opinion,  and South Africa is too small  fry for such exalta- 
tion.     Indeed,   it  is only a sense of duty that takes me to San 
Francisco at   all,  at  a time when I am badly wanted in South Africa. 
But I  feel I  should  be  there,   in case I  could be needed as one of 
those who remember   1919.     Issues may be raised where I could speak 
with some  effect because of my past experience.    Churchill has 
wired me  to express his pleasure that I  can and will go there. 
But  it may be   that when the  conference comes,  the play will al- 
ready have been fully written and only the theatrical performance 
will take place; and   in that I   shall  take little  interest, and 
that probably with a sad heart.12 
Smuts   surmised  that when the  conference met the decisions would 
have been already decided upon by  the big powers and  the affairs at 
the conference would serve only  to reflect what had already been done 
by the victorious   allies   in the occupied capitals of the Axis.    "Peace 
will depend  not only on what we plan at San Francisco but also on what 
is done  in Berlin,   Vienna,  Rome and   the other occupied capitals where 
we are   in charge of  future dispositions and policies.    The foundations 
are there,  and  if   they are  foundations of sand we shall plan the build- 
13 
in vain here." 
The San Francisco Conference drafted the charter of the United 
Nations  and  the Statute of International Court of Justice.    Prime 
Minister MacKon,ie  King of Canada made a motion in the Steering Com- 
mittee of the   conference   that Smuts be granted permission to speak at 
the Plenary Session.    The motion was  seconded by Anthony Eden and 
14 
approved by voice vote. 
On May   5 Smuts was  nominated President of the general assembly, 
one of the  four commissions of  the  conference, which dealt with the 
Preamble and   trusteeships.15 In his  speech at   the opening of the 
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Conference on June  12,   1945 Smuts expressed optimism that the charter 
represented   "a very real  and substantial advance on all previous plans 
16 
for security against war." 
Our charter is not  a perfect document.    It is  full of compromises 
over very difficult   and  tangled problems.    But at  least it is a 
good practical workmanlike plan for peace—a very real and sub- 
stantial   advance on all previous plans  for security against war. 
It provides for a peace with teeth; for a unified front of 
peace-loving peoples against future aggressions; for a united 
front among the great powers backed by the forces of the smaller 
powers as well. It provides also for lesser combinations for 
prompt defense on a regional or local basis. And it provides 
for central organization and direction of the joint forces for 
peace. *■' 
In this speech Smuts enumerated on the major contrast between 
the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the drafting 
of the Charter of the United Nations.    At  the close of the First 
World War,  not  as much preparatory work had been done  that the way had 
been open for  his own   individual  tour de   force.    In the brilliant  state 
paper of December  1918,  The. League of Nations:    A Practical Suggestion, 
with little previous work  to draw upon except the report of the Philli- 
morc Committee,  he had  enumerated  and expounded the essential objectives, 
organs,  and procedures  of the future League of Nations.    Twenty-seven 
years  later  the situation was radically different.    Two years,  if not 
more, before   the close of  the Second World War preparatory work was 
begun by hundreds of experts  and advisers  on the "establishment of a 
wider and permanent  system of general security."    In all this work, 
which was put   into preliminary shape ^Dumbarton Oaks   in Washington 
in September,   1944,   Smuts  took no part. 
During   the first U.N.O.   conference,   however, Smuts dealt force- 
fully with two   important  issues.     These  issue: 
involved voting in the 
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Security Council  and   the wording of the   charter.    Smuts posed the fol- 
lowing questions regarding unanimity  in  the United Nations in a letter 
on June 7,   1945  to Edward R.  Stettinius,  Head of the United States dele- 
19 
gation to U.N.O.       He asked,   suppose the Great Powers could not agree  in 
diagnosing a  threat  to peace and   in prescribing the measures to deal with 
it?    Should  all  action be held  up until unanimity was reached?    That 
raised the highly volatile  issue of the veto,  on which differences of 
opinion existed,   at  first between the British and Americans and,  later 
on, between  the British  and Americans on one side and the Russians on 
the other.    On this   issue Smuts was not merely an observer.    In his 
letter to Stettinius  Smuts stated: 
I would not  appeal   to  the representatives of the Big Five to give 
us  an answer,   one way or the other.     If they cannot,  then we would 
a k them to  suggest   some way out,  some procedure to remove  the 
ioc    anVsaveSche  conference  from failure    from Jeing jbaodojje 
at   this  late  stage.   ...    We cannot   face the world with a complete 
failure.     The  consequences would be  too disastrous. 
At  the Yalta  conference of February  1945  it had been agreed that 
decisions of  the Security Council of the   future World Organization on 
matters of precedure  should require an affirmative vote of seven of the 
eleven members   including  the concurring votes of the permanent members; 
the United States,   the Soviet Union, Great  Britain, France,  and China. 
At San Francisco an attempt was made by some of  the lesser powers  to 
K^O  "from all arrangements relating 
exclude the veto of  the permanent members     from ai 
» „»- at least,  from discussions 
to the peaceful  settlement of disputes,    or at 
of disputes by  the Security Council as distinct  from investigation of 
such disputes.     A crisis  developed on June  2 when the Soviet representa- 
tive insisted   that   the permanent members must possess a veto ove> 
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matters before the Security Council.    On June  13 the Yalta formula was 
21 
adopted and   included  in the Charter of the United Nations on June 26. 
On grounds  of constitutional principle,   Smuts considered  the 
Soviet Union's claim totally  unfounded.    Earlier, in a long letter to 
Churcliill  on September  20,   1944 he   advised acceptance on the grounds of 
political necessity.     In his   letter Smuts depicted the Soviet Union as 
a pariah  in  the past and was  likely  to behave  as one in the future unless 
she received   satisfaction.     "Should a world organization be formed with- 
out Russia," he argued,   "she will become the power centre of another 
22 
group.    We  shall  then be heading towards a third world war." 
In other words,  he thought   it necessary   to pay a high price in 
terms of constitutional principle   in order  to entice Soviet Union  into 
the United Nations,    whether  he was  right or wrong, his intervention 
produced a  strong effect  upon  Churchill.    On September 25,   1944 Churchill 
showed Smuts's   letter to President   Roosevelt. The Smuts  letter reads: 
At first  I   thought Russian attitude absurd  and their contention 
one not  to be  conceded by other  great Powers and inevitably to be 
turned down by smaller Powers also.    But second thoughts have 
tended  the other way.     I assume  that the Russian attitude  is  sin- 
cerely  stated by Mr.  Molotov and   correctly  interpreted by Moscow 
n    Cadogan as  one involving honor and  standing of »»*~*« 
her Allies.     She asks whether she  is trusted .and treated as an 
equal or   is  still an outlaw and Pariah.    A ""^""^"S^ 
is more  than a more difference.     It touches  Russian SS^ BE2BEJ 
and produces an  inferiority complex and might poison ^opean rela 
tions with   far-reaching results.     Russia consciou    of her power may 
become more grasping  than ever      Her making no att m t  to find^a 
solution shows her reaction and  sense of power. .  .. as 
for the Powers   is adopted  even including their voting o    q 
directly  concerning  their   interests, the result »«W * g* £ 
United Kingdom and  the United States be mod  rate^nd .en. ^ 
not  to  flout world opinion.   .   ;•""".    o£ preventing action 
unanimity will only have the effect of a veto    o   p 
where  it may be wise or even necessary. ^JT"^ for Russia 
slow down  action but   it will  also make it  **>£*£ "^ and 
to embark on activities disapproved of by the 
the United  States.24 
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No doubt  this memorandum played  some part in encouraging reappraisals 
25 
and compromises of Yalta and,   consequently,   in bringing about U.N.O. 
Prior  to  the San Francisco Conference,   Smuts made a second note- 
worthy  intervention.     On April 4,   1945 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
convened   in London  to discuss,  among other issues,   the proposals for 
the Charter which the   experts had drafted at   Dumbarton Oaks in August- 
September  1944  and  the  further proposals which the politicians had 
agreed upon at Yalta in February 1945.     Smuts praised their work but 
still found  something lacking  in the draft charter.     In a statement to 
the South African Delegation on April 24 he said that the charter was 
too legalistic   in tone.     It needed  such words  as to make the common man 
feel that  the  charter was not merely a piece of machinery but  something 
26 
truly great. 
At  this Commonwealth Prime Minsters Conference Smuts drafted an 
27 
eloquent  declaration of humanity's hopes  and faith.        The conference 
of Prime Ministers agreed   that  this would make  a noble preamble to the 
charter.    Perhaps  the members of the  conference   felt  the preamble was 
too noble  and not  quite  consistent   in style and   contents with the rest 
of Che charter.     Whatever  the reason,   the prime mincers and  their ad- 
visers combined Smuts's draft with  the draft of Sir Charles Webster, 
28 
though it  continued  to bear   the name of Smuts. 
In deference  to the diplomatic proprieties,  the new draft began ^ 
by identifying the High  Contracting Parties subscribing to  the charter.   ^ 
At San Francisco,  American idealists   such as Dean Virginia Gildersleeve, 
complained  that   the Smuts draft,  as  it was called, lacked  in emphasis on 
31 . i      twisted   in her  book,  deserved 
humanity.       The  aspirations  of humanity,   she insisted  in 
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better treatment.       She proposed the opening words--"We the peoples of 
the United Nations   ..."    Her proposal was adopted, but  the closing 
sentences  of the Preamble  left no doubt at all that it was  the govern- 
ments    not   the peoples of  the United Nations, who were the  creators of 
the charter  and   the  subscribers  to it. 
Smuts'8   idealistic  initiative produced consequences  that were 
detrimental  to himself and  to South Africa.    His initiative introduced 
"fundamental human rights"  into the politics of the United Nations. 
The San Francisco Conference proved  to be the last  international meet- 
ing v:hich Smuts attended with his reputation still untarnished by the 
racial attitudes   imputed to  his  country and to himself as   its Prime 
Minister.    As President of  the Commission on  the General Assembly and 
as a respected  elder  statesman he was able several times to guide the 
conference over minor  problems such as   the. regulation of the length of 
time  to be  allotted   for routine  items of business  in the General Assembly. 
Neither he nor any other person, however, would have been able to alter 
a document   that had been so meticulously prepared. 
During the   last   five years of his  life,  from 1945 until 1950, 
Smuts worked  and  spoke  publicly for the  success of the United Nations. 
Though he took an active part   in setting up this new league  of nations 
at San Francisco he realized   the rather   limited roletoth South Africa 
and Western Europe would play   in the post-war world. 
The political,   social,   and economic changes following the war's 
end could only  injure  Smuts   in  the eyes of his political enemies in South 
Africa.    The  collapse  of Europe,  the expansion of Communism,   the decline 
33 
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of Britain and   the  commonwealth had been  foretold by the opposition in 
South Africa.    From the very beginning of the war to its  end,   the 
Nationalist Party reiterated  its   call to South Africa to seek her own 
safety by making a separate peace and by withdrawal from the cominon- 
35 
wealth. 
Smuts did not believe that  safety lay along that route.    He fore- 
saw the attempts  that would be made  to isolate South Africa.    He could 
not foresee any  gain South Africa could get by setting out  to isolate 
herself.     According to  the reasoning of Smuts,   the policy to follow 
was for South Africa  to keep the  friends he had,  to support them in 
their efforts  to rebuild   their strength.    On July 29,   1945 he wrote: 
Unfortunately my official position closes my mouth,  and I  can- 
not  give the  warnings I  think are called  for.    And I may even take 
an exaggerated view of  impending dangers.    But I was not wrong in 
1919-23,  and  I think the dangers   today are,   if possible,  greater 
as Russia is more ruthless and   inexperienced in dealing with such 
situations  than Britain and France were twenty-five *•*••£». 
All one   can do is   to put on one's  thinking cap    and «*««•«* 
opportunities of being helpful as may occur in the future.    Here 
in South Africa I   shall be held up as one of the warmongers who 
elped   to precipitate  these evils on mankind!    Andthe charge ha 
a certain measure  of plausibility which will go down,  as  it did in 
1922-24.36 
Smuts's public statements during this period indicate his open- 
minded view of Soviet Russia's aims. He regarded Russia as a continental 
power which pursued limited objectives that were dangerous; but he be- 
lieved that the dangers could be contained by a realpolitik compounded 
of patience and firmness. For that reason he repudiated the anti-com- 
munist crusade but welcomed   the American return to an active policy in 
r -  i,„„rfra still to retain sole custody Europe.    He   thought  it  necessary   for America stin 
„th*r shield for western Europe, 
of the atomic bomb.    He  could see no other shield 
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He considered   the polarization of power between America and Russia 
37 
however, a dangerous   threat  to peace. 
In  1945  Smuts   seemed  to be returning to his vision two years 
earlier of  the commonwealth's role as mediator within the "trinity" of 
Great Powers but   this  vision no  longer had substance.    Smuts observed 
the unmistakable  retreats of Great  Britain as an Imperial Power.    In 
the eastern Mediterranean, which had been a special interest of his 
own in two world wars,   he  found  those retreats hard to bear.     For him 
the Jewish National Home remained,   as   it had always been,  one of his 
great  causes.     On November 30,   1947 when the partition plan of the 
United Nations  special   committee on Palestine was passed by the general 
assembly,  Chalm Wcizmann,   the Zionist  leader,   sent Smuts the following 
telegram. 
At  this milestone   in Jewish history I think with  feelings of 
deepest  gratitude of your noble  friendship and unwavering support 
throughout  the years   from 1917 onward  for  the cause of my people. 
May God bless you and guard you.38 
In a public telegram to Weizmann on March 29,   1948,  Smuts urged him to 
39 
accept  the partition of Palestine. 
Though  Smuts  lamented  the dissolution of the old British empire 
he clung to his   faith  that  a new Britain would arise with a new role  to 
play in the drama of human history.    At  this time  (1947-1948)   Smuts be- 
lieved   that Great   Britain and   the commonwealth had before them a brilliant 
prospect of self-fulfillment within  the  larger setting of history.    It 
was the year of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.    Smuts wel- 
comed these events  both   for what  they were and  for the creative  promise 
which he read   into   them.     In a letter to George Marshall, Smuts reiterated 
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his desire "that   the Truman-Mar shall policy of security and recovery in 
40 
Europe will remain of full   force and effect." 
At the  same  time Smuts had written Churchill about policy matters 
relating to Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe and Western Germany's 
integration with   the West.     To Churchill he stated: 
I  almost hesitate to have to  confess  it, but I am beginning to think 
more and more   that the wise course for us is boldly and openly to 
integrate Western Germany with the West,  and,   instead of continuing 
to dismantle   and cripple her,   to put her on her feet again and make 
her part  of our eastern defence wall,  as  she has been for  centuries. 
With the present weakness of the European situation,  I  see no 
way out of  the Communist menace  short of calling on Germany to play 
her part.41 
Smuts welcomed American participation into the affairs of Western 
Europe.    He acclaimed them as  the augury of a three-fold achievement: 
first,   the Atlantic Community;   secondly, European Union;   thirdly, 
Co^onwealth Europe.    He  thought   it   inconceivable that Britain and  the 
commonwealth would   let  slip   this opportunity of union with Europe. 
Realising  that no government  or  institution could achieve world 
stability single-handed,   Smuts  invoked the principle of  cooperation to 
which he had  devoted to much of his   life.    He was doubtless encouraged 
to do so by events   in 1948,  when  the Western European governments   for.cd, 
first,   the Organisation  for  European Economic Recovery,   then,   led  by 
Churchill,  set  up   the consultative Council of Europe, and,  finally, 
created   the North  Atlantic Treaty Organisation which included  the United 
M-,r*hall Aid to such European 
States, whoso 80V.rm.-t offered generous Marshall 
states a, shouid  seeh cioser economic and pos.fhly, politfea. onion a-»e 
*™.W...    „„« his last advice to the United Kinedo„, stiU hoider 
of the kev position in a ahn.en „orid, «, to pnU herseif toother and 
•ted States,  and democratic Europe, 
cooperate with the   commonwealth,  the Uni 
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Following his last appearance on the world stage  in June 1945 
when he attended  the San Francisco Conference, Smuts  turned his interest 
and activities  toward South African politics.    By 1947-1948 Smuts's 
political alliance with  the Nationalists had come apart.    By naming the 
hated  lihcral Jan H.  Hofmeyr Deputy Prime Minister and by recognizing 
the Slate of  Israel,  he  risked   a general election in May 1948. By this 
time his political base had been  completely undermined by the Nationalists, 
who were led  by Daniel F.  Malan.    Malan reassured English-speaking electors 
by temporarily putting aside Nationalist plans  for a republic and by 
promising to deprive Africans of their representation  in Parliament and 
the Cap.' Provincial   Council.     In  the ensuing election Smuts lost his own 
seat and the Nationalists   gained  a majority of five  in Parliament.     Smuts 
found a seat  at Pretoria  East and made up his mind to fight to the  last 
as in the South African War.    His political   career was, however,  virtually 
finished,   and  his life's work of   conciliation doomed when Malan broke 
with the  70-year-old   tradition of mixed Anglo-Afrikaner ministries by 
appointing an   exclusively Afrikaner Cabinet and embarking tentatively on 
a policy of apartheid,  or racial  separation. 
As leader of  the Opposition Smuts actively campaigned on behalf 
of his South African Party.     He drove himself to still  greater exertions, 
often traveling long distances by  air,   including several  trips to Great 
Britain.    On April 24,   1950 he attended a huge open-air  celebration of his 
eightieth birthday at   Johannesburg.    He received the Freedom of the City 
and made his last public appearance at  a banquet  in Pretoria, 
later, on May 28, he  suffered a mild  coronary thrombosis.    His health 
steadily worsened with   further attacks and on September  11 he collapsed 
with heart  failure and never recovered. 
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The   family  declined Prime Minister Malan's offer of a state 
funeral and  instead  chose a military funeral.    They scattered his 
ashes on the rocky hillside near his beloved home Doornkloof. 
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CHATTER VII 
JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS:    AN ASSESSMENT 
The ease with which Smuts could associate with different people, 
especially in his later years, was based on real understanding and   in- 
sight,.    He achieved  a personal harmony, apart  from political views and 
policies,  that  penetrated   to  the great leaders of the world, as well 
as 10 humbler  friends.    Among these were Alice Clark, Margaret Cillett, 
finily Hobhuuse,   Gilbert Murray, Louis Botha, Winston Churchill, Jan 
Hofmeyr, Paul Kruger, Woodrow Wilson,  David Lloyd George, Leopold Amery, 
Franklin Roosevelt,   and many others. 
A.; a South African,  he was  a natural aristocrat, yet a man of 
the people;  an   Intellectual  giant,  yet  a son of the soil; an inter- 
preter of Nature,   yet  • nan who understood  the simplest of human beings. 
He stood   for .South Africa first,  but  not South Africa alone. 
Smuts the   statesman was also the philosopher and scientist.    In 
his philosophical work,  Holism and Evolution, his conception of the 
potertlalitics of nan   is analyzed and discussed with a wide-ranging 
tolerance. 
In mind we reach  the- most   significant factor in the unive™e,  the 
supreme organ which  controls all other structures and>»»*•»*"»• 
Mind  is not yet   the master,  but  it  is the key xn the hands of the 
ouster, Personality.    It unlocks the door and "leases the nw 
born spirit  from the bonds  and  shackles and dungeons of »«tuial 
necessity.     It   is   the  supreme  system of control    and "*»"*"" 
secret of freedom.     Through  the opened door,  and the .lets *i* 
Still dim the   eyes  of  the emergent  spirit,   it points to the great 
Vistas of knowledge.    Mind   is the eye with which the un.v.rsc i» 
holds  itself and knows   itself divine. 
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From 1914   to 1916 Smuts was  regarded as one of the foremost 
allied   leaders   in Europe,   and his  advice to British governments was 
treated with  the   greatest  respect.     Again, during the Second World 
War Churchill  and others  called upon Smuts  to give advice and companion- 
ship on matters  of great  importance.    Yet,  at one time or another, 
throughout his   career,  feeling sometimes ran high against him in his 
native   South Africa.    His  unrelenting nationalist critics spoke out 
at every opportunity and ultimately  succeeded in undermining his base 
of strength.    Leaders in Europe,  especially David Lloyd George, Leopold 
S. Amery,  and Winston Churchill  told him that Europe needed him and his 
future  belonged   to  the whole world,   not just South Africa. 
There are   clearly three different aspects of Smuts's life-work 
as a statesman.     First, he  tried  to build bridges between South Africa 
and Great Britain,   a formidable  task,   in view of the recent experiences 
of the Afrikaners   in the South African War.    Second, he  tried to bridge 
the gulf  between  the English and Afrikaner elements in South Africa; 
the adoption of the Act of  the Union bears  testimony to his zeal  in his 
direction.    Third,   he tried   to work out a cooperative basis  for the rela- 
tions between white  and non-whites,   but he did not get much beyond  a 
theory. 
As  an ambassador of South African interests  in Great Britain, 
he was by  far  the  best man  for  the work.    He had a natural  capacity  for 
persuading people,   and exorcised  it   to a higher degree in Europe than 
he did  among his  am people   in South Africa.    Circumstances there gave 
him his   opportunity,   and he  made   skillful  use  of  his  chances.     Kitchener's 
early hint   to him about the probable  advent of a Liberal Government  proved 
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very important, and provided a turning point  in British-South African 
postwar negotiations.     Ho  could not  identify himself to a large extent 
with British  policy;   and he pointed out  that all his life he had striven 
for the principle of  liberty,  as opposed to the repressive politics of 
totalitarian-minded men.    He seemed  to fit naturally into the British 
context,   and was more  and more given positions of trust  and authority. 
In the First World War he was offered a position on the British War 
Cabinet.    He  seemed   to make   friends  easily and  found everywhere con- 
genial  colleagues.    When overseas,  he was away from the smallness,   sus- 
picions,   frustrations of party politics—to him,  a welcome relief.    No- 
body could have done more   for good relations between Great Britain and 
South Africa. 
He had   fought   for  South Africa's status at  the peace conference 
and placed   it   on an  equal   footing with  that of Britain.    He claimed  that 
South Africa had  achieved   a  greater   status  by becoming  a member  of  the 
League of Nations.     To Smuts   there was safety for South Africa in the 
wholeness of the British Empire and  the privileges South Africa had 
gained by the very  fact  that   the empire remained an elastic and expand- 
ing institution,  offering advantages  in proportion as cooperation and 
undemanding prevailed.    An empire on a new footing was  coming into 
being,  and  Smuts  saw advantages   in  this  for South Africa.    And so,  at a 
time when many  overseas politicians were willing to condone the right 
of secession,   Smuts  stood out  against   it. 
Yet,  he   could have  combined his conception of South African 
nationhood,   for which he had  fought  many battles against  the Imperialists, 
with an open door to  the development of secession.    His position was  so 
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strong In Europe,  after all his services, that he could have persuaded 
the overseas  politicians,   and won over   the opposition inside South Africa. 
Independent development,  approached with care and wisdom, was a natural 
feature of the  principle of growth within the Empire,and should not 
have become a means of  inflaming racial   hatred.    The people needed 
education and  encouragement,   based on a positive appreciation for South 
Africa.    Smuts  should  have  demonstrated   that this appreciation could be 
combined with  the position of South Africa as  an equal  independent state 
within the commonwealth• 
The Afrikaner was  not  prepared   for "fusion."    He had struggled 
for many y»ars   to demonstrate his individuality, and  the right  to develop 
his own  language.     It   had been a hard  struggle,  the cultural depth of 
which Smuts  never understood,   in his preoccupation with imperial policies. 
The Afrikaner,  who had   grown  up with the  "superior attitude" of his 
English fellow citizens   in regard to his   culture, and had  listened to 
derogatory remarks about Afrikans, was   filled with fear that  larger 
imperial  contacts would   lead   to   the swamping of the Afrikaner  tradition. 
The Afrikaner,   therefore, believed  that   separate development,   for that 
ooment of time,  was   the  only  safe road. 
Looking at General Smuts'  political  career as a whole, we «y say 
that he  finally rejected British  imperialism, but had  to express his views 
tentatively,   step by step.    What  he wanted most was tne unity of Southern 
afrika,   including Rhodesia—   task obviously for the distant future. 
There are  two aspects  of Smuts'   personality that appear to be 
partly in  conflict.     On   the one hand there  is the lonely student who, by 
„r   rhe  highest distinctions   in 
sheer  intellectual  ability, won  seme oi   cne nig' 
214 
England, step by  step.     He was  an Afrikaner with the natural  reactions 
of a son of the veld, but with a flair  for hard work and for using the 
opportunities presented   in  the  interest of South Africa.    He never be- 
came a full-fledged Englishman;   at the end of his  life he  felt   it a re- 
lease to return  to his  family at Doornkloof.    His sympathy with Great 
Britain was  condemned by many of his own countrymen; but he believed 
that his services  to Britain would help South Africa. 
On the  other hand,   there was the mighty British Empire, with 
its enormous prestige,   extending a hand of welcome—partly in its own 
interests—to  a young Boer who had  fought against Great Britain.    What 
a great opportunity that was   for  the young Boer.    President Paul Kruger 
had had  the  insight  to employ Smuts,  and Smuts was  loyal   to him.    He 
shared   the President's attitude  to British Imperialism and reacted 
sharply to the political maneuvers connected with it.    He felt deeply 
for Kruger and  threw himself whole-heartedly into the struggle.     He 
initiated and brilliantly  conducted the invasion of the Cape towards 
the end  of the war.     But, when,   after a surprisingly long struggle 
•gaiMt   the might   of Britain,   the Boers had to give  in, he had  the fore- 
sight  to see that   the most profitable way for the Republic,   in the in- 
terests of greater  South Africa, was to cooperate. 
Smuts looked  ahead  to   the   time when the help given would be a 
benefit   to South Africa by  increasing her status.    He looked also at 
the Allies and   saw beyond  their  idealistic talk that  each was working 
for its own advancement.     He  sympathized with the moral aspirations of 
his ()uak,r   friends,   the Gilletts of Oxford,  but  also appreciated  the 
hard  facts of politics. 
215 
In Smuts's philosophy of holism, one message stands out--a mes- 
sage of perfection,   building up and   leading to still greater perfection, 
of fragments  leading  to wholes which are  superior  to the mere sum total 
2 
of their  constituent  parts.     It is  a doctrine of optimism and elevation. 
Smuts's philosophy of holism,  on its political  side, was particularly 
applicable to Southern Africa.    He believed  that the lower part of the 
continent   could best  be administered  by the people who actually lived 
there.     Smuts would   have  liked  to include Rhodesia,  and he made two 
efforts to persuade   its  leaders.    But he had had no ambitions beyond 
stability;  his   cause was not on the  same footings as "the scramble  for 
Africa." 
But  a difference arose  in regard to the non-whites.    Here Smuts 
held the  traditional Afrikaner view.     He was kindly in his attitude. 
Overseas he  sat  by many distinguished  non-whites and had good  friends 
among them.    But   in  the South African  context he supported  the tradition 
of separate development,   and  insisted  that  in the circumstances it was 
the only practical policy.     For reasons of practical politics he never 
adopted  the views  of British  liberals  on matters  like  the franchise. 
But he did  not   favor   laws   that were  to  stand   for all time;   there was 
always  to be an element of elasticity.    He was a practical politician, 
accustomed   to estimate   the  course to be followed   in a particular situa- 
tion at a particular  time,   but he always tried to avoid dogmatic pro- 
nouncements. 
Holism,   therefore, was  limited   for Smuts politically by the 
circumstances of  the  situation  in South Africa.     But  in shared  ideals 
there were no such  limits.     His  letters   to friends  in Oxford show this 
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clearly,   especially the  letters  to Alice Clark.    Her world of spiritual 
values was very real  to him,  and genuine.    He understood that  the phi- 
losophy of   the whole would  remain unrealized, because it was perhaps 
unrealizable.     But   it was  something to aim at,  a light  to give direction; 
fraught with  frustration,  but deeply  embedded,  as a hope for  the future. 
Smuts's reputation remains  intact and  all  the more admirable, 
in spite of  the difficulties  in a country like South Africa.    Smuts's 
job, after   all, was to do what was possible in a particular society 
with particular people,   and  one should try to respect his judgment. 
He was prepared  to modify existing arrangements   in the liberal direc- 
tion, when  he   saw an opportunity.     Dogmatism on ultimate principles, 
he foresaw,   as   the political  danger;   the rigid mind,  in this changing 
rarld, docs  not   lead   to wisdom.     But  unfortunately  the mind that  is pre- 
pared, with wisdom,   to adapt   itself to  the future, drives the extremists 
into a panic.     The achievement of a balanced outlook is difficult be- 
cause it  invariably exposes  people   to distrust and  criticism;  but that 
outlook was   the  aim of Jan Christian Smuts,  and  the extent to which he 
achieved  it   is his  title   to  fame. 
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NOTES 
lj.   C.   Srauts,  Holism and  Evolution (New York:    MacMillan Company, 
1926), p.   238. 
2Jan Christian Smuts,   p.   287. 
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